Mission Command and Intelligent Disobedience
Major General Robert Ross and the Burning of Washington (1814)
Capt Simon Lash AGC(SPS), CAL Senior Research Fellow
Never tell people how to do things.
Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.
Gen George Patton
Mission Command is founded on the principle of responsibility, unity of command, freedom of action, trust, shared understanding, and the responsibility to act to achieve the superior commander’s intent. In 2024, the Centre of Army Leadership published Mission Command and Leadership on Operations Since 1991,(1) which immediately brought to my mind the example of Major General Robert Ross, the land commander responsible for the capture of Washington D.C. in August 1814. This CAL Leadership Insight examines Gen Ross’s decisions during the days leading up to and including the capture of Washington and considers whether he was an exemplar of the application of Mission Command.
Background
Britain had been embroiled in war with the USA since June 1812 as the colonies aimed at decreasing British influence in North America, including British North America (Canada). With its focus directed towards defeating Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe, Britain initially committed meagre forces to defend Canada and, until the war in Europe ended, it relied mainly on the Royal Navy to disrupt American forces on the US Eastern seaboard and the Chesapeake. With victory in the Peninsular War and the abdication of Bonaparte in April 1814, however, Britain was able to send a sizeable force to North America to end the war. Maj Gen Robert Ross, a Fusilier and veteran of North Africa, Holland (during the Anglo-Russian invasion) and the Peninsular War, was chosen to lead one of the divisions.(2) In June 1814, Ross set sail for the USA. Once at sea, he opened his orders from Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. The orders Ross received were as follows:
Sir, it having been judged expedient to effect a division on the Coasts of the United States of America in favour of the Army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada, Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane has received instructions to direct a squadron to proceed with a detachment of troops and a detachment of marines towards those places on the coast where it may appear to him most advisable that a descent should be made. And His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, confiding in your valour, enterprise and direction has been graciously pleased to commit to you command of the troops in such operations as you may judge it expedient when on shore to undertake. In addition, to the force which may have been placed under your orders previous to your departure from the Gironde, you will on your arrival at Bermuda take under your command one other regiment of British infantry and one company of artillery which have been directed to proceed thither from the Mediterranean for that purpose. The amount of force which will thus be placed under your command [three regiments of infantry with a proportion of artillery, one regiment of infantry and one company of artillery and one battalion of Royal Marines with a proportion of Royal Artillery] will sufficiently point out to you that you are not to engage in any extended operation at a distance from the coast. If, in any descent, you shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten the inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby authorised to levy upon them contributions in return for your forbearance. (3)
1 Risso, Linda (ed.), Mission Command and Leadership on Operations Since 1991 – AC 72278 (Camberley: Centre for Army Leadership, 2024).
2 The Division comprised of the 4th, 21st, 44th and 85th (LI) Regiments of Foot. Supported by Royal Marines, Colonial Marines and Artillery.
3 As quoted in The National Archives, The Day the White House Burned, 26 August 2014.
The orders allowed Maj Gen Ross to apply what today we call Mission Command. The Orders described the Lord Bathurst’s intent and were not prescriptive about specific steps and objectives. However, they still did provide some boundaries to action. At a time in which speed of communication was slow and potentially unreliable, it was not unusual for orders to be far less prescriptive than what we are used to today. The overarching intent was the driver of all commanders’ decisions and action.
Considering his Orders, Ross may have taken away some key points: Vice Admiral Cochrane had overall command as to where the troops would land; Ross had command of the troops once they were on land and had freedom to conduct operations; Ross was ordered not to engage in extended operations at a distance from the coast; finally, Ross could apply contributions in lieu of destruction of property if he felt it was necessary to advance the cause and achieved Lord Bathurst’s intent.
What is not in these orders is the analysis of the wider military and diplomatic context in which Ross was expected to operate. Crucially, Ross was aware of Lord Bathurst’s intent to draw US forces from the Canadian border to put pressure on the US Government and to expedite treaty negotiations, which were occurring at the same time. (4) He knew that he had to put as much pressure as he could on his adversary without appearing cruel or unnecessarily vengeful.
The diagram below shows the Chain of Command under which Ross operated and – given the different intents of Bathurst and Cochrane – the root of the predicament in which Ross would soon find himself.
The attack on Washington
Arriving in theatre in late July 1814, Ross and his men were sea weary and required time on land. Upon their arrival, Cochrane, Ross and Cockburn devised a joint sea and land operation to capture and destroy a flotilla commanded by Commodore Joshua Barney, an American Navy Officer, that had been harassing the British. According to their plan, Ross would march his division along the coastline and Cockburn would sail a squadron up the Patuxent River, a combined operation. On 22 August, Ross and Cockburn reached Pig Point where Barney’s flotilla was believed to be moored only to find that the ships had already been scuttled. Needing rest, Ross moved the division to the nearby small town of Upper Marlborough, from where he decided to attack Washington.
Ross’s decision is interesting as it served his orders but at the same time conflicted with them. It served the Orders as they stated, ‘commit to you command of the troops in such operations as you may judge it expedient when on shore to undertake.’ However, they also clearly said, ‘you are not to engage in any extended operation at a distance from the coast.’ At this point, Ross was already separated from the main fleet, which was some 20 miles South. This could already be construed as ‘distance from the coast’. (5)
Having made the decision to march towards Washington, notice was sent to Vice Admiral Cochrane informing him of the plan. A response was sent to Ross informing him that the action was not sanctioned and ordered him to return to the fleet at Benedict. However, in the early morning of 24 August, Ross and his division headed towards Bladensburg and Washington. Ross officially disobeyed an order from a superior commander.
Bearing in mind that Mission Command as a concept was not codified at the time of Ross and that it was not applied in eighteenth and early nineteenth century warfare as it would be today, it is nevertheless interesting to reflect on the possible reasons behind Ross’s decision to take the initiative. Ross focused on Lord Bathurst’s intent and assessed what course of action would have allowed Bathurst to be in the best position to achieve it. Ross’s orders gave him latitude to do so, and he used his judgement to force the US into surrendering or at least to move forces away from the northern border to protect the Eastern coast and waterways, which could give Lord Bathurst an advantage.
Today, AC 72202 states that, Mission Command ‘requires a decentralised system of command that allows subordinates freedom of action within their commander’s overall intent. Mission command tells a commander’s subordinates what to achieve and why, but not how.’ (point 2-48). The doctrine is clear, and today’s commanders would not to be in any doubt about whose intent they must meet. At that time, however, Mission Command had not been codified and it was possible for Ross to believe that his decision to execute Lord Bathurst’s intent was the right one. While Ross was subordinate in rank to Cochrane, he had received orders by the superior commander (Bathurst), which gave him command – and therefore freedom of action – when on land. Ross seized an opportunity, based on his understanding of the situation at the time and the overall intent of his mission.
Ross reached Bladensburg (6 miles north-west of Washington) around midday on 24 August. Facing a US force of about 8,000 men, Ross engaged with the enemy and after several hours was successful in forcing a US withdrawal. His next objective: Washington. Arriving at the outskirt of the city, he halted for a short period and then entered the city under a flag of truce. (6) His intention was to negotiate the surrender of the American capital with the aim of securing a ‘contribution’ in exchange for the safety of the city. To his surprise, though, no one came to arrange terms. Instead, Ross and his accompanying men were shot at, with two being mortally wounded and his beloved horse, Roslin, being shot from underneath him.
Firing on a party under a flag of truce was considered callous, particularly by European powers – but this was not Europe! This is where Ross made another decision upon which it is worth reflecting. He ordered to burn down the building from where he and his men had been fired at. After returning musket shot, the building was destroyed by fire. Once informed of the events, Cockburn was adamant that the city should be destroyed and Ross’s Orders gave him permission to do just that (‘you shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten the inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby authorised to levy upon them contributions in return for your forbearance’). (7) Instead, however, Ross declared that no retribution against the civilian population was to take place and that troops who disobeyed that order would be punished. (8) He did however give the order to burn public property that enabled the US Army and government to function, which was now seen as being ‘free game’ as no contribution had been negotiated to spare them.
At the time, the fact that no contribution had been paid being and that troops been fired at under a flag of truce would been considered justifiable reasons to burn both public and private buildings. Instead, Ross gave the order to burn only the public buildings. Many important Government buildings, including the White House and the Capitol were damaged, which had a strong demoralising impact on the American troops. (9) This is an excellent example of Ross’s assessment of the wider impact that his orders would have on the ground and on the wider conflict. Although Ross had latitude to go on a rampage in Washington, he showed restrain. Similarly, when it came to burning the Marine barracks, locals pleaded with him no to burn them as they were located too close to private dwellings. Well within his remit to burn any building that enabled the war effort, Ross agreed not to burn the barracks as this would have affected civilians and possibly caused casualties, which would have reflected badly on him, his soldiers, and the Army as a whole. (10)
5 Gleig George Robert, The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans in the years 1814-15 (1836).
6 At this point the division was comprised of 3 Brigades. The reserve was the third Brigade comprised of the 21st Regiment, Artillery and Marines/Colonial Marines.
7 Joel Achenbach, “In 1814, British forces burned the U.S. Capitol”. Washington Post, 6 Jan 21.
8 National Park Service, Robert Ross. 7 December 2022.
9 Guide to the Robert Ross Papers, 1813-1873. Special Collections. Research Center, Estelle and Melvin Gelman Library at George Washington University.
10 Vogel, Steve. Through the Perilous Fight: From the Burning of Washington to the Star-Spangled Banner: The Six Weeks That Saved the Nation (New York: Random House, 2014).
Conclusion
This short summary of Ross’s actions and decisions in the summer of 1814 open interesting questions about the challenges that the application of Mission Command has for military leaders. Although operating in different historical conditions, when Mission Command was not codified, Ross fully understood the broad intent of his chain of command. However, due to the realities of communications at the time, he was not fully informed about the latest developments. He relied on his own knowledge and understanding of the situation to strike at the very seat of power in America with the goal of ending the war. Focusing on achieving the best outcome for Lord Bathurst, Ross was confident in showing both initiative and restraint.
Ross captured the initiative and successfully took the capital city. Although he was in a position in which he could have inflicted severe damage, he assessed the long-term impact that this course of action would have on the wider diplomatic context and measured it against the more limited tactical advantages that this would bring to him in the short term. He therefore opted for restraint. It has been argued that for as a result, British Prisoners of War were treated humanely. (11)
11 McCavitt, John, and Christopher T. George. The Man Who Captured Washington: Major General Robert Ross and the War of 1812 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016).
Questions
- How has technology changed Mission Command at the tactical level?
- To what extent does Mission Command require followership?
- How can the the philosophy of Mission Command be applied in the workplace/at staff and in barracks?
- Is there a tendency to focus on the mission/task rather than the intent? Why?
Resources
ADP: Land Operations (2022)/AC 72202, Part 2: The Application of Land Power, Chapter 2.
Gleig George Robert, The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans in the years 1814-15 (1836). McCavitt, John, and Christopher T. George. The Man Who Captured Washington: Major General Robert Ross and the War of 1812 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016).
Risso, Linda (ed.), Mission Command and Leadership on Operations Since 1991 – AC 72278 (Camberley: Centre for Army Leadership, 2024). Vogel, Steve. Through the Perilous Fight: From the Burning of Washington to the Star-Spangled Banner: The Six Weeks That Saved the Nation (New York: Random House, 2014).