The Personality of Leadership

By Dr Chris Kempshall, CAL Senior Research Fellow

In March 1918, the allied cause faced potential disaster. The opening of the German Spring Offensive through Operation Michael had begun to force a wedge between the British and French armies and the defensives lines had started to give way with the American Expeditionary Forces not yet having arrived in sufficient numbers to make an active participation in the unfolding events.(1) In these circumstances it became clear to the assorted allied forces that the previous arrangement of each nation largely operating under its own autonomy without a unified commander was now untenable. A Supreme Commander was required. The two primary candidates for this position were both French generals: Ferdinand Foch and Phillippe Petain. The resulting decision to choose Foch was, certainly for the French President Georges Clemenceau, a seemingly easy one due in no small part to the differing personalities of the two men. In essence, Petain’s dour and pessimistic character and appraisal of the allied situation contrasted heavily. with Foch’s more optimistic and energetic personality.(2). The decision to select Foch was ultimately the correct one as he led the allied forces to eventual victory.

The different approaches and mentalities of Foch and Petain, and the notion that one is preferable to the other, is an important consideration both for historians and prospective leaders, especially those in the military. At what point is optimism seen as more beneficial than pessimism, and – given that neither Foch nor Petain in this instance would have believed themselves to be in the wrong – how do we reconcile them against the need for realism?

(1) David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 53–55; Chris Kempshall, British, French and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914-1918. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp.204-214.
(2)  Anthony Clayton, Paths of Glory: The French Army, 1914-1918 (London: Cassell Military, 2003), pp.165-6; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (London: Belknap, 2005), pp.437-8; Elizabeth Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War, Armies of the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.275-282; Kempshall, British, French and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914-1918., pp.214-5.
(3)For more on Foch, see: Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General, 2014.

From a morale point of view, it is generally accepted that the outward mood of the commander can have a marked impact on those under their command. Viscount Slim was particularly aware of this during the Burma campaign of the Second World War and later reflected on how he had tried to settle the nerves of those he led:

The situation was about as bad as it could be. It looked as if we would all be finished in a day or so. I thought, ‘I’ve got to put a good face on this’ so I stepped out of the tank and those fellows, a half dozen of them, just looked at me and I didn’t know what the hell to say, so thought, ‘I must say something’, so I said, ‘Well, gentlemen, it might be worse.’ There was one unspeakable fellow there who said ‘How?’ I could not think of what to say, so I said, ‘It might be raining!’ (4)

Whilst framed as levity, Slim was clearly attempting to exude a form of confidence that he did not necessarily feel but that would be valuable to those around him. In this instance even a semblance of optimism had benefits. The temptation might be then to consider optimism, both in the face of adversity and, more generally, to be the obvious default setting for a military leader. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery certainly believed that ‘the leader must have infectious optimism, and the determination to persevere in the face of difficulties’ and should also ‘radiate confidence’. (5)

There are however notable dangers to this approach. Appraisals of First World War generals have often viewed an abundance of optimism to be a criticism especially when it causes those same leaders to detach themselves from the reality of the situation. As Gary Sheffield has written about Field Marshal Douglas Haig, he was a man possessed of an ‘habitual optimism’. (6) This was a trait which had caused him issues even before the First World War and has helped provoke many of the most serious criticisms of his leadership. (7) Critiques of the decisions to continue operations at the Somme in the late autumn of 1916 and similarly around Passchendaele during the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 can both potentially be traced back to Haig’s optimism that a breakthrough was possible being seemingly at odds with the reality of the situation. (8)

(4) Field Marshal the Viscount William Slim, ‘Address by Field Marshal the Viscount Slim on 14 October 1952 to Officer Cadets of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst’, n.d., http://www.pnbhs.school.nz/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slim.pdf.
(5) Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery, The Path to Leadership (London: Collins, 1961), pp.11-12.
(6) Gary Sheffield, Douglas Haig: From the Somme to Victory (London: Aurum Press Ltd, 2016), p.121.
(7) Sheffield, Douglas Haig, pp.47 and 105.
(8) William Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (London: Little, Brown, 2009), chap. 11; Sheffield, Douglas Haig, pp.252-3.

Similarly, in 1917, General Robert Nivelle who was possessed of ‘a pleasant, open manner, an aggressive spirit and boundless self-confidence’ had charmed various French politicians and cultivated good relations with Haig before being elevated to be the Commander in Chief of the French army.9 What appears to have clinched the position for Nivelle was his optimism as ‘he let it be known that he had the formula for breaking the trench warfare deadlock and would be able to deliver success to a war-weary nation’. (10) The fact that his optimism and self-confidence were gravely misplaced resulted in an unmitigated disaster for the French army in 1917. (11) Not only were there heavy casualties amongst their soldiers, many survivors effectively mutinied against their leaders that they perceived to be wasting their lives. We must likely accept that an aspect of this response was rooted in having seemingly been lied to by Nivelle and his optimism regarding their chances in the offensive he had planned. These men would have to be ‘remobilised’ in order to further participate in the war. (12)

Interestingly what seems to have played a significant role in steadying the French ship during the dark days of 1917 was Petain’s own brand of concern for the men under his command mixed with a dose of realistic pessimism. He was a strict disciplinarian and his most obvious response to the disorder in the ranks were repressive controls and punishments, but he also appears to have paired a carrot with his stick that won over the men through the promise of no further costly offensives. (13) Whether the French soldiers would have agreed to any further offensives even if Petain had ordered them, as he was required to do in the immediate aftermath of Nivelle’s dismissal, is debatable but Petain’s pessimistic appraisal of the French military situation would likely have prevented him from forcing the issue even if had been so minded.

Optimism and the hope that it provides can be highly effective motivators in wartime, but they can also be perilously dangerous things when things go wrong. It does not take much – as in the case of 1917 – for those being led to rebel against their leaders for instilling in them false hope and optimism regarding a situation that did not warrant it. Similarly, Petain’s pessimism had no place in 1918 when the allies required a leader who believed that victory was attainable, but it did have value in 1917 in recognising that the situation was dire and that it needed to be addressed.

There are, therefore, numerous lessons for modern day leaders that can be taken from these examples. Optimism and pessimism can be found in many moments and both can have their uses when paired with the appropriate degree of realism and self-awareness. Viscount Slim’s quip in the face of adversity landed so well because the men around him were aware of the reality of their situation and Slim was not really pretending it was anything other than grave. Foch’s more optimistic tendencies rose to stem the crisis in 1918 because morale needed to be bolstered and command given to someone who believed that the Germans could not just be halted but, in the right circumstances, forced back the way they had come. His optimism proved not to be misplaced but it also slightly obscures the considerable military prowess he had collected over nearly four years of war. Petain was also a skilled commander, but if he was unable to convince the political leadership that victory was possible, he would not likely have faired much better with those under his command. In that sense his pessimism risked becoming self-perpetuating. Whereas his reluctance to force the issue was beneficial in 1917 he was not the man for 1918.

(9) Clayton, Paths of Glory, p.119.
(10) Clayton, Paths of Glory, p.119.
(11) For a more detailed examination of the events and specific failures of Nivelle’s offensive, see: Clayton, Paths of Glory, chap. 7; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, chap. 7; Jean-Yves Le Naour, 1917: La Paix Impossible (Paris: Perrin, 2015), chaps 3 & 4.
(12) Leonard V. Smith, ‘Remobilizing the Citizen-Soldier through the French Army Mutinies of 1917’, in State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War, ed. John Horne (Cambridge: CUP, 2002).
(13) Greenhalgh, The French Army, pp.207, 209-13.