

THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

SPRING 2024 / ISSUE #188

**FIGHT
TOGETHER,
TONIGHT AND
TOMORROW**

THE JOURNAL OF
BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT



ARMY

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ISSUE #188 / SPRING 2024

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SPOTLIGHT ON A 'BOND DEEPLY ROOTED' IN OUR HISTORIES

THIS co-authored edition of *The British Army Review* forms part of a series of initiatives across Defence to mark 120 years since the signing of the Entente Cordiale on 8th April 1904. It captures the spirit of our continued close cooperation in military thought, charting how we "Fight Together, Tonight and Tomorrow".

It was during the Crimean campaign in the mid-19th century that the UK and France found common ground after the upheaval of the post-revolutionary period and the early Napoleonic wars. In 1904, the Entente Cordiale consolidated Anglo-French relations bringing about a permanent alteration in Europe's strategic landscape that endured through two world wars and the challenges posed by our respective post-colonial campaigns.

With a land war raging in Europe and persistent instability across the Middle East and Africa, the importance of our strategic partnership cannot be overstated. Indeed,

it is difficult to pinpoint a time in our modern histories when co-operation between our two militaries has been of such importance, or with such potential to define an era.

As we develop our land forces to meet the challenges of today's strategic context, there is no other army with whom we have so much in common. Our histories are intertwined, we are neighbours with comparable ambition, underpinned by equally talented populations. It follows that the exchange of ideas offers a rare and unique opportunity that we must seize, from how to attract the very best of our respective nations to the acquisition of cutting-edge technology.

Our deep and mutual affection is evident at every level of our armies, from unit exchanges to deputy commanders at divisional level and with our chiefs. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Estonia, where a French infantry company operates within a UK battlegroup. This year will see the assignment of a French

battlegroup under 7th Light Mechanised Brigade Combat Team as part of the UK's Allied Response Force, building on the spirit of interoperability enshrined in the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. 2024 will therefore see the UK working as closely as ever with our principal European ally to make a substantive land contribution toward the re-establishment of deterrence in Europe.

Soldiers can have an aversion towards sentimentality, preferring to focus on the practical implications of our close cooperation. This superb edition of *The British Army Review* will, however, illustrate that today's close operational and institutional relationship is much more than a response to the current threat. Rather, it is the latest, natural evolution of a bond deeply rooted in our histories. This exchange of ideas, thinking and concepts is an impressive tribute to 120 years of partnership. I am deeply grateful to all those who have contributed. – **General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff**

FOREWORD: GENERAL PIERRE SCHILL

SEPTEMBER 1854. The French and British fleets land several thousands of soldiers on the coasts of Crimea to fight the expansionist impulses towards the Black Sea of a conquering Russia, led by Czar Nicholas I. The combined engagement of French and British troops against a common opponent represent a turning point: an era of fierce opposition was replaced by an era of operational cooperation. An anecdote illustrates this change in perspective: during Queen Victoria's state visit to Paris in 1855, the cadets of the Saint Cyr Military Academy wore on their hats (called shako) red and white feathers, the colours of the Queen. This tradition endures.

This understanding between soldiers is the prerequisite for the political agreement signed on 8th April 1904. Despite the jolts of history, this entente has never stopped expressing itself. In the darkest hours, loyalty never failed. 120 years after the signature of the Entente

Cordiale treaty in London, the international context has been marked by the return of war at the borders of Europe. The need for cooperation is growing. It induces a convergence of our efforts in the framework of NATO or of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, and the will to deepen mutual knowledge between the French and the British armies. They favour interoperability and make a common engagement more credible.

The British and French armed forces have a network of some 20 liaison and exchange officers. Integrated within the central administrations and the tactical units, they ensure the smooth exchange between the two armies on both sides of the Channel. Mutual reinforcements enable us to meet the operational engagements in the framework of the New Force Model. They will ensure the setting up of the Allied Reaction Force that the British and French Armies will respectively man in 2024 and 2026.

Common operational training carried out in the framework of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force makes the perspective of a combined operation more credible, as is the case with Operation Cabrit/Lynx in Estonia.

The 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale gives the opportunity to highlight the activities developed every year by both armies, be they operations outside the national territories, major exercises between units or training schools, or partnerships implemented by the regiments in the framework of the Bonds of Friendship.

Determined for British-French cooperation to be an asset for the defence of Europe, the French Army enthusiastically commits itself in this partnership with the British Army. Its ambition is embodied in a motto recalling the common objective: *Fight Together, Tonight and Tomorrow*. – **General Pierre Schill, Chief of the Army Staff France**



General Pierre Schill during a visit to London as the guest of General Sir Patrick Sanders in November 2023

FROM THE EDITOR

One hundred and twenty years on, the ‘Cordial Agreement’ to work together, to resolve our differences amicably, and to maximise our points of common interest remains as strong as ever – especially between the two armies of France and the United Kingdom. The two nations remain close – both in the inevitable geographic sense, but also in the senses of shared interest and shared friendship. But near neighbours do not always make the best of friends – just ask Volodymyr Zelensky, Yoon Suk Yeol or Tsai Ing-wen. That proximity can provoke problems will also not be lost on any of those who fought to liberate Kuwait, have walked Cyprus’ Green Line, served in Northern Ireland during The Troubles or spent even the briefest of time on operations in the Balkans.

Noting that your nearest frequently transpire not to be your dearest and given that the northeast of Dover and Cap Gris Nez are separated by just 20 miles of water, it is little wonder that the United Kingdom and France have, in the past, had their share of – often epic – fallings-out. Thankfully, as demonstrated by the articles in this dual language edition of *The British Army Review* (no mean feat for an editor with little recall of his GCSE French), relations between the two nations – and more pertinently their militaries – are now

characterised by cooperation rather than conflict. Of course, operating as allies is not without its challenges but, as reflected on the pages that follow, a shared spirit and mutual respect are being enhanced and embedded by a busy calendar of joint activities that are proving instrumental in ironing out any interoperability issues.

I am yet to have had the privilege of seeing this cross-Channel camaraderie up close – despite more than two decades of reporting on the British element of the alliance – but have, albeit tenuously as a civilian journalist, been a beneficiary of the bond that exists between the soldiers of the two armies. Humour me, therefore, as I tell you about the occasion I interviewed (from the partisan perspective of a Tottenham fan) one of France’s greatest sporting exports – David Ginola – for *Soldier*, the official magazine of the British Army. Having completed a year’s national service with the French Army during the late 1980s and as a campaigner for The Halo Trust and Red Cross, the fleet-footed winger, then earning the adulation of Everton fans, represented something of a celebrity scoop for the publication. However, Ginola, in common with many of the other Premier League stars of the day, was rumoured to be as nonchalant in his approach to media commitments as he was

on the pitch. Consequently, I was somewhat surprised when my request for an audience was very quickly granted. David, I was told by his agent, wished for me to join him for a post-ballet dinner in a suitably chic London restaurant. Fast forward to the interview itself and there was no waning of enthusiasm from ‘le magnifique’, who remained engaged and engaging throughout an extremely cordial encounter.

It quickly became apparent, however, that Ginola’s readiness to talk basic training and overseas exercises – and to be genuinely generous with his time – was based on an assumption that I too had experienced military life. Despite describing his last day in uniform as being “one of the happiest of my life” [quelle surprise that having to keep a closely shaved head and taking orders held little appeal for a footballer later famed for his flowing locks and a carefree attitude that infuriated managers], Ginola had still been imbued with the French Army’s *esprit de corps* and held soldiers in the British ranks in extremely high regard. If fame, wealth and success can’t evaporate the empathy felt for a near ally, it should come as no surprise that the spirit of the *Entente Cordiale* endures among professional soldiers on both sides of the Channel. Long may it do so. – Andrew Simms



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STRONGER TOGETHER

THE *Entente Cordiale* was signed on the 8th of April 1904, between France and Britain at the height of a period in European international politics when an isolationist Britain was watching, with interest, the network of alliances that was beginning to build across the continent of Europe. Although translated in various forms, I believe that ‘Friendly Agreement’ best serves the spirit and substance of the *Entente*.

French and British interests are so closely aligned that the two nations have always had a clear and singular choice: work in agreement together or come into disagreement with each other. The subsequent love/hate relationship between Britain and France was in 1904, and remains now, as old as the disappearance beneath the North Sea of the Doggerland land bridge, more than 8,000 years ago. 1066, in that context, is recent history, and the Hundred Years War of the 14th and 15th centuries saw ownership of what could be considered ‘French’ and ‘English’ lands change hands like the ebb and flow of tides. (And I have always considered

it an interesting aside that while the English seemed to have won all the great fights of that century of conflict – Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt, et al – it seems to me that it was the French who exited with the strategic win. Lessons there for modern times perhaps?) Another 400 years later, the open warfare of the Napoleonic period had been replaced with a long period of continental peace, and France and Britain, when they went to war, as they did in the Crimea between 1853 and 1856, were now fighting together on the same side, rather than against each other as they had in the past (and so it has remained ever since). This period of ‘peace’ was, however, underpinned by an ongoing competition between France and Britain that was played out not just in the colonial scrabble for land in Africa, but on a global scale. Students of modern conflict would easily recognise the buzz-phrases of grey zone conflict, sub-threshold activity, little green men, and every other ‘new’ idea of the last few decades, as they could be applied to the events that unfolded in the relationship between France and Britain in this period of our long history.



Thus, even in periods when open war was absent, the rivalry between the two great European nations was forever bubbling beneath the surface. In 1898 a small French North African expedition, heading eastwards into the Upper Nile Basin, met with a rather larger British-led force intent on establishing imperial control over the Sudan. In what historians call 'the scramble for Africa', the West-to-East ambitions of French African colonialism had met, head on, with the Cape-to-Cairo-Railway ambitions of the British Empire. While the actual events of this collision were, on the ground, relatively amicable, the reporting of the stand-off that became the so-called 'Fashoda Incident' ('La Crise de Fachoda') in both capitals led to jingoistic sabre-rattling. Despite the public mood for conflict, calmer heads in France and Britain, at the turn of the 20th century, had no interest at all in coming to blows – but they were also reluctant to sign a binding treaty with each other that would constrain their mutual and separate ambitions.

British foreign policy at the time was strongly of the view that Britain's interests abroad would be ill-served by any binding agreement that could lead to being drawn into the power struggles of continental Europe. (Approaches had been made to Britain both by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the Franco-Russian alliance, in a bid to secure the powerful British Empire on the side of one or the other of these two competing European blocs.) National interests remained firmly focussed on the building and maintaining of a world-spanning Empire, and a binding treaty with France risked tying a paradoxically isolationist but 'global' Britain into European problems. But an absence of a treaty with France risked a continuation of deliberate or accidental 'incidents' as imperial ambitions collided. The national public moods that surrounded Fashoda could easily have driven less robust politicians

to fall into unwise inter-national confrontation. The solution was the *Entente Cordiale*, which was, in fact, a series of agreements, separately negotiated, but all signed together as a single package, in which the two nations agreed to resolve their differences 'in a friendly spirit of cooperation', drawing lines on the African continent, and elsewhere, and setting the tone for an ongoing positive relationship.

So, what is the point of this potted revision of history? In a nutshell, France and the United Kingdom are so close to each other, in terms of geography, history, values, philosophical approaches, roots and common interests, that our ambitions for ourselves are bound to both coincide and conflict in the ways that they have always done, regardless of our more formal treaty obligations. So, France and the UK still have a simple choice – work together or compete. In this fragile 21st century, competition between these two ancient European powers makes less sense than it has ever done before.

We are members of the same military and diplomatic alliance (NATO) and have played differing but mutually supporting roles in that alliance, since its beginning in 1949 in the aftermath of the Second World War. Membership of NATO alone is not enough to ensure that our two countries interact to strengthen our points of convergence and reduce our points of divergence to our mutual benefits. Nor is the fact that, with shared values, we sit alongside each other as permanent members of the Security Council of the UN. Much is spoken, in British circles at least, of the so-called 'special relationship' between the UK and the US; but there is an equally genuinely deep and special (and much longer) relationship between France and the UK. Formal treaties aside, and the flaring up and down of points of disagreement or difference also put aside, France and the United Kingdom, working together, represent the cornerstones of European and wider security. And now, in particular, with the commitment of the US to European security becoming ever more uncertain, the steadfast cooperation of those two cornerstones becomes more important than ever.

Whenever our two nations have been working together in a state of 'friendly agreement', towards commonly beneficial goals and based on commonly held values, the benefits to both nations, to wider Europe, and, dare I say it, far beyond Europe, have been self-evident. On those occasions throughout our long mutual history when we have not, the opposite has been the case. So: long live – vive – the *Entente!*

"Formal treaties aside, and the flaring up and down of points of disagreement or difference also put aside, France and the United Kingdom, working together, represent the cornerstones of European and wider security."



United front: Statue of Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle in Calais, France

THE NECESSITY OF THE ENTENTE 'SUPERIOR'

IN 2010, the Lancaster House Treaty was signed by the then Prime Minister, and now Foreign Secretary, Lord David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, signalling a reinvigoration of the United Kingdom and France's defence and security cooperation. The treaty articulated a closer relationship within the defence industry, recognising the need for 'mutual dependence' whilst maintaining 'strategic autonomy'. This somewhat opaque sentiment recognised the traditionally adversarial relationship between UK and French defence industries, and France's fierce protectionism over its sovereign industrial base. The treaty begrudgingly acknowledged military budget constraints on both sides of the Channel and so become colloquially known as the 'Entente Frugale' – a marriage of economic convenience rather than one of true necessity. In a similar vein, the *Entente Cordiale* of 1904 was not a formal agreement as such, but rather a paving of the way to a stronger relationship in the face of an increasingly aggressive German rhetoric, almost predicting events that would unfold to conflict in 1914.

In the 14 years that have passed since Lancaster House, a major land war in Europe has moved into its third year and broader geo-strategic events indicate a further widening of the chasm between the panacea of post-Cold War stability and an era now dubbed 'pre-war' by both politicians and generals alike. That necessity for 'mutual dependency' with our closest friends and allies to keep the furnaces of the defence industry burning appears to have become increasingly relevant, and important, as Russian forces continue to occupy the east bank of the Donbas. Furthermore, in Europe, where supply constraints and inflation continue to impact upon defence budgets, any desire to grow our own sovereign industrial base and generate independence of supply must be tempered with the feasibility of being able to 'go it alone'. Could – or indeed should – we attempt to deliver a major, complex and exquisite sovereign land programme once again at a scale and size of Ajax? Rather, would it not be more appropriate to exploit supra-national businesses' ability (at least at the outset) to transcend politics

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and pool transnational expertise to focus on capability development as witnessed in the complex weapon pipeline?¹ This would attempt to deliver what the Farnborough agreement of 2000 has never really achieved across the broader panoply of the European defence industry, operationalising industry while driving strategic patience into the psyches of the various defence ministries. This seems particularly apposite at a time when one side of the American political deity espouses 'European solutions to European problems'. After all, geography matters; as the two European nuclear powers sit only 22 kilometres apart, is it time the UK and France did more together in the land domain?

¹The complex weapon pipeline is an innovative approach of providing a consistent level of annual funding to MBDA and Thales to enable better investment planning and a more modular approach to weapon development.

Within the Lancaster House Treaty the European Missile Joint Venture MBDA was provided a specific aim of reducing complex weapon development costs by 30 per cent and optimising investments across multiple nations and businesses. Since then, the complex weapon pipeline has seen significant successes, using supra-national companies to co-develop capabilities such as the UK-French Storm Shadow/SCALP, where the benefits derived are not principally restricted to participant nations' security. Export successes have resulted in significant fiscal returns for national treasuries while keeping respective defence sector's furnaces burning. This point has been well highlighted by the conflict in Ukraine and continues to remind the UK of the importance of the nation's defence furnaces. These furnaces all contribute to the ability to start and scale production faster than establishing an industrial base and associated suitably qualified and experienced personnel from scratch in a time of existential



danger. But it does more than just this: these furnaces also provide the ability to deliver rapid spiral development of in-service capabilities, preventing acquisition from falling into a trap whereby the waterfall approach to procurement is the only option (as seen in the British Army's current core land platform inventory). This is important as we attempt to maintain the technological edge.

It is doubtful that anybody in either Ukraine or Russia would argue against the necessity of a sovereign industrial base – the latter has mobilised 30 per cent of its pre-war industry onto a war footing. Yet for the UK, keeping capability development 'in-house' is neither a reality in terms of capacity and knowledge nor a fiscal reality if measured against the scale and scope of our ambition. This is also true throughout the rest of Western European democracies, including Ukraine, and of course Russia where armaments are actively being sourced beyond their own borders. However, if we wish to maintain our technological advantage, a position we take as the default against our ability to generate mass (at least in a time where an existential threat appears just that too far away), collaboration simply has to be viewed as a positive. It can enhance research and development opportunities,

drive financial efficiency through cheaper unit prices and spread non-recurring costs, open up a broader export market than open to a single country and help keep the UK's land industry growing. In the air domain Typhoon, the Global Combat Air Programme and A400M provide glimpses of where international collaborations offer the optimal opportunity to secure access to innovative and affordable capabilities through the sharing of development costs, while increasing defence's contribution to alliances. This approach also contributes to prosperity, creating opportunity for greater export opportunities through joint exports in markets that we or a partner nation may have a stronger relationship with. However, as recently noted with some of our European allies, who we choose to collaborate with may affect where we wish to – and indeed can – export to.

Evidence therefore suggests that the 2010 Entente Frugale was based upon sound logic, even if not a complete love affair, playing directly into the purpose of the UK's Land Industrial Strategy, published in 2022. The strategy has been designed with collaboration at the forefront of procurement. It is not simply just about 'buying British'. The Land Industrial Strategy assesses effective international

partnering, especially through NATO, to give the Army the best opportunity to access the capabilities we need at an affordable through life cost. All new requirement teams will need to explore collaborative opportunities to identify mutually beneficial propositions that still meet the UK's operational independence and technology investment needs. The 19 objectives that make up the Land Industrial Strategy Operating Framework create a broad definition of value to be considered in our investment decisions and ensure our programmes will deliver the industrial resilience the UK needs, benefitting UK prosperity.

That industrial resilience the UK needs appears to be something of an obsession for the defence social media Twitterati, reaching fever pitch following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In an apparent wake-up call, and after the first UK-French summit for over five years, Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron acknowledged the changing geo-strategic landscape in March 2023, serving to strengthen UK-French ties. As the two nuclear powers in Europe, to confront the new geo-strategic landscape there must be a more united Western European offer. Perhaps the time for export competition should now be turned into an



export Entente coalition? If France's sovereign defence industrial base, so protected by the Elysée in a way the UK's land industrial base has not been, could collaborate with the UK in a transparent and open manner, significant mutual benefit through the exploitation of each other's strengths and mitigating weaknesses could be realised. Rather than competitors, we become collaborators.

As already touched upon, examples of successful collaborations between the UK and France do exist within the complex weapon pipeline. Storm Shadow/SCALP, initially developed from 1994 by Matra and British Aerospace, saw a further milestone post Entente Frugale in the form of the 2017 joint contract to upgrade the French and British stockpiles. Storm Shadow/SCALP has also been exported, with the Black Shaheen integrated into the United Arab Emirates' Mirage 2000 fleet. This success is an example of supra-national companies working intra-nationally to deliver a mutually symbiotic capability for both countries. Storm Shadow's replacement, the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (another joint UK-France MBDA programme), has entered the assessment phase with a proposed in-service date of 2028. This would appear to show the longevity, or to put it another way, the strategic patience necessary, to deliver complex programmes.

It must be noted that successful collaborations are not the sole purview of the complex weapon domain. The supra-national OCCAR [Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement / Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation] consortium drives successful land programmes. Boxer, a manifestation of two nations (the Netherlands and Germany) now has a user community – known as the Boxer User Group – consisting of five nations (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Lithuania and Australia) all with a common purpose; the efficient use of and in-service

support of the Boxer capability. In France, the Scorpion modernisation programme has shown where internal industrial consortiums sharing information has led to success. The Jaguar armoured reconnaissance and combat vehicles have been developed and produced by a consortium of Nexter, Arqus and Thales. France's already strong industrial base could benefit from greater collaboration with its ally just across the Channel, opening wider export markets, sharing costs and increasingly the technology on platforms from joint research and development with the UK. It will also not have gone unnoticed that Nexter merged with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann in 2015 to produce the Franco-German business, KNDS. This consortium is inextricably linked to Rheinmetall and Boxer production and in the UK manifests as KNDS (UK) and the BAE Systems/Rheinmetall joint venture, RBSL. Another example of success is the CT40 cannon, a joint venture by Nexter and BAE Systems in which novel technology has conspired to deliver the next generation of 40mm cannon and cased telescopic ammunition for both France's Scorpion and the UK's Ajax.

It would therefore appear that supra-national industrial frameworks do exist within the land domains of France and the UK. Mutual investment in science and technology could prove to be both catalytic and ultimately symbiotic to both industrial bases. Furthermore, leveraging the success of the complex weapon pipeline and supra-national businesses, opportunities within land deep fires capability development exist right now for both the British Army and Armée de Terre. As we look to make the deep decisive and execute recce strike at every level, hitting moving targets out to 150 kilometres seems a logical goal. Could these requirements, born of the supra-national complex weapon pipeline, act as a catalyst for a much wider land domain collaboration? The complex weapon pipeline is an endorsement for supra-national businesses'

ability to deliver successful collaborations and credible capabilities, while it would appear to also force politicians' hands in endorsing greater collaboration where strategic patience has borne fruit. Following the Prime Minister and the French President's most recent summit in 2023, which recognised Ukraine and the importance of strong national industrial bases, exploiting the weaknesses and strengths of both the UK and the French land industrial base will be critical in generating affordable and profitable combat credibility in the future. This appears to be a Western necessity of developing technology to stay one step ahead of our adversaries, critical if we are to generate a credible conventional deterrent needed to generate credible escalation levels. The UK's growing land industrial base could profit from the relative stability of the French industrial base, with both countries exploiting the pooling of research and development, as seen in the complex weapon pipeline. The wider national benefits derived from bigger export markets and more resilient supply chains should be driven through the co-development of intellectual property facilitated by supra-national businesses, transcending international borders, politics and competition. After all, the UK is too geographically close to France for us at best to wilfully ignore each other, and at worst compete within the same international markets as we face the stark reality of Russian aggression.

Where the complex weapon pipeline has seen success, and should be exploited in the short term, the broader land domain should consider following suit. France's well-established land domain and the UK's growing equivalent have much to offer and learn from one another, a perspective no-doubt Henry VII would endorse. Mutual dependence must now trump strategic autonomy; a marriage of convenience moving to a collaboration of necessity, a true 'Entente Superior' in the land domain.



A Boxer artillery variant on Salisbury Plain Training Area

UK MOD © Crown copyright 2022



COMMON CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR SHARED SOLUTIONS

AUTHOR

Colonel Rémi Pellabeuf, Head of capability prospective at the future directorate at the French Army HQ.



THE *Entente Cordiale* marked a significant stage in the history of Franco-British relations. The Lancaster House Agreement, building on this legacy, provides a solid basis for cooperation in a range of areas, including defence. In a rapidly changing international context, France and the UK, both significant European strategic players, share a converging analysis of current and emerging military threats. In exploring the common challenges facing both nations, a path exists for joint solutions in military air-land capabilities.

Following an era of geopolitical positioning of the major competitors within a still regulated framework, the invasion of Ukraine seems to be the first major signal of the beginning of a new era of the breakdown and instability of the main global balances. International relations are uninhibited and unbridled, and so-called frozen conflicts are resurfacing, bringing territorial strategies, identity ambitions and human challenges to the fore. In this constantly changing world, the horizon of current military threats is evolving rapidly and calls for a joint response. New technologies, such as artificial

intelligence and drones, are adding a complex dimension to the battlefield.

In 2022, the French Army and the British Army co-authored a document setting out their vision of the battlefield in 2040, demonstrating the closeness of their approaches. In particular, they recognise the potential for radical change offered by certain technologies, which they need to take into account in developing their future forces:

- **Expanding information space:** Increasing connectivity and 'big data' with analytics.
- **Cyber:** There will continue to be substantial advances in processing power, access and digital interconnectivity.
- **Electromagnetic spectrum:** The pervasion of electronic devices, internet connectivity and smart technology will make the electromagnetic spectrum one of the most contested domains.
- **Space:** The future force will operate in a contested space environment and may be required to protect space assets for use by society and themselves.
- **Technological proliferation** will mean that even inferior, irregular adversaries will

likely be able to challenge the future force in certain capability areas.

■ **Human-Machine Teaming:** There will continue to be considerable development in autonomous systems and how the future force combines advances in robotics and automated systems with its force will be crucial.

■ **Emerging technologies** – such as synthetic biology (accessing and directing bioprocesses to build things that do not yet exist), novel weapons and swarming – have the potential to radically change the way the future force operates and is structured. The impact of these emerging technologies within defence in areas such as sensors could be transformational.

The current environment in which our respective nations operate requires optimum use of available resources. In this context, capability cooperation between France and the UK could offer significant advantages, in addition to cost sharing, in terms of improving interoperability and stimulating innovation. However, we must not ignore the difficulties inherent in bilateral capability cooperation: complexity can lead to delays and friction in decision-making, and national military requirements can be diluted to a lowest common denominator, in a context where national industrial interests weigh heavily in the political balance of choices, as do technological sovereignty and control of national capabilities. Striking the right balance is a tricky business.

However, there is one symbolic example of successful Franco-British capability cooperation: the Milan anti-tank missile programme. It highlights how the benefits of cooperation, such as the sharing of technological expertise and financial burdens, have led to the development of a powerful weapon system that has remained in service for several decades and proved its worth on the battlefield. Launched in the 1970s, the Milan is a guided missile used to defend against battle tanks. France and the UK worked closely together to develop, produce and deploy this weapon system. The Milan development process demonstrated the synergy that can be achieved when two nations share technological expertise to overcome technical challenges and build on each nation's strengths. This partnership resulted in an anti-tank missile that combined French guidance expertise with British precision propulsion. The production of the Milan was also marked by close collaboration. Manufacturing plants in France and the UK worked in tandem to produce missiles to the highest quality standards. This joint approach not only optimised costs but

“By overcoming identified obstacles and building on a shared vision of the capability challenges of the future battlefield, our two nations can not only rise to the challenges of today, but also lay the foundations for sustainable future security.”

also accelerated the system's entry into service, strengthening the operational capability of both nations. Finally, once integrated into the French and British armed forces, maintenance and upgrades have been carried out collaboratively, maximising efficiency and ensuring optimum system availability. So the Milan example illustrates that collaboration on capabilities can be successful when nations combine their resources and skills.

As a European nation and a member of NATO, the United Kingdom remains a key player in the defence of Western Europe. By improving their cooperation on military capabilities, France and the UK could play a leading role in strengthening defence in Europe, provided they know how to combine their respective interests. Both countries benefit for their equipment from the technological standards defined by NATO, which can become a real catalyst for Franco-British cooperation and the path to greater interoperability and the source of broader synergies within the Alliance. This harmonisation helps to create a common operational environment, which is essential for successful military partnerships. The military landscape is evolving rapidly with the advent of innovative technologies such as artificial intelligence, drones and their autonomy, cyber security and the extension of weapons' ranges. Close targeted collaboration on research and development in these technologies could help position France and the UK at the forefront of military innovation. Such a joint approach could help the maintenance of competitiveness in an ever-changing global environment, with

collaboration that could serve as a model for other European nations, encouraging a collective approach to common defence challenges.

In the absence of joint design and development, it is still possible to carry out joint procurement of military equipment. This would generate significant economies of scale, reducing acquisition and maintenance costs. In addition, closer cooperation would strengthen both nations' ability to negotiate advantageous contracts with the defence industry, while stimulating innovation through the sharing of technological skills.

The staffs of the French and British land forces have identified robotics, ground-air/anti-drone defence, information and communication systems, command and control and data sharing for artificial intelligence as areas of common interest for future battlefield capabilities.


In conclusion, the anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale* provides a further opportunity to reflect on how France and the UK can strengthen their cooperation on military capabilities. By overcoming identified obstacles and building on a shared vision of the capability challenges of the future battlefield, our two nations can not only rise to the challenges of today, but also lay the foundations for sustainable future security. By facing up to their strategic visions, the two nations can improve the coordination of their defence policies, strengthen their capabilities for deterrence capability and increase their collective responsiveness. The converging strategic approach also offers the possibility of getting the most out of limited resources, by encouraging closer cooperation in the development and procurement of military equipment, as well as in research and technological development.

The balance between preserving national sovereignty and the need to work together effectively is a complex but necessary challenge if we are to meet the emerging security challenges in the best possible way.

The Milan anti-tank weapon system, pictured on operations with British forces in Iraq

Courtesy of Soldier Magazine





CHANNELLING COOPERATION IN AN ERA OF HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT



AUTHOR

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BRITAIN and France's long and often fluctuating relationship is well documented. Analogous to siblings or twins, when interests align, their achievements have been great, but when they diverge the two nations have often been in direct competition. However, in the past 120 years the military-to-military relationship has largely sustained a character of its own. One of the greatest examples of Anglo-French cooperation, the Eurotunnel, was recently used as an analogy by a senior French officer to describe the military relationship; even amidst political turbulence, when winds make the sea very choppy, the trains in the tunnel run to time.¹ He added as a quieter aside, that he particularly liked the analogy, as the United Kingdom never puts submarines in tunnels!

The enduring nature of the military relationship

is perhaps unsurprising. In the current context of international affairs, it is hard to conceive of a strategic threat to one nation which is also not a strategic threat to the other. Some of these threats have become manifest in recent years, war in Europe a ruptured fault line which now transcends the continent. With an eye to the future, Lawrence Freedman's observation that US foreign policy is now so inextricably bound up with presidential politics could place an even greater emphasis on the bond between the two nations.² Taking stock of the relationship on the eve of the 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale, whatever future events await, there is solace in the

¹Anon.

²Freedman, Lawrence, 'Ukraine: Through the Gloom'. samf.substack.com/p/ukraine-through-the-gloom?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2 (accessed 24 January 2024).

mutual understanding shared by both nations; after his inaugural meeting with his opposite number, Grant Schapps, the French defence minister Sébastien Lecornu remarked “there are discussions on security issues in 15 years’ time that we can only have with the British”.³

The purpose of this article is to reflect on how the Anglo-French military relationship has evolved in recent years and where it may be destined to go in the future. The focus is on the collaborative provision of military land capability at the operational and tactical levels within the context of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force and the NATO Force Model.

THE COMBINED JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force was conceived as part of the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty signed by President Nicholas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron at Lancaster House in 2010. The summit declaration made clear the combined vision: “We will develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force suitable for a wide range of scenarios, up to and including high intensity operations. It will involve all three Services: there will be a land component

“In the current context of international affairs, it is hard to conceive of a strategic threat to one nation which is also not a strategic threat to the other.”

comprised of formations at national brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated headquarters, and logistics and support functions. It will not involve standing forces but will be available at notice for bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations. We will begin with combined air and land exercises during 2011 and will develop the concept before the next UK-France Summit and progress towards

³Lecornu, Sébastien cited in Barotte, Nicholas, ‘Otan: un axe Paris-Londres en cas de retour de Trump’, *lefigaro.fr/international/otan-un-axe-paris-londres-en-cas-de-retour-de-trump-20231124* (accessed 25 January 2024).

⁴Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation (accessed 25 January 2024).

full capability in subsequent years. The Force will stimulate greater interoperability and coherence in military doctrine, training and equipment requirements.”⁴

In the land domain this meant a two-star land component command headquarters capable of commanding a bilateral force. There is also the airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, a one-star rapid-reaction formation based on either 11^{ème} Brigade Parachutistes or 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team on a rotational basis. The two-star land component command achieved its initial operating capability on completion of Exercise Citadel Bonus in 2019 and full operating capability, with some caveats, in 2020 on Exercise Citadel Guibert, despite the exercise being curtailed due to the outbreak of COVID. However, one of the challenges with the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force’s bespoke land component command headquarters is that it requires bespoke exercises; it doesn’t have the ability to ‘plug and play’ on existing exercises, particularly NATO ones. Consequently, the headquarters hasn’t been exercised since 2020, but this should not be mistaken with thinking the Combined Joint Expeditionary

A French and British soldier converse during Exercise Gaulish – a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force exercise held at the Urban Zone Combat Training Centre in Sissonne, France

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Force is no longer relevant. In particular, the Force affords the United Kingdom and France the ability to respond to events in the Middle East, Africa, the Indo-Pacific and countering violent extremist organisations; the airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which maintains a biennial cadence of bilateral exercises, deployed most recently in Oman in 2023 on Exercise Pegasus Amarante. At present exercising the land component command HQ may not be as high as other training priorities, but as 7th October 2023 proved, the requirement to respond to events at pace remains.

There are those who argued at its conception that the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force appeared 'like a military solution to a political problem rather than a response to a military need'.⁵ However 13 years and two Anglo-French summits later, the Force endures.⁶ At the 2018 summit at Sandhurst, both sides agreed to build on the success of Exercise Griffin Strike in 2016, when more than 5,000 personnel from the United Kingdom and France executed major land, sea and air activity for the first time.⁷ The summit communique declared the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force was already capable of

"There are those who argued at its conception that the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force appeared 'like a military solution to a political problem rather than a response to a military need'. However 13 years and two Anglo-French summits later, the Force endures."

peace enforcement operations and it would take forward a programme to deliver a force which could exceed 10,000 personnel with full operating capability in crisis management operations involving early entry in a potentially hostile territory by 2020. By the time of the Paris summit in March 2023, there was mutual recognition of the need for the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force to adapt to meet the challenges of an evolving security environment and new contested areas, including in the High North.⁸ The commitment to harnessing the full potential of the Force was set within the context of increasing interoperability and further integration between the forces of both nations.

NATO FORCE MODEL

Whilst the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force offers the United Kingdom and France a bespoke, permanent capability, in a broader sense both nations' armies had already begun reorientating towards large-scale, state-on-state, high intensity warfare even before Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. Following both nations' protracted involvement in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and stabilisation operations, high intensity warfare now informs how both armies are structured, equipped, trained and employed. Both have their respective modernisation programmes and projects; How We Fight 26, Projects Lewes and Wavell in the case of the United Kingdom, and Scorpion and Titan in France.⁹

The United Kingdom and France's reorientation to high intensity warfare has also been galvanised by change in NATO. The NATO Force Model is a product of the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Areas concept conceived under the current Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Christopher G. Cavoli. The model was introduced following the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid in support of leaders' decision to modernise and strengthen the NATO Force Structure for the future.¹⁰ Both countries have made national offers to resource the NATO Force Model to ensure capabilities,

equipment and forces are available to support the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the right time and in the right place. The United Kingdom has volunteered to fulfil the Strategic Reserve Corps and the Allied Reaction Force Special Operations Component Command, consisting of a multi-domain special operations headquarters, and land, maritime and air special operations task groups. It has also offered Headquarters 1st (UK) Division to be the first land component command HQ of the new agile, multi-domain and combat effective Allied Reaction Force announced at the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, which will be ready to deploy at very high readiness to a range of crises.¹¹

Historically, France's relationship with NATO has been less consistent than the United Kingdom's. However, General de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966 is often misrepresented as France withdrawing from NATO. France did cease to assign its personnel to the staff of headquarters in the NATO command structure and French units were not placed under NATO command, but France remained an active member of the Alliance and in 2009 re-joined the command structure.¹² President Putin's widely reported mis-calculation of the effect Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine would have on strengthening NATO has cemented both

⁵O'Neil, Paul, 'CJEF: A Solution in Search of a Problem?', rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/cjef-solution-search-problem (accessed 18 January 2024).

⁶In 2018 the Anglo-French Summit took place at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK, and in March 2023, the UK was hosted in Paris.

⁷UK Gov Publishing Service, 'United Kingdom-France Summit Communique', assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81f0ba40f0b62302699fc3/2018_UK-FR_Summit_Communique.pdf (accessed 21 January 2024).

⁸Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, 'Policy Paper: UK-France Joint Leaders' Declaration', gov.uk/government/publications/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration#:~:text=At%20the%20Sandhurst%20Summit%20in,to%20engage%20in%20European%20defence (accessed 21 January 2024).

⁹The United Kingdom's and France's modernisation programmes are discussed in the Transformation articles of this British Army Review edition (see pages 17-22).

¹⁰UK Ministry of Defence, 'Press Release: UK to make more forces available to NATO to counter future threats', gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-make-more-forces-available-to-nato-to-counter-future-threats (accessed 22 January 2024).

¹¹Op Cit; Brig David Bickers, 'Piecing Together a Picture of our Future Role in NATO', *The British Army Review*, Issue 186, Spring 2024.

¹²SHAPE, 'That France did not leave NATO in 1966 but continued to play a very active role in the Alliance?', shape.nato.int/page214871012 (accessed 22 January 2024).



**Members of 4th Battalion,
The Royal Regiment of
Scotland and 8 Régiment de
Parachutistes d'Infanterie de
Marine on Exercise Gaulish**

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nations' commitment to retaining armies capable of large-scale, state-on-state, high-intensity warfare.

The United Kingdom and France are clearly but two of NATO's 31 member countries contributing to the NATO Force Model. From 1st January 2024 nine allied nations are providing forces to NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force land forces centred around the United Kingdom's 7th Light Mechanised Brigade Combat Team. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force is part of NATO's Reaction Force and as part of the United Kingdom's commitment the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is also providing the land component command HQ. In mid-2024 the Alliance will transition the NATO Reaction Force to the new Allied Reaction Force.¹³ Within the context of these NATO commitments there are bilateral opportunities where France and the United Kingdom could burden share in the future, especially at the land component command headquarters level. Opportunities exist to train and validate together under NATO exercise constructs, but also the potential for force elements to be available to deploy bilaterally.

CONCLUSION

Despite the periodically oscillating nature of the relationship between France and the

"The notion that unless the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is deployed it risks being cut, fails to recognise the broader benefits of maintaining a combined and permanent force."

United Kingdom, at present it is impossible to envisage a scenario in which a strategic threat to one nation is not similarly perceived by the other. In recognition of this duality, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force was conceived as means of establishing a permanent bilateral capability through the development of interoperability. Full operating capability was achieved in 2020 and the leadership of both nations remain committed to evolving the Force to meet the challenges of today's security environment. Following decades of stabilisation and counter-terrorism operations, and accelerated by Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, both nations' renewed focus on high-intensity warfighting has been emboldened by the advent of the NATO Force Model. Now, alongside multiple NATO allies, both the United Kingdom and France stand to play leading roles in the provision of capabilities, equipment and forces to the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This justifiable shift in emphasis to warfighting may not render the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force a current priority, but this should not be equated with the irrelevance of the Force. In particular, the events of the 7th October 2023 serve as a timely reminder of the airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Forces' high-readiness to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations. The notion that unless the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is deployed it risks being cut, fails to recognise the broader benefits of maintaining a combined and permanent force – the constant of interoperability the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force has engendered serves as a foundation for cooperation within the NATO Force Model. Rightly, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force's deployment should not be forced; both nations should hold their nerve and employ the force in the right context and at the right time. In the meantime, the commitment to sustaining currency and competence in interoperability standards and combined planning serves to mark the strength of the Anglo-French military relationship and ensures the analogous trains keep passing through the Eurotunnel.

¹³NATO, 'UK to lead NATO's 2024 rapid response force'. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221565.htm (accessed 05 February 2024).



TRANSFORMATION: IT'S NOT THE SIZE OF THE DOG IN THE FIGHT...

AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Austen Salusbury is an infantry officer by background. He is currently serving as the Army Headquarters liaison officer to the French Army staff.



FOR reasons principally of geography, Britain has historically been comfortable possessing a small, highly professional army. Given its size compared with its French and German counterparts, it didn't feature in the Schlieffen Plan drawn up towards the end of the 19th century and, as every GCSE student of history knows, it was described as "contemptible" by Kaiser Wilhelm in 1914. It's only when the geostrategic landscape has been misread that such a small land force has proven to be costly, which gives rise to a strategic shock with reverberations throughout society. During the First World War it took several years for the British Army to grow its industrial base sufficiently to prosecute an industrial war. Despite there being plenty of differences in the situation that now confronts the UK well over a century later, there might still be temptation in some quarters to reach for Twainian quotations about history rhyming. A return of large-scale conflict to Europe might not quite have been regarded as a black swan event in

the 2010s, but such an event can only have been considered a statistical outlier given resourcing of British land capability during this period. Gradual reductions in the size of the force were not offset with a level of investment in equipment that would maintain land capability; UK forces were becoming to a degree hollowed out. While *Future Soldier* will keep the British Army on track to be its smallest since the height of Britain's naval dominance in Napoleonic times, it is intended to create a more lethal Army through investments in capability (with the most urgent being accelerated under Op Mobilise) and to optimise the Army's utility as part of a coalition through structural adjustments.

Consciously or otherwise, the UK's tendency to commit a large part of its land forces proportional to their size on overseas deployments has endured and even become more pronounced with time. A brief glance at the UK's post-colonial history provides a clue to the genesis of this: it's in the British Army's psyche. 9,000 personnel were deployed

protecting British interests in summer 2023 (a number which has since grown) and, in 2024, the Army will provide the lion's share of 20,000 UK personnel deployed to Europe for Exercise Steadfast Defender, alongside overseas commitments elsewhere. This is despite a 21,000 reduction in the size of the Army since 2012. While activity should not be conflated with output, these figures have often been used to demonstrate the Army's efficiency and underpin the UK's grounds for leadership positions within coalitions.

After two decades of campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan during which the British Army riffed in the early stages on its counterinsurgency experience from the post-colonial era campaigns of the 1950s and 60s, the shortcomings of the British Army, which largely mirror those of other western armies, have been held up to the light with the return of conflict at its most barbaric to the continent of Europe. These post-colonial campaigns played to the self-image that many held of a historically small land force able to deploy overseas in pursuit of the national interest, achieving effect globally and of being servants to the government of the day. With the turn of the 21st century, the British Army and western allies found themselves employing at full stretch a force optimised for industrial war against a primitively equipped

"In 2024, the Army will provide the lion's share of 20,000 UK personnel deployed to Europe for Exercise Steadfast Defender, alongside overseas commitments elsewhere. This is despite a 21,000 reduction in the size of the Army since 2012."

but determined insurgency in Afghanistan. Op Entirety in 2009 provided the British Army with orders to optimise for success in Afghanistan across every line of development and represents the high watermark of a force optimised for industrial war being employed to counter an insurgency. The result was a de facto disinvestment in the Army's ability to warfight at scale. The nature of the threat was widely recognised as being amorphous and, consistent with this, strategy became difficult to define, which in turn had its effect on the definition of the British Army's core purpose.

THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE

Russia is re-grouping and preparing for a long war of high intensity. The invasion of Ukraine has gone far from perfectly for President Putin but there can be no doubting the extent of

Russia's strategic patience and that his army will be learning lessons, however slowly. During the recent counter-insurgency decades we employed forces that were structured and equipped for industrial war, re-employing to varying degrees of success capabilities to match the character of the conflicts in which we were engaged. While we might have been successful in denying Al Qa'eda a safe haven for at least the length of time that coalition forces were deployed in Afghanistan, our warfighting capability during this time did not receive the investment required of a nation that maintained coalition leadership ambitions. We have therefore been confronted with the dual challenges of thickening our existing structures while preserving the utility of our industrial era forces through investment in technologies that have proven to be game changing in Ukraine.

In 2004, the direction of Defence for the next two decades was set out in the *Future Capabilities White Paper*. "Developing a fully integrated Network Enabled Capability is considered to be at the centre of this [effects based] approach. As a consequence fewer platforms will be required to achieve the desired military effect. The emphasis is no longer on quantity as a measure of capability."¹ For the land domain, the thinking behind the development of a medium-weight capability enabled by a network manifested



A long line of British Army Foxhounds roll on to the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland during Steadfast Defender 2024. Approximately 16,000 British soldiers are taking part in the exercise – the largest set of NATO multi-national military manoeuvres in a generation.

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itself in the Future Rapid Effects System, itself a consolidation of a broad range of late 1990s' equipment programmes. The problems associated with the Future Rapid Effects System programme must be left for more informed consideration elsewhere, but if nothing else it served as the genesis of Ajax which will be delivered over the course of the next 18 months. Over the 20 years since the publication of this White Paper, the British Army has undergone five significant change programmes: *Future Army Structure* (in 2004); *Future Army Structure (Next Steps)* (in 2009); *Army 2020* (in 2012); *Army 2020 (Refine)* (in 2016); and *Future Soldier* (in 2021).

Today's transformation is centred on the core purpose articulated by the Chief of the General Staff of protecting the nation by being ready to fight and win wars on land. The lack of a core purpose has seen the British Army 'operating' to meet a broad range of cross-governmental requirements but without the strategic coherence that a core purpose provides. This is reflected in our equipment fleet which has been the line of development where the absence of a core purpose has been most evident. The withering on the vine of our military industrial base, the resilience of which was key to the industrial conflicts of the 20th century, has characterised our post-Cold War history. However, the *Land Industrial Strategy*



(2022) provides a vision for reinvigorating our relationship with industry in the context of today and recognises its central importance to the fulfilment of the Army's core purpose. Built on pragmatism, the strategy advocates the tolerance of compromises in requirements if this can lead to burden sharing in major equipment programmes with partner nations, given the strategic benefits that result.

Future Soldier (2021) has set the British Army on a path towards confronting the risks that were pushed beyond tolerance with the conflict in Ukraine. It reflects some considerable foresight; security force assistance units, whose purpose is to build partner nation capacity, have been central to the UK's land contribution to Ukraine. But this provision of support to Ukraine has also been reciprocal with much gleaned from the battlefield to inform the British Army's prioritisation of investment in capabilities. This has resulted in electronic warfare, uncrewed aerial systems, long-range fires, ground-based air defence plus logistics and stockpiles being prioritised in the short-term. Launched in June 2022, *Op Mobilise* coheres the acceleration of these priority capabilities along with the provision of support to Ukraine and the introduction of greater efficiency in the Army's acquisition processes. The adjustments made to *Future Soldier* in September 2023 keep the British Army on the same modernisation pathway but optimise the Army's offer to NATO and looks to realise the vision for *How We Fight 26* (how we can best fight with current equipment and resources). Providing further definition on the role of HQ 1st Division as a Land Component Command also forms a key part.

The strategic imperative upon Western armies is to transform at pace. But what comes with rapid transformation is the risk of incoherence. The difficulty of delivering coherent transformation in the land domain is well recognised. The broad range of functions required, delivered by a complex interaction of people and technology, is susceptible to hurdles in approval understanding, the aggregate of multiple programme or technology delays and all whilst technology and requirements move on. Coherent transformation in the land domain has to have effective gearing between a longer term Army core purpose and near-term (or in-year) strategic goals. For the British Army, this is delivered through the recently endorsed Strategic Approach Framework, the basis of which is that short-term strategic goals derive from an agreed Approach, which in turn is driven by the Chief of the General Staff's priorities, his vision and, ultimately, the Army's core purpose.

While the Strategic Approach Framework is intended to maintain coherence in the British Army's transformation, it is the *Land Operating Concept* (2023) that provides the vision of how future wars will be won on a more transparent battlefield that is characterised by greater autonomy, fragile networks and ubiquitous sensors. The *Land Operating Concept* draws on a broad evidence base and emerging lessons from Ukraine. In conjunction with the Strategic Approach Framework and the priority of building the most capable land force for NATO, the Army has a clear force design headmark which supports coherent transformation.

The size of the regular force has reduced from 102,000 personnel set out in the 2004 *Future Army Structure* to a force of 73,000 under *Future Soldier* in 2021. Personnel numbers have remained an emotive subject but given their relevance only if other factors such as technology remain constant, the focus of UK media commentary on force levels has often precluded more serious conversations on capability. Furthermore, if the predictions of the *Land Operating Concept* are correct, the exponential effects on the conduct of warfare of robotics and artificial intelligence will result in numbers becoming even less relevant over time. The French Army has for historical reasons maintained specified tasks not directly related to a core warfighting purpose (for example, its role in the national youth programme *Service national universel*). While for the British Army playing a cohesive role in society remains something that is well implied, its core purpose to protect the nation by being ready to fight and win wars on land has permitted hard-nosed decisions to be taken on their merit over the size of the Army. If a reduction in mass allows for an investment in technology that increases overall lethality, the British Army has shown itself to be comfortable with such an approach. However, such an approach will only survive in today's strategic context if it is coupled with investment in strategic reserves that would allow second (and third) echelon forces to be brought to bear in the event of a war of national survival.

Through embracing technology, making difficult decisions over force levels and retaining its focus on a newly defined core purpose, the British Army has shown itself to be bold in its characterisation of current and future conflict and how it will contribute towards the government's strategic goals within the framework of NATO.

¹ *The Defence White Paper: Future Capabilities, 17 September 2004, House of Commons Library, p.3.*



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY

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As we are celebrating this year the 120th anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale*, it is interesting to note that for more than one century the French Army and the British Army have been evolving in a quite similar way regarding both the nature of operational deployments in which they have been committed and the adaptation of their structure, often induced by budgetary constraints and by the new nature of conflicts during the last decades. These twin armies, of similar size both in terms of personnel and equipment, whose missions and ambitions also remain very close, must both shift from an expeditionary army model focused on counter-insurgency to a versatile and reactive 360° war fighting corps and thus a return to conventional warfare.

Both of them have to consider the new global strategic challenges, illustrated by the Russian offensive in Ukraine which began just over two years ago. In addition to that comes an acceleration of technological

evolutions, which extends the range of conflict to increasingly numerous and complex domains, requiring an adaptation of the military instrument that is characterised by flexibility and speed to achieve enhanced interoperability and agility in the air-land manoeuvre. In spite of major similarities in their transformation programmes (in particular in terms of goals), the starting points and situations of the two armies are quite different. This article provides an opportunity to update on these transformations and on the factors that they seek to take into account.

NEW CONFLICT AND MODERNISATION

The Army must currently meet the challenges posed by the growing dichotomy between technological advances which make our platforms increasingly efficient, lethal but costly, and the available means of our adversaries that increase their lethality at a cost that remains limited and with production easily realisable (for example mini-uncrewed

aerial systems in Iraq or in Ukraine), all within a context that highlights the need to develop a war economy able to massively regenerate forces. Work to incorporate the structural lessons of current conflicts is necessary in order to adapt to the new paradigms of warfare in a measured and determined way, taking into account the connectivity and management of data, the transparency of the battlefield and the hyper-lethality of modern weaponry, particularly in the third dimension.

To that end, the new Commandement du combat futur is becoming the French Army's tool to strengthen its capability agility and to anticipate the evolution of conflict resulting inter alia from the use of artificial intelligence, the implementation of uncrewed aerial systems, the need to achieve effects in depth (fire and intelligence), etc. Lastly, this command will work on continuing the structuring of a solid and efficient command and control system, integrating innovations and able to be resilient against a peer adversary.

In order to ensure a proper adaptation of the military instrument to the new conditions of engagement, the combat support and combat service support land forces are restructuring into three new division-level commands: the CAPR (Actions in Depth and Intelligence Command), dedicated to combat in the tactical depth; the CAST (Army Special Forces Command), which will focus its activity on hybrid combat with influence and special operations, but also the Army Cyber

“Confronted with the hardening of the geopolitical context and the return of conventional conflict, the major challenge remains the capacity to mobilise a sufficient part of the population for the service of its forces.”

and Digital Support Command, which will integrate the Cyber and digital domains; and lastly the CALT (Theatre Logistic and Support Command), in charge of the rear.

This need to adapt organic structures comes with the will to evolve toward a greater decentralisation and to better place in context the actions of tactical headquarters to make them more operationalised. The focusing of the divisions towards regions (World – Europe/Near East) and the focusing of the brigades towards areas will provide the tactical echelons with a better knowledge of their potential area of commitment while generating a larger freedom of action and a better reactivity.

Along that same line, the creation in October 2023 of an operational command for air-land operations in Europe – Commandement Terre – Europe – will make it possible to meet the reactivity, coherence and efficiency requirements for the deployment of the Army in this area.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Confronted with the hardening of the geopolitical context and the return of conventional conflict, the major challenge remains the capacity to mobilise a sufficient part of the population for the service of its forces. The attractiveness of an Army career and the ability to retain soldiers are major challenges while carrying out, at the same time, a large-scale modification of its structures and how it operates.


This manifests itself through the transformation of approximately 9,000 positions; some of the soldiers will change job within their unit by getting new skills (anti-uncrewed aerial systems warfare, electronic warfare, mortars...), others will move to newly formed units (cyber, long-range fires, gap crossing...). Contributing to this trend, the overall technology level of equipment requires an increase in the staffing levels of the Army, which is currently lower than the levels of comparable western armies.

Achieving this ambition relies on a reinforcement of the organisations in charge of recruitment, a better synergy between training organisations complemented with the implementation of innovative mechanisms to finance the studies of young French people in return for their joining, the development of support plans for families and the wounded, all that relying on an increasingly individualised management of those serving.

Beyond this dynamic already well under way,

“The Army must currently meet the challenges posed by the growing dichotomy between technological advances which make our platforms increasingly efficient, lethal but costly, and the available means of our adversaries that increase their lethality at a cost that remains limited and with production easily realisable.”





the involvement of an increasing swathe of the population takes the form of an increase in the number of reservists, the goal being to have one reservist for every two active duty military by 2035, and by numerous initiatives to mobilise the youth around diverse types of commitments in order to strengthen, within the Army, some crossover between complementary populations of soldiers.

PROTECT THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

The role of the Army on the national territory (in the mainland and overseas) requiring a proximity to the population has now become routine since Operation Vigipirate was transformed a few years ago into Operation Sentinelle. This mission aimed at protecting the national territory, which remains one of the major links between the Army and the population, clearly relies on the reserve and therefore leads us to increase and diversify the recruitment and employment of reservists to fulfil the range of operational commitments and also to strengthen a significant bond with the nation.

The tougher geopolitical context also requires us to consider the youth more broadly, ensuring we make our institution better known and contributing to the spirit of defence and national cohesion. Steered by a *Etat-Major Interarmées du Territoire National* (Joint Headquarters of the National Territory), this protection aspect confirms the role of the Army in the protection of the national territory, which will be decisive during the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

“The celebration of the 120th anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale* represents an opportunity to further enhance cooperation while ensuring that the possible avenues of cooperation can be exploited to achieve a better efficiency of our combat tools.”

RESILIENCE OF THE SOLDIERS AND EQUIPMENT

In the context described above, the armed forces must be able to generate and regenerate their forces with agility and reactivity without diminishing their requirements in terms of skills and abilities. The transformation of the Army therefore focuses both on the moral strength and versatility of the troops, two key elements which have been forging its identity and ensuring its efficiency for several decades. The primacy of the mission, the warfighting spirit and the concern for the human aspect remain the indispensable foundations of the troops’ training. The ability to adapt to the theatre and circumstances, the spirit of manoeuvre and reversibility will make it possible to confront the multitude and variety of potential threats.

This need for resilience and the necessity to shift toward a war economy also applies to equipment and to the capacity to regenerate the forces in a context of heavy attrition, thanks

to a better industrial depth. The Integrated Structure of Army Equipment Maintenance (SIMMT) plays a key role in that framework within the “being and enduring” pillar of the Army transformation. This search for resilience and decentralisation is in particular materialised by the logistic strengthening of division- and brigade-level tactical echelons and by denser regimental fleets as well as the regimental maintenance sections. This effort comes within the necessary overlap between the Scorpion programme, aimed at equipping the Army with better connected capacities, and the Titan project which will look to introduce new capabilities (heavy assets, air defence, deep fires...) but also to a better integration of assets and achievement of effects at joint level owing to network-enabled collaborative combat capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The celebration of the 120th anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale* represents an opportunity to further enhance cooperation between the British Army and the French Army while ensuring that their parallel evolutions are properly understood and that the possible avenues of cooperation can be exploited to achieve a better efficiency of our combat tools, be it through the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force or more broadly within NATO in the framework of the New Force Model from the perspective of a commitment against a peer adversary. The bilateral Staff Talks which bring the entire British-French liaison network within the central staffs will be essential to ensure that current developments are properly understood and that bilateral cooperation is optimised within this new context.

HOW BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP CAN BRIDGE TECHNICAL CHALLENGES



AUTHOR

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ALITTLE more than a hundred years after the *Entente Cordiale* changed the nature of the relationship between the French and British militaries, the Lancaster House Treaty established the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force – once again re-defining the way that the two most potent European militaries cooperated. This rapprochement heralded a new era for the two armies whether within the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force framework, or on bilateral exercises and operations in Europe, Africa or the Middle East. Simultaneously, the reduction in army sizes which has been a feature of the post-Cold War period has required a much lower level of combined echelon than was needed at any time in the 20th century, in turn bringing technical challenges – particularly for radio and data communications.

This has increased the importance of the human and procedural aspects of interoperability which – although enhanced by regular combined exercises and operations – are best achieved through long-term collaboration enabled by the bonds of friendship between formations and units

and the permanent network of liaison and exchange officers in both countries.

THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

How do countries in an alliance like the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force work effectively together on joint operations? It's interoperability that helps all the pieces fit together and run smoothly, and the UK and France have been striving to improve the military effectiveness of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force since it was founded in 2010. Why then after ten years of cooperation did the full operating capability validation report for the Force's 2* headquarters state that communications and information systems only worked because British soldiers were trained to operate French equipment?

The answer is simple, interoperability is an investment that competes for the interest of leadership and financial resources with a host of other priorities and capabilities. It is also worth noting that the tactical communications and information systems the British Army uses were conceived in an era when NATO concepts and doctrine did not expect nations to be participating in major

British Foxhounds cross the Vistula on a French river crossing rig in Poland during Exercise Steadfast Defender

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combat operations multilaterally below the divisional level. Consequently, the current need to be interoperable well below that level was not anticipated. Furthermore, the benefits of interoperability relative to its costs and risks are often not well understood. However, while technical interoperability is highly desirable for multinational operations, it is not an absolute requirement. In fact, even where technical solutions between national systems do exist these are often fragile and single points of failure. Just as commanders who have satellite navigation in their vehicles still deploy with, and maintain competence using, a map and compass, multinational forces must have planned and rehearsed their reversionary means for command, control and coordination between national force elements.

This article explores not only the significance of procedural and human interoperability in overcoming technical challenges but advocates that, of the three pillars of interoperability, they are the two most vital to success.

The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force full operating capability validation and subsequent 2* military judgement panel is the perfect example of this theory in practice. 1 (FR) Division and 1st (UK) Division successfully demonstrated over a series of exercises between 2018 and 2020 that even when faced with a complete lack of technical interoperability, the 2* Combined Joint Expeditionary Force land component could deploy against the ten specified mission tasks, albeit with caveats against the two highest risk tasks. The caveats related to technical interoperability shortfalls with communications and information systems, intelligence sharing and joint fires. The 2* military judgement panel concluded that against the two highest risk mission tasks there would be an increased risk to mission or life because technical interoperability gaps increased latency in the passage of mission critical information. However, it was assessed that procedural workarounds, although somewhat 'clunky', reduced the risk to a tolerable level.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL AND HUMAN INTEROPERABILITY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Procedural interoperability plays a pivotal role in military operations as it ensures that different units follow standardised procedures and protocols. It allows for smooth communication, shared situational awareness and synchronised actions. The importance of procedural interoperability lies in its ability to streamline decision-making processes, reduce misunderstandings or errors, and enhance overall operational efficiency.



A French and British observer keep a watchful eye on proceedings as troops are put through their paces at the Urban Zone Combat Training Centre in Sissonne as part of Exercise Gaulish

One key aspect of procedural interoperability is the establishment of standard operating procedures, which serve as a common language that allows different units to understand each other's actions and intentions on the battlefield. By adhering to these established protocols, military personnel can effectively communicate and execute missions jointly. Standard operating procedures also contribute to enhancing situational awareness among forces, minimising confusion and reducing the risk of friendly fire incidents.

The chief challenge to procedural interoperability is the sheer scope of standard operating procedures that govern military operations. There is no expectation that all procedures can be known ahead of time, and even what could be very similar procedures (for example, the military decision-making process or estimate) can be completely different from one nation to another. In operations, subordinate units from one nation will need to adopt the higher headquarters' procedures from another nation, which may not have multinational consensus (for instance, as shared doctrine arising from NATO). Those procedures will need to be taught and understood by the nations working together. Growing an understanding of those procedures, and understanding a nation's standards for those procedures, requires considerable effort. This is where the human dimension of interoperability can be a force multiplier when done correctly, and this is

best delivered on bilateral deployments such as Operation Cabrit/Lynx – the enhanced forward presence in Estonia – as well as training exercises enabled by the exchange and liaison officer network.

THE ROLE OF HUMAN INTEROPERABILITY IN OVERCOMING TECHNICAL CHALLENGES

Human interoperability refers to the ability of individuals from different units and nations to understand each other's perspectives, collaborate effectively and adapt to unfamiliar environments. It encompasses cultural understanding, language proficiency, leadership skills and necessitates cooperation between personnel at all levels.

Although it's applicable to everyone, the commander-to-commander relationship is the cornerstone of human interoperability and sufficient effort should be invested early to establish mutual trust and understanding between them to counter the inevitable moral degrading, and technical and procedural frictions their forces will face. The interoperability force multipliers, however, are exchange and liaison officers.

One of the key challenges in military operations is the complexity and diversity of personnel involved. Soldiers from different branches of the armed forces, as well as multinational partners, need to be able to work together in high-stress environments where

split-second decisions can have far-reaching consequences. In such situations, effective communication is paramount for mission success. Even when language should not be a barrier, it often is, and this can have fatal consequences, as Brigadier Tom Brodie of the British 29th Infantry Brigade discovered when – during the Battle of the Imjin River in the Korean War – he informed his US commander that “things are a bit sticky, sir!”. While the intention was to convey a position of extreme difficulty, it was understood by General Soule to mean there was no need to reinforce or order a withdrawal. Not quite as consequential, but observations from Exercise Citadel Guibert 2019 included commentary on the French not understanding the nuances in the English language of effects verbs and that British officers would waste planning time debating which of three words to use when they all meant the same thing. In this instance the recommendation was to utilise the NATO list of effects verbs. But it is in these situations where routine deployments and exercises, such as the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Estonia and the biennial cadence of Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force exercises (Pegasus/Falcon Amarante) as well as the annual company-level exchange field training exercises under the Exercise Gaulish agreement, prove their worth.

More routine interactions such as enduring bonds of friendship, links between units and exchange and liaison officer positions can also add enormous value. Liaison officers, such as those within the Land Warfare Centre, Field Army/Army Headquarters and on the Army Staff in London (as well as their British

“While exchange officers are a longer-term investment, they provide not only a deep cultural understanding to the receiving headquarters but become completely familiar with the personalities and ways of working of their hosts.”

equivalents in France), are key enablers of this bilateral activity and also bring a welcome bilateral focus and perspective to headquarters which are focused on multiple outputs and often have to prioritise the immediate over the important. While exchange officers are a longer-term investment, in often enduring posts, they provide not only a deep cultural understanding to the receiving headquarters but become completely familiar with the personalities and ways of working of their hosts. The importance of the exchange officer posts in the continuing Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force collaboration between 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team and 11e Brigade Parachutiste being a perfect example.

In conclusion, achieving effective command, control and coordination within a multinational force requires a combination of procedural interoperability, human interoperability and strategies to enhance technical interoperability. There are at least 13 different systems for battle tracking within NATO. Many of them, because of different

technical standards, are not interoperable. With ever increasing reliance on technology to provide the commander with a digital common operational picture, the requirement to overcome technical challenges more efficiently and effectively has never been more paramount. By its very nature, an operational picture is not ‘common’ if other members of a joint task force can’t see it! By addressing the procedural and human aspects of interoperability comprehensively on bilateral deployments, exercises and (unit and personnel) exchanges, armies can overcome technical challenges more efficiently while maximising their overall effectiveness.

One hundred and twenty years since the *Entente Cordiale*, the cooperation and interoperability between the French and British armies underpins the combined military capability at the heart of European defence, as it did throughout the 20th century. That collaboration continues, for example between our divisional headquarters, our airborne and air assault brigades, and not least our units with their bonds of friendship, whether on exercise or operations. This is the case, whether within the framework of NATO, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force or whether on other coalition operations – such as the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, and it is fundamentally a human story. Regardless of the technical challenge, therefore, this cooperative spirit – supported by our liaison and exchange officer network – together with our combined operational battlegroups and headquarters, must and will prevail against current and future challenges.



A French paratrooper on the drop zone after parachuting into Exercise Falcon Amarante 18 © Crown copyright



British and French paratroopers carry their parachutes off the drop zone during Exercise Falcon Amarante in 2018

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SHARED 'AMARANTE SPIRIT' LIFTS EVOLVING AIRBORNE ALLIANCE

AUTHORS

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Lieutenant Colonel Olivier Baglin, French exchange officer to 16X HQ, in charge of A-CJEF activities planning and coordination within the J5 cell.

In a more contested and volatile world, collaboration between nations is not just a strategic imperative but a tactical necessity. The Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (A-CJEF), a product of the Lancaster House Agreement, is testament to the growing collaboration between the United Kingdom and France. It enhances both NATO's Air Manoeuvre and its very high readiness capabilities. This article examines how the interoperability goals of UK and French airborne forces are underpinned by a shared ethos born from tactical training between the two nations, termed 'the Amarante Spirit'. Amarante, originating from the French word, refers to the symbolic maroon from the beret of many parachute units.

ORIGINS OF THE AIRBORNE COMBINED JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

In the 2010 Lancaster House Agreement, the UK and France committed to enhancing their defence capabilities and sharing resources. The A-CJEF, as part of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, was conceived as a mechanism to bolster interoperability and joint capabilities, through air assault and airborne operations. The A-CJEF represents a rarity in that it is a truly combined very high readiness expeditionary force that can demonstrate to adversaries that NATO allies

can project together, thus contributing to modern deterrence.

The Lancaster House Agreement, serving as the foundational document for this collaboration, outlined the commitment to joint defence capabilities and set the stage for initiatives like A-CJEF tactical training. It also serves as the foundation for additional memorandums of understanding to enable the tactical requirements of the A-CJEF, such as the sharing of logistics. This involves joint training programmes, exchange programmes and regular cross-nation deployments, allowing personnel from 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste to work side by side in diverse scenarios. This hands-on experience is invaluable, providing an opportunity for soldiers to learn from one another and develop a shared language of operations.

In its original design, the A-CJEF is a combined very high readiness expeditionary force for NATO under the command of either a UK or French brigade headquarters. Formally, the A-CJEF should be formed by a minimum of a battlegroup from 16 Air Assault Brigade from the UK and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste from France. This construct envisages national force elements operating side by side, while under the command of a combined HQ. Tactical integration derives from this integration

at HQ level, which sets the framework and opportunities through which it can blossom.

THE A-CJEF TODAY

Since its inception, the A-CJEF has matured significantly. A key component of the A-CJEF framework that has enabled this maturation is a biennial exercise which alternates command between the UK and France. To date, there have been nine major field training exercises as part of this design, conducted in the United Kingdom and France, as well as elsewhere. These exercises have helped foster a detailed understanding of the realities of combined capabilities and how they can be developed. For example, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste now maintain a series of shared standard operating instructions termed the *A-CJEF Handbook*. This is an ever-evolving product encapsulating much of the operational planning, capabilities and tactics of both nations to reinforce understanding and collaboration. Increasingly, the two formations are now collaborating at a lower and more integrated tactical level. The seamless coordination and shared operational tactics have become the hallmark of this collaboration, with soldiers from both brigades comfortable at integrating at company level, enabling them to “fight tonight” in the face

¹ *British Army Review #183, The Army needs to be ready to 'fight tonight', Summer 2023, p.4.*

² *Strategic Vision of the Chief of the Defence Staff, CDS, 2021, p.2.*

³ *Vers une armée de Terre de combat – A warfighting Army, CGS, 2023, p.7.*

of real and present threats.¹ It was from this integration that the ethos of the Amarante Spirit ethos emerged organically.

This ethos, born from a shared understanding of the evolving challenges faced by expeditionary forces, has become a critical component of both brigades’ ability to have meaningful dialogue on some of the more challenging components of combined airborne capability development. Through regular command-led dialogue, facilitated by this shared understanding, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste have set ambitious interoperability goals for the next five years to make the A-CJEF a more potent force. These ambitions follow the guiding principles of the well-known 16 Air Assault Brigade adage of gearing efforts of the force to becoming ‘useful, usable and used’. With the A-CJEF construct, this offers options not only to national decision makers, but also to NATO.

WHAT IS AMARANTE SPIRIT?

Undeniably, it is a shared ethos between two airborne forces. However, this natural camaraderie shared between airborne soldiers is not limited between France and the UK. It is shared amongst a wide range of allies and partners, demonstrated by an ever-expanding international airborne community of interest, including the US, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, as well as many others. However, the heart of the Amarante Spirit specifically lies in the close collaboration at the tactical level between French and British airborne forces, enabled through the A-CJEF construct. That said, Amarante Spirit is not just

about exercising together. It is about weaving a tactical tapestry that binds the airborne forces of the UK and France in a common mission. This collaboration goes beyond the sharing of equipment and resources. It is about fostering a deep understanding of each other’s operational methods, tactics and decision-making processes, to allow the British and French paratroopers not only “to win the war before the war”² but to win across the entire spectrum – competition-contestation-confrontation.³

EXERCISE PEGASUS AMARANTE 2023

One of the key milestones in developing A-CJEF tactical interoperability was the 2023 iteration of Exercise Pegasus Amarante. This exercise, which took place in Oman in October last year, was the most ambitious yet. Co-designed by 16 Air Assault Brigade HQ and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste, it aimed to test the A-CJEF in force projection and operating in an expeditionary setting for the first time. Using the British Army’s Global Strategic Hub concept enabled the projection of the A-CJEF training into Oman – beyond European borders for the first time. This provided a platform for rigorous training, testing and refining interoperability of the UK and French airborne forces. It also allowed the A-CJEF to successfully incorporate a third nation into its training for the first time, welcoming elements of the Royal Army of Oman. This included a parachute insertion conducted by the Sultan of Oman’s Parachute Regiment, a sign of the potential for the A-CJEF framework to attract other allies and partners. However, crises in the Middle East and Africa, and the



A capitaine of HQ 11^e Brigade Parachutiste and corporal from HQ 16 Air Assault Brigade watch each other’s backs after parachuting into Exercise Falcon Amarante

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subsequent operational demands on high readiness forces, led to both nations having to downscale the exercise at the very last minute. Initially planned to be two battlegroups, one French and one British, operating under HQ 16 Air Assault Brigade, supported by both UK and French tactical aircraft, the exercise ended up being less than a UK battlegroup with an attached French company group.

Despite the downsizing, Exercise Pegasus Amarante proved to be a crucial step forward in achieving valuable interoperability objectives. The adaptability displayed by both 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste under changing circumstances underscored the resilience and commitment of these airborne forces to work seamlessly together. The lessons learned from the exercise became a catalyst for refining operational planning processes and addressing potential challenges that may arise in joint airborne operations. For example, in line with the British Army's How We Fight 2026 proposition, the A-CJEF HQ commanded and controlled Exercise Pegasus Amarante using a dispersed HQ for the first time. A large planning and intelligence department remained in the UK, a small forward HQ deployed to Cyprus where it would be able to be control the simulated theatre entry into Oman, and a light and agile tactical HQ inserted on the ground in Oman. The concept was highly successful. The A-CJEF fought dispersed, lowered their signature in the field and kept logistical drag to a minimum.⁴ The achievements of this exercise are even more remarkable when considered against the final numbers deployed and the few interoperability touchpoints: only five French staff officers integrated into 16 Air Assault Brigade HQ and the final deployment in Oman consisted of 1 Royal Irish battlegroup HQ with two UK companies and one French company under command.

INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a highly ambitious exercise that involved force projection across four countries and thousands of miles, Exercise Pegasus Amarante encountered many issues, exacerbated by the challenges of interoperability. These ranged from the most obvious, such as language barriers and sharing ammunition, to the more complex such as international procedures for air-land integration and communicating between commands across operational level communications infrastructure. Reassuringly, the aforementioned benefits of the Amarante Spirit helped the A-CJEF forces overcome each issue in turn. The shared understanding of challenges very high readiness forces face in expeditionary settings provided the



“Reassuringly, it seems the Amarante Spirit ethos has sparked a culture of innovation and interoperability within the airborne forces of the UK and France.”

foundation for the adaptations for success. The liaison officer network changed regularly, communication barriers collapsed and collaborative planning at all levels meant a shared understanding of the commander's intent, allowing junior commanders freedom of action when all else failed. Perhaps of greatest significance in overcoming interoperability issues was the importance of being open with our partners about our own, and their, areas for improvement for the benefit of shared capability. These frank conversations are only possible with a close relationship, made possible by the Amarante Spirit.

THE FUTURE AIRBORNE COMBINED JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Reassuringly, it seems the Amarante Spirit ethos has sparked a culture of innovation and interoperability within the airborne forces of the UK and France. Joint research and development initiatives are underway to identify and implement cutting-edge technologies that enhance the effectiveness of air assault and airborne operations, while simultaneously improving the interoperability of the systems we already have. This should help both nations address the numerous challenges tactical formations face in achieving How We Fight 26 and Une Armée de Terre de Combat.⁵ From advanced communication systems to more joint parachuting and air manoeuvre, the commitment to staying at the forefront of military technology and capabilities is evident.

These innovation initiatives, regular command

dialogue and the lessons from Exercise Pegasus Amarante have provided the vehicle for the A-CJEF to define a route to improved combined capability. In an effort to enhance integration, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11^e Brigade Parachutiste have agreed on an interoperability roadmap that identifies several areas for development. Within this framework, the A-CJEF will prioritise developing its technical interoperability with a focus on command-and-control capabilities, such as delivering tactical secure voice, a recognised common operating picture, and core services for operational information systems that work beyond line of sight. To ensure realisation of these aspirations, the UK and France have agreed to share clear and open assessments on progress in these areas. Perhaps most significantly, jointly agreed specific goals for each biennial exercise will provide predefined times to test progress and collect data on the interoperability benefit of these endeavours. Furthermore, both parties have agreed to invest more to realise the benefits of the Amarante Spirit through more regular engagement, exchanges and training events, rather than waiting for the large-scale Pegasus (UK-led) or Falcon (French-led) Amarante exercises.

CONCLUSION

In the ever-evolving landscape of global security challenges, the Amarante Spirit is a clear example of the benefits of cooperation between the airborne forces of the UK and France. It showcases how two nations can commit to, and achieve, the development of a combined very high readiness expeditionary capability. While Exercise Pegasus Amarante faced unexpected challenges, the resilience displayed by the airborne forces in adapting to challenging conditions showcased the strength of this partnership. Close integration achieved through joint training, shared experiences and collaborative innovation, guided by the principles of the Lancaster House Agreement and CJEF tactical training, serve as a foundation for future operations, ensuring that the Amarante Spirit continues to thrive and evolve. However, this is not just a military endeavour. It is a statement of solidarity between two nations. A shared vision for a safer and more secure world.

⁴British Army Review #183, *The Army needs to be ready to 'fight tonight'*, Summer 2023, p.4.

⁵*A Warfighting Army - The rapidly-changing strategic situation is compelling the French Army to speed up its transformation with the objective of being ready to go into combat in the service of the French nation as a power for balance and training. That means boosting its operational capabilities by drawing on its moral strengths, new equipment and increased reactivity at all levels.*



HOUSE STYLE – HOW HISTORY HAS SHAPED THE FRENCH ARMY

AUTHOR

Having undertaken nearly all of his professional military education in France, **Brigadier Jon Cresswell** is now the Deputy Commander (Deep Battle and Joint Effects) with France's 1st Division.



As we mark the 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale, there is a danger of seeing this rapprochement by France and Great Britain as the birth of convergence and compatibility. In reality, nothing was further from the truth in geo-strategic terms: the entente established a 'restricted fire line' between the two nations' global interests while also contributing to French security against Germany and its central European alliance. By the start of the 20th century, France was very much a maritime power with its continental interests being largely defensive. Britain's powerbase was almost exclusively maritime with the only land power area of interest being the Indian subcontinent. If 'entente' secured British and French respective interests in Africa, it was the extension of the Entente to Russia in 1907 that secured India against Russian ambition. This started to align Britain against an increasingly expansionist Germany, especially after the German naval bill of 1908: better to fight Germany on the Meuse rather than Russia in the Khyber Pass. Nevertheless, it was the

naval agreement of 1912 which entwined the strategic destinies of France and Great Britain and made British commitment to hostilities in 1914 inevitable, unavoidable, even desirable.

The two nations' military institutions were very different and remain so to this day. This goes some way to setting out their 'house style'. Defining a national 'way of warfare' is a favourite question to visiting senior leaders at staff colleges but they are often quite difficult to pin down and risk meandering into platitudes rather than identifying a distinct and recognisable style. In the remarkable RUSI podcast series hosted by Professor Peter Roberts, *The Western Way of Warfare*, the most notable intervention on this subject was by Professor Anthony King who opined that the western way of war is the US way of war – an industrial and methodical approach to operations. What Professor King did not mention, however, is that it was France that essentially taught the US 'how to fight' on the Western Front in 1918. Therefore, the western way of warfare could be said to be the French way of war. In both large-scale combat

operations and stabilisation campaigns,¹ the architects of combat in the 20th century (and now 21st) hail from the French army.

The army of the Ancien Régime serves as the basis for the framework of today's French army.² In many ways it was similar to the British Army of its day: a small, professional force formed around the sovereign (and whose legend is well known through its immortalisation by Alexandre Dumas³) and expanded in wartime. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars witnessed a paradigm shift in terms of the raising of large armies (the *levée en masse* or the nation in arms, which is the basis for the rousing French national anthem – *La Marseillaise*). While the concept of the division emerged in the 18th century, the early 19th saw the emergence of the army corps – essentially a mini army, able to operate independently and converge with other corps to deliver overwhelming mass. While there remains some reference to the Ancien Régime in French unit names and traditions, for example, 1st (Royal) Artillery Regiment – The King's Fusiliers,⁴ it is the heritage of Imperial France that has left an indelible mark on the army and its house style in terms of *l'audace*. This is particularly evident at Saint-Cyr where the cadets commemorate the Battle of Austerlitz every year – the first battle where officers from the academy fell in action. The Second Empire came to a disastrous end in 1870 at Sedan⁵ and the Third Republic was born out of the ashes of both defeat at the hands of Prussia, which emerged as a unified German Empire,

¹*Ink Spot* theory (*tache d'huile*) was developed by General Gallieni in the pacification of Madagascar in 1896.

²Change of command ceremonies follow the pre-revolutionary pattern and generals review their troops to the Scottish march of Robert the Bruce (a version of *Scots Wha Hae*) highlighting the Auld Alliance between France and Scotland (Mary, Queen of Scots was a French princess). French Navy and Marines parade to the (Breton) Pipes.

³The Musketeers still exist today as the *Garde Républicaine*.

⁴The first commanding officer of the Regiment was King Louis XIV and its alumni includes a certain Lieutenant N Bonaparte RA.

⁵It was the Prussian/German army's operational art together with its breach-loading Krupp artillery that secured victory against the French army's undoubted tactical prowess and superior marksmanship. Of note is that Napoleon III chose to go into Exile in Britain and his son, Louis-Napoleon, commissioned into the Royal Artillery and fell in the Zulu War of 1879.

⁶This does not mean that the whole force was conscript. The army included a sizable 'regular' cadre, especially for its overseas garrisons and territories.

⁷While the British might remember the French army mutinies of 1917 – one of the strategic drivers for Third Ypres, the dark days of 1918 with Haig's 'Backs to the wall' order of the day and Petain's army marching to the rescue of the BEF is lost in our popular recollection of the Great War.



Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, and Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, after the inspection of the Guard of Honour of C Company, 6th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders at Iwuy, 15th November 1918

and a short-lived Commune, which was brutally suppressed by the interim Republic.

The 44 years between the creation of the Third Republic and the outbreak of the Great War saw France develop a modern, industrial and continental army based on conscription to enable rapid expansion on mobilisation.⁶ Germany was the principal threat and also the target in terms of restoring Alsace and Lorraine to French governance. The army served as a school for republicanism and assumed an important status, popular veneration and political influence as the tool that underwrote the sovereignty and freedom of the state. It was also a source of pride and influence overseas. France had sought redemption through expansion in Africa and the Far East, thus bringing us back around to the importance of the Entente Cordiale. When war came in 1914, France was ready and despite the terrible cost and challenges to the Republic, there was no doubt who the victor was. This is important, as there appears to be a popular misconception that the Great War ended as a draw and in, Anglo-Saxon circles, that it was largely a British victory on land. We should make no mistake; this was a decisive victory, won through the stranglehold of economic blockade by Allied sea power and in battle on the Western Front with the glory largely going to France with Ferdinand Foch as Supreme Allied Commander.⁷ The US Army learned its craft here, under French instruction and with French equipment; arguably the British did too, by imitation, notably in terms of fire planning and combined arms fire and manoeuvre. France introduced storm troop tactics, not the Germans, and the French first used the creeping barrage in April 1915. If the first day of the Somme is remembered in British history as a tragedy, the French attacks that day achieved their objectives.

Understandably, after the disastrous culmination of the Second Empire, the Third Republic developed a natural apprehension towards military intervention in politics – although ironically the Republic formally came into being through a military president in the form of Marshal Patrice de MacMahon. The military was associated with Roman Catholicism and was often either royalist or bonapartist: vestiges of this remain to this day. The latter part of the next decade saw a resurgence of military politicians with General Boulanger as the War Minister, where his threat of a coup d'état led to his conviction in absentia for treason and ultimately his suicide in 1891. The importance of republican (civil) control of the military was clear and reinforced by the demands of total war, perfectly captured by the apocryphal statement, attributed to Clemenceau, that war was 'too serious a topic to be left to the military'. Nevertheless, continuing a tradition of turning to (or offering opportunity for) military intervention in times of crisis, the fall of Metropolitan France in 1940 and the country's partition into two main zones led to a French state under Marshal Philippe Pétain, the hero of Verdun (and the saviour of the British Expeditionary Force in 1918).

The architect of France's continued fight against Nazi Germany, its symbol resistance and the restoration of French sovereignty was another general, the aptly named Charles de Gaulle, who while maintaining his position as a military officer, quickly made the transition to become a political leader. France was to turn once again to De Gaulle during the crisis of 1958. The general returned to the political stage, initially as prime minister and then as the first president of the Fifth Republic. Doubtless his military credentials underpinned his legitimacy when he faced down a military coup in Algiers in 1961.

In terms of national consciousness, it is difficult for the British reader to understand the shock of 1940 and its enduring impact to this day. This second national disaster at the hands of Germany informed France's determination to develop an independent nuclear deterrent and informed a consensus in the French military that the armed forces did not have the means – and the nation lacked the will – to fight in 1940. This manifests itself today in the CHEM [Centre des hautes études militaire/ Centre for Higher Military Studies], which is the French equivalent of the UK's Royal College of Defence Studies, but with the membership of UK Higher Command and Staff Course. While the British military seeks to train its brightest and best to command campaigns at the operational level, France prepares its service elite to argue for resources in the city and to exercise influence on the political-strategic stage. The re-establishment of the French army in the Allied order of battle in 1942, equipped by the USA, created a new style of warfare for 'Fighting France'. With limited heavy firepower capabilities, and largely dependent on the US Army for heavy artillery, the French forces developed a manoeuvre centric style of warfare. This was to prove highly effective under the command of Marshals Juin in Italy and De Lattre in France, where the latter's First French Army took the right of the Allied line to liberate France and went on to cross the Rhine and march to victory in Germany.⁸

If 1940 continues to weigh heavily on French thinking then so does 1956. Brought up in the shadow of Fashoda, De Gaulle was not given to pro-British sentiment and his relationships with Churchill and Roosevelt were not easy. The term Anglo-Saxon in English tends to be associated with the post Roman/pre-Norman era but in French it is the term which covers the Anglosphere, once the realm of Britain and now with the USA as the cultural and geo-strategic flag bearer. Although De Gaulle was not in power in 1956, he was heavily influenced by the fallout of Suez and the importance of French strategic

Monument to French general and statesman Charles de Gaulle on the Avenue des Champs-Elysees in Paris



“The architect of France’s continued fight against Nazi Germany, its symbol resistance and the restoration of French sovereignty was another general, Charles de Gaulle, who while maintaining his position as a military officer, quickly made the transition to become a political leader.”

sovereignty in the face of American hegemony (Britain of course went the other way). This manifested itself through France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. France rejoined in 2009, but is not part of the Alliance's nuclear planning group on the basis that its national deterrent must remain exclusively sovereign. Sovereignty is an important part of French strategic thinking. While both Britain and France both have 14 overseas dependences of varying status, France maintains sizable national forces in its overseas territories together with pre-positioned forces in other countries where there are bi-lateral defence agreements. West Africa holds a particular cultural importance for the French army and has given rise to a preference for wheeled platforms over tracked. National sovereignty is also a cornerstone of France's defence industry, which is one of the central pillars of her national security strategy. Defence sales overseas represent an important

⁸The author of this article has the honour to serve in the successor formation to the 1st (Armoured) Division, formed in Tunisia in 1942 and which fought through North Africa, Italy, France and into Germany.

⁹Largely absent from the British Army although clearly present in the US military.

means of underwriting French military capability. The notion of sovereignty extends to Europe and France's place as the leading military power in the European Union.

From unit command at colonel rank to staff college-trained lieutenant colonels as unit chiefs of staff, to formal parades, national manifestations (the most famous being the 14th July – Bastille Day) and a cult of sacrifice and patriotism which underpins the 'moral component',⁹ history has defined the French army, technically, tactically and culturally. There are the Saint-Cyr promotion titles and even street names commemorating valour and sacrifice at the lowest tactical echelon, a system of direct entry non-commissioned officers with their own academy, and the rank system and insignia, which are quite different from the Anglo-Germanic ones. All these elements define the French army of 2024 as the product of a rich tapestry of events, success, tragedy and culture. While 2024 sees the celebration of the Entente Cordiale, we must recognise that there are significant and intriguing differences between our two nations and our two militaries. Exploring, understanding and bridging the divide must be constant and we should recognise these differences as positive in terms of offering diversity of view and combined strength through unity.



AND SO WHAT ABOUT THE BRITISH?

If the previous pages were written with the British reader in mind, it seems only fair to offer the French reader a reverse view of the British Army beyond the opening observations of Great Britain being a maritime power where the Army was very much the second service with an almost separate army in India.

The British Army is proud of its heritage, which is based on a record of largely successful enterprises over the course of its history, which formally dates from the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 following the English civil war and the Commonwealth.¹⁰ That said, its professional structure is largely that of the parliamentary/Commonwealth forces of the interregnum whose infantry wore scarlet coats. Like all military narratives, it is carefully confected to reflect positively on the values of the institution. If the Army sees itself as largely successful this is because of Britain's maritime position, which meant that she could largely pick and choose her land commitments and deploy the Army on the maritime flanks, where continental armies were at the limits of their interior lines, or reinforce continental allies. The Army could also withdraw by sea if unfavourably matched. As such, the British Army was never really a defensive force, although it did have an internal security role. As an expeditionary force, its small size was a reflection of the limited investment that land power merited compared with sea power, which was non-discretionary. The Indian army was a different entity altogether and was much more operational although largely limited to the sub-continent, at least until 1914. In terms of capability, it was also kept one-step behind the British regular army. The wars of the 18th and 19th century have been largely forgotten beyond the names on the colours and guidons and even Waterloo is little more

than a name for most Britons. The Army's modern form comes from the First World War and its warm-up act, the Second Boer War (1899-1902), which effectively transformed the red-coated drill-based force into the khaki-clad open order riflemen that took to the field in 1914. If the Great War created the modern British Army in terms of its structure, then the identity of today's Army is largely based on the Second World War and the counter-insurgency campaigns since, punctuated with small national or major coalition operations.¹¹

The 'house style' of the British Army is defined by its unique past. Officers were traditionally drawn from the aristocracy and the landed classes as commissions in the infantry and cavalry were purchased and sold on. This meant that an officer usually required a private income and commitment to the profession of arms was as much social as it was professional. This started to change with the abolition of purchase in 1881¹² and the gradual development of a modern and professional army with military training areas, ranges and large-scale exercises. The officer corps retained a degree of social distinction despite its transformation in the 20th century, most notably due to the requirements of a continental army in the Great War. Outwardly, there might appear to be less formality between officers, especially within the confines of the officers' mess with

¹⁰The term *Commonwealth* here should not be associated with the club of nations that today is linked by a former association with Britain. The *Commonwealth* here refers to the religious based parliamentary regime that became increasingly authoritarian following the execution of King Charles I.

¹¹The Falklands in 1982, the Gulf War of 1991 and, more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq.

¹²The Childers Reforms.

equally relaxed interactions between the messes albeit bounded by a formal structure, which occasionally can seem quite rigid, but is usually just theatre. There is no lateral entry into the corps of senior non-commissioned officers. Soldiers enlist and begin their service as privates (there are a number of terms for the private soldier depending on unit and tradition – guardsman, highlander, rifleman, craftsman, gunner, sapper, trooper) although in the technical arms, promotion is based on professional qualifications and therefore can be rapid in some areas. Sergeants, therefore, have many years' experience. The basic team (tank, gun detachment, infantry section [squad/group in US or French parlance]) is commanded by a corporal who will also have a number of years of experience as a soldier. Soldiers can become commissioned officers in two ways: the first is to apply for officer selection where usually the soldier is identified and recommend by their commanding officer. The second is to promote from warrant officer as a natural career continuation based on technical expertise and professional experience. These officers become 'quartermasters', although the term is less used these days and they promote directly to captain and often assume second-in-command positions in sub-units before taking technical functions on a unit staff. Of note is that officers are trained in terms of tactical leadership using the dismounted infantry platoon as the learning platform for combat and they learn to manage their soldiers and capabilities in barracks but are not automatically trained as instructors. At unit level this role is usually carried out by non-commissioned officers. Equally, all direct entry officers are trained at Sandhurst on a course that lasts for one year in which they learn to become soldiers, leaders and officers. They then complete their training at an arms school (infantry, armour, military engineering, artillery



etc) to learn the professional skills required for their first command appointment. Most officers now undertake a three-year undergraduate degree before joining the Army but there is no equivalent of Saint-Cyr (unlike the US Army with West Point); indeed, the UK does not have an equivalent of France's Grandes Ecoles.

The units of the British Army are smaller than their French counterparts. The basic unit is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is usually between 500 and 800 strong. This will usually equate to three principal sub units (squadrons, companies, batteries) with supporting sub units (support and headquarters). Units are either called regiments (for cavalry, artillery, engineers, signals and logistics) or battalions for infantry and some other support services. Of note, is that the term 'regiment' can also be used in place of 'corps' to represent an overall identity bounded by one capbadge. So, the Royal Regiment of Artillery comprises some 20 individual 'regiments' and the Royal Anglian Regiment (infantry) has three battalions known as 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion etc, but the corps/regimental identity itself has no tactical significance. It does, however, play an important role in terms of recruiting, personnel management, regional affiliation and esprit de corps.

The lived experience of the Field Army is based on the life of the unit, its place in the training and readiness cycle and its role. A soldier's daily existence is essentially guided by the programme of their sub-unit, routine maintenance and administration, support tasks and training for their individual role. While there is a clear sense of teamwork in the Army (a term which has now been harnessed to represent a challenge culture and greater inclusivity as an operational enabler) notions of patriotism, service and sacrifice rarely feature in its vocabulary – unlike in France or the United States. Unit parades where the colours are paraded and the national flag is raised are virtually unknown although the tradition was once common as seen on the King's Birthday parade where a Guards' colour is 'trooped'. Units do not sing (usually) and the handover of command is not formally marked with ceremony. Yet, occasionally the British Army goes to the other extreme with the most extraordinary and precise ceremonial as witnessed at the funeral of Her Late Majesty (pictured left). The British Army numbers a significant number of other nationalities and so while soldiers swear allegiance to the Crown, they do not have to hold British citizenship. To this end, the Army bases its ethos on professionalism with the Crown as

"While there is a clear sense of teamwork in the Army, notions of patriotism, service and sacrifice rarely feature in its vocabulary – unlike in France."



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the unifying identity rather the patriotism.

In terms of national history, apart from its birth in the English civil war and its formalisation at the restoration of 1660, the only other major national rupture where the Army was central to the political outcome was during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The accession of the Catholic James II to the throne in 1685 was tolerated initially and, that same year, the Army suppressed the West Country 'Monmouth' rebellion at the Battle of Sedgemoor. On the basis that both the King's daughters were Anglican, the protestant succession was assured but the (improbable) birth of a son who was baptised in the Catholic faith changed this and pushed nation and army into revolt. An appeal went out to the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange and his wife, Mary Stuart, who was the eldest of James II's protestant daughters. The Dutch fleet landed at Torbay, the Garrison of Plymouth declared for the Protestant cause and as the Dutch marched on London, the English army fell back and changed allegiance. Its commander was John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough and an ancestor of Sir Winston Churchill. Arguably this was the last major intervention in domestic politics save for the Curragh Mutiny of 1914 which was a question of inaction rather than actual action, although it did lead to the resignations of both the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the General Staff.

The operational and social history of the British Army traces the expeditionary operations and colonial campaigns of the 18th and 19th centuries with the Second Boer War acting as a watershed between the old and the new. In the three-year campaign on the South African veldt, Britain learned the realities of modern warfare and the khaki-clad, magazine-fed rifle-equipped force¹³ with its modern artillery that emerged was ready for the challenge of 1914

in everything except scale. It was in the two world wars that the Army became the nation in arms and finally eclipsed the Royal Navy (the Royal Artillery alone outnumbered the senior service in the Second World War). That said, it was not until January 1916 that conscription was introduced in Great Britain. In both wars, the mobilised British Army was reinforced by large contingents from the Empire (largely but not exclusively today's Commonwealth) including 2.5 million from India alone.

The post-war era saw the wars of decolonisation, the withdrawal from 'east of Suez' in 1971 and an enduring continental NATO commitment in West Germany, although Britain still maintains a number of overseas garrisons ranging from the South Atlantic to Cyprus and Brunei, with more recently the development of 'regional hubs' in Kenya, Germany and Oman. From 1969, the culture of the Army was re-defined by internal security operations in Northern Ireland. The 1982 Falklands campaign stands out as the last great 'national adventure'. Although largely a maritime campaign, it saw the British Army deploy 8,000 miles to fight in extremely hostile environmental conditions. Since then the British Army's campaigns have been broadly the same as those of France save for the 2003 Iraq War for Britain and operations in the Sahel for France. Its fighting style, from its harsh introduction to modern operations on the veldt and the Western Front through to modern campaigns, is defined by firepower with leadership based on delegated empowerment where officers lead by example and a highly professional and experienced non-commissioned officer cadre sets the standards.

¹³This included the cavalry which was essential mounted infantry armed with the same Lee Enfield .303 that was carried by the infantry.



'FOR BETTER, FOR WORSE': WHY MARKING D-DAY STILL MATTERS

AUTHOR

Professor Matthias Strohn is the Head of Historical Analysis at the CHACR.



In the world of wedding anniversaries, the oak represents the 80th return of the special day. It is the last anniversary that is officially celebrated, simply because it is difficult to find couples that have been married for longer. And so, in many ways, the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy that we will commemorate in June this year, will probably be the last occasion that will see the active participation of the veterans, those who were there and those who did the fighting. According to US sources, less than one per cent of those who had served in the US military during the Second World War are still alive. 16 million US military personnel served, of whom approximately 119,000 are still with us today. As the National World War Two Museum in New Orleans states, 131 of these die every day.¹ Other countries, including the UK, have similar statistics. Honouring the heroism and the actions of those who fought on the beaches and in the fields and bocages of Normandy is important. It shows the gratitude of the nation to the sacrifice that these young men made – often including the final sacrifice. As the UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps expressed: “We must never forget the sacrifices made on D-Day and the selfless courage of the veterans of Normandy. It’s hard to imagine a more noble act than risking

your life to defeat tyranny and oppression.”² Britain will commemorate the anniversary with a major event in Portsmouth, many local events across the UK and a number in Normandy itself. The defence secretary has expressed that he is “proud that the Armed Forces will lead the nation in tributes to the heroes of Normandy in Portsmouth in June”.³

This act of commemoration is important for the reasons mentioned above, both internally within the UK, but also internationally. Bringing the nations together that fought (on both sides) shows an historical understanding, but, more importantly, it shows to the world the willingness of these nations to stand their ground and fight for right and freedom. Shapps summed this up when he stated that: “The 80th anniversary of D-Day will remind us that we can never take peace for granted. With war raging in Europe once again, we must recommit to protect and defend Britain’s peace and freedom with our allies around

¹nationalww2museum.org/war/wwii-veteran-statistics [accessed 12/03/2024].

²gov.uk/government/news/portsmouth-to-host-uks-national-commemorations-for-the-80th-anniversary-of-d-day [accessed 12/03/2024].

³For further information on these events, consult dday80.campaign.gov.uk [accessed 09/03/2024].

the world. The alliances we forged on 6 June 1944 are still vital to the UK's security today.⁴ The official commemoration events that we will see this summer will thus send a strong signal of unity from the beaches of Normandy to other parts of the world, including friends and allies in central and Eastern Europe.

In many ways, fighting with allies has been a long-established trademark of the 'British way of warfare', which stretches far further back than the Second World War. One might think of the Anglo-Prussian alliance in the 18th century, which helped in establishing Prussia as one of the members of the European pentarchy of powers, and which resulted in Britain cementing its position as the leading colonial power. In a *British Army Review* focused on the *Entente Cordiale*, one should mention this agreement as well, which was signed 120 years ago. Although it was not a formal alliance, it ended the traditional Anglo-French rivalry and paved the way for their diplomatic co-operation within the context of perceived German foreign policy pressures and aggression. One could argue over German aggression prior to the First World War, but it was clear who the aggressive power was in the run-up to the Second World War. Again, Britain and France stood shoulder to shoulder against Germany after their declaration of war on the 3rd September 1939. After the defeat of the Allied forces in mainland Europe in 1940, it was clear that a return to the continent would be necessary. The British military started planning for this more or less immediately after the last soldier had been evacuated from Dunkirk. The Free French Forces under Charles de Gaulle found their headquarters in the UK. It was therefore only logical that the small French

"Normandy sends a strong political signal to the world, one of unity, resolve and ability to defend one's nation and values."

contingent that landed on D-Day, on Sword Beach at Coleville, disembarked in the British sector and under British command. In 2019, the last surviving French Commando, Leon Gautier, remembered that the French soldiers were the first ones to hit the Sword beaches. As he stated, the French troops were only a few seconds ahead of the Allied forces, but this was a symbolically important and significant gesture.⁵ In the light of historical truth it should be stated that this co-operation was not always without tension – Winston Churchill's dictum springs to mind that "the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without allies". Some of these general tensions of alliances and coalitions became obvious when in November 2019 the French President Macron called the NATO alliance "brain dead". Today, in 2024, and with a war raging in Eastern Europe, it is clear that this is not the case.

Perhaps the most astonishing rapprochement

⁴[gov.uk/government/news/portsmouth-to-host-uks-national-commemorations-for-the-80th-anniversary-of-d-day](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/portsmouth-to-host-uks-national-commemorations-for-the-80th-anniversary-of-d-day) [accessed 12/03/2024].


⁵[reuters.com/world/europe/frances-last-surviving-d-day-commando-joins-beach-landing-anniversary-2023-06-06](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-last-surviving-d-day-commando-joins-beach-landing-anniversary-2023-06-06) [accessed 11/03/2024].

⁶[washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/10/germans-still-fight-over-d-day/8c599eb5-40ab-4cdf-9393-5e573a737add](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/10/germans-still-fight-over-d-day/8c599eb5-40ab-4cdf-9393-5e573a737add) [accessed 03/03/2024]

is the one that has happened between the Allies and their former enemy in the Normandy campaign. In 1994, the then German chancellor Helmut Kohl was not invited to the 50th anniversary of D-Day and the festivities were seen by the Germans as a direct affront. As the then chairman of the German Parliament's foreign affairs committee stated, "I cannot be pleased that, 50 years after the war, those who have been reconciled and are now allies in the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance cannot find a way to go beyond this".⁶ This was different ten years later, and, in 2004, Gerhard Schröder was the first German chancellor to attend the ceremonies to commemorate the D-Day landings. This was an obvious sign that Germany had arrived within the brotherhood of western nations. Interestingly, it sometimes seems that the Germans have embraced this to an unprecedented level. In public debate, the commemoration of Allied casualties (who fought on the right side) seems to be more acceptable than remembering one's own nation's war dead (who fought on the wrong side).

So, Normandy sends a strong political signal to the world, one of unity, resolve and ability to defend one's nation and values. This is a powerful and necessary signal, especially in current times. However, the relevance of the Normandy campaign is not restricted to this political sphere. There are also 'pure' military lessons that can be learnt from the 1944 Normandy campaign for the armies of 2024. These lessons cover the entire spectrum of war, from the strategic level to the tactical reality on the ground. Naturally, not all of these lessons can be transferred directly 80 years through time. However, even when this direct link cannot be made, the historical reality is still

Remnants of the Longues-sur-Mer artillery battery that 'greeted' Allied troops on Normandy's beaches Courtesy of *Soldier Magazine*



the perfect starting point for discussions about tactical, operational and strategic matters in 2024. This can range from an analysis of strategy in Southwick House to a discussion of the deployment of artillery in a 2024 tactical scenario at the Merville or Longues-sur-Mer batteries. Interestingly enough, this is exactly what happened in 2019, when the author attended a battlefield study which focused on artillery in Normandy. The main finding was that in a future peer-on-peer conflict artillery would probably once again play the role of the 'god of war' that Stalin had once attributed to it. Fast forward only a few years, and, as we all know, the debate about the war in the Ukraine is centred to a large degree on the importance of artillery and the lack of available artillery ammunition for the Ukrainian Army. In some ways, it makes the members of that particular battlefield study sound like Cassandra, the Trojan priestess and daughter of King Priam of Troy who was dedicated to the god Apollo and fated by him to utter true prophecies but never to be believed. It seems that, in this case, history had the answer even before we knew what the question was.

It is therefore not surprising that battlefield studies to Normandy remain very popular, not only within the British Army, but also within

“Senior national and international headquarters visit the battlefields in Normandy to help them understand things such as combined arms manoeuvre or joint warfare, logistics or the challenges of coalition warfare.”

other NATO states. Several NATO countries are currently increasing their investment in the realm of battlefield studies, and the CHACR is involved in the process, supporting our friends and allies in establishing battlefield studies programmes for their armies.⁷ Properly resourced and conducted with the wider and current questions in mind, these studies remain a superb (and comparatively cheap) tool to enhance the Army's fighting power. The complexity of the Normandy campaign ensures that there is 'something in it for everybody'. It is therefore not surprising that the War Studies Department at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst conducts a highly successful exercise in Normandy to train the officer cadets in tactical aspects and educate them in history. At the same time, senior national and international headquarters

visit the battlefields in Normandy to help them understand things such as combined arms manoeuvre or joint warfare, logistics or the challenges of coalition warfare. Again, the CHACR is often involved in these tours and is prepared to facilitate future battlefield studies that units and formations wish to conduct.


But let's return to the wedding anniversaries mentioned in the opening paragraph. On 11th March 2024, a press release in the US stated that a 100-year-old Normandy campaign veteran will travel back to the battlefields this year to commemorate the events that took place in 1944.⁸ This will be his fifth commemorative trip, and, probably, his last, so he has decided to make it count: after the ceremonies and commemorations he will marry his partner in Normandy, who is a lady in her nineties. It is unlikely that they will be able to celebrate the oak anniversary in 80 years' time, but, maybe, theirs is the best way to commemorate the battle of Normandy.

⁷For the international dimension, see, for instance, the battlefield studies booklet published by the Swedish Defence University: Mikael Weissmann, Jonas Björkqvist and Patrik Wiklund, *Staff Ride Handbook – planning and conducting Staff Rides*, Stockholm 2024.

⁸apnews.com/article/dday-veteran-france-wedding-wwii-0b2b2ef68803b29d17f599d0af6f98d5 [accessed 12/03/2024].



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TITLE

Detering Armageddon: A biography of NATO

AUTHOR

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A HISTORY IN SAFE HANDS

NATO was described as “not a perfect marriage” by the US Ambassador to the UN in 1984, however, a marriage is not a great analogy for the Alliance; in Peter Apps’ words it’s more like a “polyamorous commune with multiple overlapping relationships and nuclear weapons”. And yet in its 75th year it has become the longest running international alliance in history, eclipsing the Delian League, a 74-year long Athenian-led group of city states formed in 478 BC. And, even before taking into account newcomer Sweden, NATO includes 955 million people, covers 25 million kilometres squared and if it were a single country would be both the richest and geographically largest in the world, surpassing, for the first time, the total area of the USSR at its height.

However, despite its success in preventing a catastrophic conflict in Europe, there was nothing certain about the creation or longevity of NATO. Commenting on the NATO Treaty, US diplomat Lucius Battle made the point that “there was by no means universal agreement that it was the right way to go”. On becoming Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Eisenhower brought Lieutenant Colonel Roy Lamson, an official historian during World War Two, out of retirement to record the process of establishing NATO’s military command structure with the words “even if it fails, we should know the reason why”. Apps’ book is the modern inheritor of that responsibility to commit resources to capture history “so that the lessons from the past do not get forgotten”.

Detering Armageddon, however, is far from a dry historical record. A Reuters foreign correspondent and specialist Army Reservist, the author combines the detailed research and insight of an historian with the vivid prose of a professional journalist, the access of a high ranking diplomat and the practicality of a soldier. As a result, the book is both fascinating and easy to read, aided by appropriate and charming doses of humour. Apps points out that when the longest serving Secretary General Joseph Luns was asked how many people worked at NATO he replied “about half”.


The book charts the origins and development of the NATO treaty, a document designed to be understood by an ‘Omaha milkman’. It’s peppered with rare, insightful and fascinating

anecdotes about totemic figures such as Eisenhower, De Gaulle and Montgomery: “My present instructions are to hold the line at the Rhine. Presently available Allied Forces might enable me to hold the tip of the Brittany peninsula for three days. Please instruct further.” It delves into the unilateral actions of the US following the building of the Berlin Wall, the fact NATO found out about the Cuban Missile Crisis at the same time as the world’s press and the now infamous refusal by General Mike Jackson to follow Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s orders in Kosovo.

In Apps’ hands the history of NATO becomes not only a history of the relationship between the ‘West’ and Russia but draws out NATO’s character; built on consensus and designed to prevent an isolationist America, NATO has ridden successive internal and external crises (‘saved’ as Donald Rumsfeld once claimed once a decade by a new crisis with the Kremlin) but been anchored around a core task to protect and defend fellow Alliance members. Soviet, Russian and Taliban leaders have expected the seemingly fragile alliance to fracture, only to be disappointed. As Apps astutely points out “consensus isn’t everyone saying yes. It’s nobody saying no”.

The wording of the all-important ‘self-defence clause’ Article 5 is quotable by many... ‘if a NATO ally is attacked, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this an armed attack against all members’. Apps highlights the less familiar final part of the Article: “[NATO] will take the actions it deems necessary to assist.” Hardly the most binding obligation to commit to war in defence of others. And yet Apps suggests Article 5 is the reason European countries have been able to unilaterally arm Ukraine; the fear of collective NATO punishment has been enough to deter Russian retaliation on individual states. Moreover, NATO relies on momentum and “a lot of momentum is generated by a sense of threat and fear”.

It is clear, despite its imperfections, NATO is more relevant and necessary than ever. However, if the Alliance is to succeed following the arrival of new members, understanding its evolution is critical to understanding both its character and its future. As Shakespeare’s *Tempest* reminds us “what’s past is prologue”.



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TITLE

How the French Think: An Affectionate Portrait of an Intellectual People

AUTHOR

Sudhir Hazareesingh

REVIEWER

Professor Matthias Strohn,
Head of Historical Analysis, CHACR

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

Book reviews are usually reserved for new additions to the literary world rather than titles – such as *How the French Think*, which was first published in 2015 – that have already been well-pored over. There is, however, good reason to revisit the works of Sudhir Hazareesingh in *The British Army Review's* salute to the anniversary of the signing of the Entente Cordiale because, 120 years on, one could ask whether 'les Rosbifs' really know how their neighbours across the Channel tick. In times of uncertainty it is paramount to understand one's closest allies and therefore this 'historic' offering remains highly relevant for those in uniform today.


The author is a recognised expert on French culture and history, and his books have won a number of prizes in France. The French edition of *How the French Think* was awarded the Grand Prix du Livre d'Idées, so it is clear that the subjects of Hazareesingh's analysis accept he is 'right' in what he says. To make his points, the historian takes the reader on a tour de force of French history and the development of French intellectual thought and culture. His main point is that France has always been characterised by the idea of the 'two Frances'. This is reflected in the book's chapter headings, which often form contradictions or juxtapositions, such as *Darkness and Light* (exploring religion and mysticism), *To the Left, to the Right* (dealing with politics and the 'vision of the nation') and *Freedom and Domination* (relating to different ideas of society as expressed in 'cultured France' versus the Anglo-Saxon world's less philosophical approaches). Having said this, Hazareesingh does not stay in the academic ivory tower and uses approachable examples to illustrate his theory, the most entertaining one perhaps being the importance of the *Asterix* comics to the French and the national dismay expressed at the latest, 'weaker' editions.

The idea of 'two Frances' still characterises the country today, but in other forms than in previous times. Hazareesingh argues that this very confident nation has lately developed a bit of a minority complex, stemming from the loss of its (cultural) influence in the world. So, the author identifies two new and different 'Frances'. The confident one consists primarily of the mainstream political and business elite, which feels materially secure, still sees France as a major power in the world (according to the author, this view is shared by 80 per cent of French people), and who buy into "the myth" (the author's words) of "la douce France", celebrating the country for its quality of life. The

other France feels more economically fragile and is characterised as being "typically older, more provincial and more nationalistic". In many ways, this part of society is more obvious to the foreign observer, because of the rise of nationalism and a 'strike culture' expressed, for instance, by the Gilets Jaunes movement. In some ways, this new development is "the latest version of the eternal battle between the two Frances", which had previously expressed itself along other boundaries, such as rural versus urban, democratic versus royal or Catholic versus secular lines.

Perhaps one of the main characteristics of the France highlighted by Hazareesingh is the standing of intellectuals in the country and the influence they hold in the public sphere. As the author states in the conclusion "not only are there more of them [intellectuals] in France than anywhere else in the developed world, the sheer volume of their production (books, essays and pamphlets) is remarkable". The author analyses how French public opinion is shaped by these intellectuals and asserts that these individuals 'matter'. Here he touches on a fundamental difference between British and French culture. Knowledge and education are not seen as things that merely open the door to the job market but, in the sense of the German educational reformer Humboldt, have value of their own. In a practical sense, it means that debates can be prolonged and very deep. I remember a discussion at the NATO headquarters in Lille not long ago, which began with a focus on operational concepts. Within a few minutes, we had left the pure military realm and had entered the area of philosophy, discussing the impact of classical French thinkers, such as Descartes, on military thought today.

In the view of the author it is this approach, in particular, which will ensure that France will remain 'la Grande Nation' despite the new rifts: "The French will remain the most intellectual of peoples, continuing to produce elegant and sophisticated abstractions about the human condition." We, sitting across the Channel, should embrace these abstractions if we want to understand how our important ally 'ticks'. One thing is certain, and this book shows it beautifully: France might be Britain's next-door neighbour but history, philosophy and other developments have shaped a nation that thinks in very different ways. *How the French Think* helps to make the point that cultural differences can perhaps not be overcome, but understood. And what more could you ask from a book and from human interaction?




The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre has published three new joint doctrine publications since January 2024. The publications serve to guide military operations and inform professional military education as British Army regular and reserve personnel progress through their careers.

Allied Joint Publication 3.24, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support (Edition A, Version 1) is the NATO doctrine for the military planning, execution and assessment of the military contribution to peace support. The publication presents a framework for the planning and conduct of peace support operations, which includes conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-building activities. It describes how the military contribution to an impartial implementation of a political strategy is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of crisis response operations. The publication is intended as guidance for NATO commanders and staff, primarily at the operational level. It describes the strategic context and provides guidance on how Alliance forces operate. It also provides a reference for NATO non-military and non-NATO non-military actors operating with the Alliance.



Allied Joint Publication 4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Movement (Edition C, Version 1) was recently published with UK national elements. The publication provides NATO's essential terms and processes necessary to enable an operational headquarters to plan and lead movement activities. It is intended primarily as guidance for commanders and staffs at the joint operational level. The doctrine also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors. The publication replaces Allied Joint Publication 4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Movement and Transport* following a series taxonomy reorganisation.

Allied Joint Publication 3.3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control (Edition C, Version 1) was very recently published. This airspace control doctrine provides commanders with the operational flexibility to effectively employ forces according to mission priorities. It is not intended to restrict the authority and responsibility of commanders and their organic resources, but rather to enhance overall operations. The publication provides deliberately broad operational guidance for NATO operational commanders and their staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive too, and provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO nations, partners, non-NATO nations and other organisations participating, and non-NATO led operations. The publication is primarily intended for NATO forces; the doctrine is also applicable to operations within the framework of a combined joint task force or multinational force of NATO and non-NATO nation units. Therefore, references to the commander joint force command throughout this publication would apply equally to the commander joint task force or commander multinational force in those situations.



Doctrine publications and supporting documents can be found at the following links:

- Defnet – Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (sharepoint.com)
- DCDC App on the Defence Gateway Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (mod.uk)
- GOV.UK – Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (gov.uk)
- YouTube – Publications may be supported by introductory videos and audio books which can be accessed from the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre YouTube channel.

MUST WATCH...



"Humans aren't quick enough to defeat machines. We need machines to defeat machines." – Former Royal Artillery officer Christopher Lincoln-Jones on the evolution of drone technologies and the risk and rewards of the military's embrace of automation. Scan the QR code to watch CHACR's exclusive interview.




The Land Warfare Centre Warfare Branch recently published the following handbook.

Theatre Enablement Handbook

Theatre enablement is required for any operation which takes place outside the UK. Whether projecting forces in a joint expeditionary force role, a combined joint expeditionary force role, as part of a NATO or pre-NATO context, with our US partners in Europe or globally, unilaterally or part of a broader coalition, the importance and need for organic land enablers in the earliest stages of a campaign to open, set and activate a theatre remains an integral part of the nature of war. Enabling is not simply the business of combat service support forces; all forces entering a new theatre, or new operation, will not only encounter theatre enablement troops; they will be moved into theatre by them, supplied by them, fuelled by them, their vehicles repaired by them, treated by them, marshalled by them, their infrastructure built by them and services contracted for their benefit. Any commander or planner that wishes to deliver any effect at distance must understand and be able to utilise the capabilities that theatre enablement can and does provide.

This handbook will provide planners at all levels the basis of their sustainment plan in terms of fundamentals, framework and principles for any expeditionary activity.




The French Army's Centre for Doctrine and Command Teaching (CDEC) was established in 2016 following the merger of the Forces Employment Doctrine Centre and the College for Army Higher Education. Located at the École Militaire, the CDEC is a decentralised Army Staff institution under the command of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff. As the reference point for doctrine on Army employment, the CDEC provides advanced Army military education and acts as a vehicle for outreach. Its end goal is to fuel military thinking with a view to improving land forces' operational effectiveness. Among its recently published works are the following:

Concept of Employment of Land Forces

The new *Concept of Employment of Land Forces* outlines the evolving environment and principles guiding land forces for the next 15 years. Divided into three parts, it emphasises the need for the army to prepare for diverse confrontations, including high-intensity conflicts. The document discusses the changing landscape, the integration of land forces into strategic functions and joint operations, and the structure of land engagement from army corps to combined arms battalion task forces. It emphasises the importance of jointness, integration and flexibility in manoeuvring to adapt to complex and hybrid threats.

Planning, coordinating, controlling the Montreal 1976 Summer Olympics

This lessons learnt report offers a comprehensive analysis of the planning, coordination and execution of operations during the Montreal 1976 Summer Olympic Games. This historical review provides invaluable insights as Paris prepares to host the 2024 Olympics. By examining the challenges faced and the solutions implemented during the Montreal Games, the report underscores the crucial role of military expertise in managing large-scale events. It traces the evolution of the coordination and operations system, emphasising the pivotal contributions of the Canadian Armed Forces in ensuring the success of the Games. Through detailed accounts and strategic evaluations, the report captures the complexities of organising such events and highlights the importance of adaptive planning and effective crisis management strategies in contemporary contexts.



The Middle East

This document delves into the cultural and geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, exploring the historical context, fundamental tenets of Islam, internal dynamics, societal structures and ongoing geopolitical challenges. It provides insights into the region's rich cultural heritage, the complexities of Islam as a religious, social and political force, and the diverse societal organisations within Arab countries. Furthermore, it analyses key conflicts in the region, such as the Israeli-Arab conflicts, the Gulf Wars, the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War, offering valuable lessons learnt from each. Additionally, the document examines the sociological and operational characteristics of Arab military forces, shedding light on their command structures, operational tendencies and strategic outlook.

Marawi: Another urban battle against the Islamic State

This document discusses the challenges posed by military operations in urban areas, tracing the evolution of warfare tactics from the 19th century to the present day. It highlights the complexities inherent in urban warfare, such as mobility constraints, the densification of the battlefield and




the multiplicity of actors involved. The text explores historical battles like Ortona in 1943 and contemporary conflicts such as the Battle of Marawi in 2017, shedding light on the difficulties of achieving tactical victories and translating them into operational success in urban environments. Through case studies like Marawi, it examines the intricacies of modern urban warfare and draws lessons for future engagements.

Deception operations

This document discusses deception operations as a manifestation of the effects-based approach and the integration of effects in the immaterial domains. These operations aim to mislead the adversary by manipulating their perception of friendly force actions, potentially leading to inconsistent or hasty decisions on their part. Deception operations must be integrated from the outset of manoeuvre conception, requiring creative planning and appropriate resource allocation. Lastly, the document underscores the importance of an approach tailored to each tactical level, providing terminology, definitions and guiding principles to assist practitioners in implementing these operations.

Manoeuvring through effects

This document highlights the evolution of conflict, marked by the increasing use of the informational and human environment, requiring the Army to be effective in all environments and phases of competition. The strategy of manoeuvre through effects and the integration of effects in immaterial fields emerges as a response to this new context. It aims to ensure tactical success by focusing on six guiding principles, including understanding and integration, and using an expanded approach to major effects and enriched modes of action.



MUST READ...

*“Some of the most remarkable stories are of those who were civilians on the 23rd February 2022 and who volunteered to fight on the morning of the 24th. Mobilisation was chaotic but essential – these initial volunteers went on to make up a significant portion of the forces that defended Kyiv.” – With Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour having recently entered its third year, *The Battle of Irpin River* – a *British Army Review* special – provides a hugely valuable insight into the opening chapter of Ukraine’s ongoing fight against a numerically-superior enemy. Scan the QR code to flick through its digital pages.*




“THE PURPOSE OF THE BRITISH
ARMY IS TO PROTECT THE UNITED
KINGDOM BY BEING READY TO
FIGHT AND WIN WARS ON LAND.”



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