Contents

BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
This is an official Army publication, prepared under the direction of the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR). The information it contains is for official use only and may not be reproduced for publication in any form without the express permission of the Ministry of Defence. Individuals or agencies wishing to reproduce material should contact the Editor. The views expressed herein (including editorial content) are those of the author concerned and do not necessarily conform to official policy. Crown Copyright applies to all material published in this Review except where acknowledgement is made to another copyright holder; this does not affect the intellectual property rights of non-MoD authors. No article, illustration or image may be reproduced without the permission of the Editor.

Clearance: All military contributors are responsible for clearing their material at CO or equivalent level. Beyond this, responsibility for clearance with the MOD lies with the editor. Contributions from overseas commands must be cleared by the relevant Command Headquarters before submission. BAR assumes such clearance has taken place.

Submissions: Articles should not normally exceed 3,000 words with the optimum length around 2,500 words. Shorter articles are encouraged and welcomed. The ideal format is Word via email but please note Powerpoint does not reproduce well in commercial printing. Also all Acronyms and Abbreviations should be spelt out in full and Plain English Should Be Used At All Times. Material for the next issue of BAR should be sent to the Editor at the address below:

Address: The Editor, British Army Review, Building 97, Land Warfare Centre, Warminster BA12 0DJ

Phones: Military: 01985 223050
Civilian: 01985 223050
Editor: Graham Thomas
Email: armyreview@armymail.mod.uk

BAR is interested in sparking professional debate and, consequently, we are looking for articles on any aspect of current or past military experience that has contemporary relevance, so long as they are well researched, clearly written and suitably engaging. Subjects of particular current interest are: contemporary operations; Integrated Action; 21st Century manoeuvre; information manoeuvre; Strike; urban operations; innovation and adaptability; Leadership; Mission Command and Defence Engagement. For further guidance please contact BAR at: armyreview@armymail.mod.uk

BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
The Review is intended to provide a forum for the discussion of all matters of professional interest to the soldier. Articles and letters are invited from all ranks and from others having a special knowledge of military affairs. Controversy is the lifeblood of any professional journal designed to promote thought and discussion and is therefore welcome. Descriptions of recent or current operations and imaginative ideas on doctrine, tactics, training or equipment are of particular interest.

PHOTO CREDITS
Contributions for all sections of the journal may be submitted at any time and will be included in the earliest issue possible. Payment: The Editor regrets that no payment can be made for material published.

Contributions, Correspondence and Contact:
All contributions and correspondence should be addressed directly to the Editor, but readers are requested to direct distributions queries to the Army Publications team: publications@hqlf.org
Please do not send surplus copies to the Editor direct them to:
Mags Warran
Creative Media Design
IDL 402, Army HQ, Ramillies Building
Marlborough Lines, Andover
Hampshire SP11 8HJ

British Army Review No.177 is distributed as a General Staff Publication (AC 74100-76) by CDS.
Scale of issue as directed by CHACR.

© Copyright The British Army Review 2019.
© Crown Copyright Reserved.
Ignoring the Calls for Korean Unification  54
Major Mike Churchman

Making the Army Better with 360 Degree Reporting  62
Captain Robin Winstanley

Psychometric Diversity, Creativity and The Open Plan Office  70
Major James Ashton

Empowerment and Mission Command - Uneasy Bedfellows?  76
Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham

A British View of International Attachment at the German Officer School  86
Lieutenant Conor Patrick

Managing the News during the Battle For Rome 1944  94
Brigadier (Ret’d) Richard Toomey

America’s Modern Wars  102
WO1 John Hetherington

Hurricane: The Last Witnesses  104
Nick Smith

Fight to the Finish  106
John Peaty

Why We Fight  108
Major David Hoey

Dr Martin Samuels

Sceptical Christianity  112
David Benest

Cornerstones  114
Colonel Toby Bridge

Command: The 21st Century General  116
Colonel Alistair McCluskey

How Armies Grow in the Age of Total War 1789-1945  118
Captain Steve Maguire

The Nazi Hunters  120
Ian Palmer
Welcome to the British Army Review (BAR) 177, winter and spring 2020. We open this edition with an obituary for Professor Sir Michael Howard who sadly passed away in December last year. As the pre-eminent figure in British military history, Sir Michael was a driving force in the development of War Studies as an academic discipline in the 20th Century. His insight illuminated many debates, and to the great relief of many Army Officers, his pen was both eloquent and concise. Notwithstanding his wide academic achievements, those who had the privilege to meet him, were received with humility, interest and encouragement. We will miss him.

When we chose the theme of ‘Competing in the Constant Competition’ for this edition, we could not have predicted that it would reflect the recent dramatic developments in the conduct of international relations as closely as it has.

The delivery of drone strikes by Iran (or their Houthi proxies) on the Saudi oil facility at Abqaiq in September illustrated the increasingly transparent fusion of state-provided military technology with non-state actors to execute a strategic attack. Tehran repeated the trick throughout November and December, with an escalating campaign of missile strikes on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) bases in Iraq. These actions culminated in the US decision to kill Major General Soleimani, the Commander of the IRGC Al-Quds Force with its own drone strike on 3 January.

Not to be outdone, Russia made moves in the Information Manoeuvre arena during the same period. On 1st November the Kremlin’s Sovereign Internet Law came into force which enables the disconnection of the Russian Internet from the World Wide Web and forces the use of national IT infrastructure. This was exercised on 27th December when RuNET was unplugged from the World Wide Web and tested. While this has been described as an essential defence capability against external threats, critics suggest it will pose an equal constraint to Russian opposition groups by providing Putin’s Government with a de-facto censorship capability in the future. In addition to these developments, on 27th December Russia declared that the Hypersonic Avangard missile system was now operational. While there remains some debate about the true capability of the system, its deployment supports the strong national narrative emanating from Moscow and plays to audiences both at home and abroad. We await the further development of these events with interest.

As we begin to explore the requirement for us to ‘operate’ as well as ‘fight’, the articles in themed section of this edition capture some of the emerging thinking by our personnel. Will Davies reports on his impressions working alongside the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, highlighting, in particular, the strategic opportunities that can be exploited if we develop our capability in this area. Perhaps the key to that is improving our ability to understand the operating
environment in its widest context. This is the role of 77 Brigade and is described for the uninitiated by James Chandler’s article. As part of 77 Brigade’s Outreach Group, Thammy Evans’ article reminds us that perception is always ‘in the eye of the beholder’ and that gender plays a critical role in this respect. It’s difficult to believe that we will fully understand the human terrain if we exclude this critical aspect of the community perspective. There’s no doubt that these aspects of our operational repertoire will become an increasingly important area of development in the coming months and years. We close the themed section with an article republished from AGILE WARRIOR reports which highlights how we may choose - or be required - to fight in the future. While this may seem incongruous in a theme of constant competition, it gives pause for thought about how we will transition between the constant need to ‘operate’ and the episodic requirement to fight. This needs serious consideration if we are to outmanoeuvre our adversaries. We will watch and report.

In the main section, we lead off in a similar vein with the second part of James Derleth’s article on Stability Operations. This is followed by an article that picks up the threads of BAR 176 on ‘Victory’ from Michael C Davies, a PhD student at KCL who highlights 10 themes through which we could reflect on victory. Strategic outcomes are also discussed by Mike Churchman. As we approach the 70th Anniversary of the Korean War, his article is a timely reminder that much remains at stake on the Peninsula, suggesting that global interests are best served by maintaining a ‘two-state’ solution in the future.

We also have three articles which look at personnel aspects of life within the British Army, followed by an excursion to our Bundeswehr colleagues in Dresden. James Ashton explores the effect of ergonomics on creative thinking in a modern military workspace, while one of our younger generation, Robin Winstanley, provides a ‘shop-floor’ perspective of 360-degree reporting. It’s an interesting point for ‘self-reflection’ for some of us ‘old sweats’. Similarly, Simon Graham outlines some of his insights into ‘empowerment’ within the Army. His research has some thought-provoking conclusions and observations; it is essential reading. Meanwhile, from Germany, Conor Patrick reports his experiences on the Offizierlehrgang 2 at Dresden, comparing it to the education we give our YOs through JOTAC.

Finally, we return to Information with our historical article on the Battle for Rome in 1944 before we close with another selection of book reviews. As ever, a diverse set of observations and opinions. We hope you enjoy them.
Professor Sir Michael Howard OM CH CBE MC FBA FRHistS, 1922-2019

This photo of Sir Michael Howard is reprinted here by kind permission of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
As BAR published an interview with Professor Sir Michael Howard a few issues back we felt it was only fitting that we publish his obituary, written by William Philpott, the President of the British Commission for Military History.

It is with sadness that I have to report the death, aged 97, of Professor Sir Michael Howard, a long-standing and in later years honorary member of the British Commission for Military History. Sir Michael was the foremost military historian of the second half of the twentieth century. After wartime military service in the Coldstream Guards in Italy and studies at Oxford University, he embarked on an academic career at King’s College London. Here he founded the War Studies Department in the early 1960s, from which root grew the expansion and diversification of military history in British universities over the last sixty years.

An advocate of what he called ‘total history’, he believed that the history of strategy and military operations could not be properly understood separately from the history of the societies that went to war. This philosophy was reflected in his scholarly output, such as his masterful history of the Franco-Prussian war published in 1961.

An official historian and translator of Clausewitz, generations of students will best know his work from his short but seminal textbook, War in European History, which I was encouraged to read in the 1980s and which is still recommended today. He had the gift of summarising the complexities of history in short, erudite and readable texts: two published collections of lectures, War and the Liberal Conscience (1977) and The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (1971) remain widely read and cited. After leaving King’s Sir Michael was Chichele Professor for the History of War and Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University. His final academic post was Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University.

Sir Michael educated several generations of military history scholars at King’s and Oxford. I myself had the good fortune to be taught by him as a final-year undergraduate shortly before his retirement from Oxford - his special subject on British strategy in the First World War era directed me onto the path which I have followed as a scholar - and thereafter he supported my application for doctoral studies and took a kind interest in the development of my career. Many other BCMH members will have had similar experience of his warmth and encouragement to students and scholars. Those who had the chance to hear him speak, which he did with verve well into his 90s, will remember his engaging, witty and thought-provoking lecturing style.

To an older generation he was a colleague and mentor, to the younger generation an inspiration or legend. I commend to you his autobiography, Captain Professor (Continuum, 2006). The modern military history profession has lost its creator and colossus.
Competition in the Periphery

Colonel Will Davies, CGS Fellow, Chatham House, uses a case study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to argue that competition extends to peripheral regions with global effects.
Major powers have entered a more intense period of strategic competition for regional and global advantage, played out below the threshold of armed conflict. This paper uses the author’s experiences in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to argue that this competition extends to peripheral regions like the KRI where, beyond the current focus on Daesh and counter-terrorism, there are opportunities to gain (and lose) strategic advantage over major rivals such as China, Russia and Iran in the longer term. However, these can only be realised if the UK and its allies view their overseas activities, including those of the British Army, through the lens of enduring, constant competition and re-frame the design and delivery of these activities accordingly.

The concept of constant competition features prominently in current debates amongst the military, academia and think tanks alongside the related concepts of the grey zone and hybrid warfare. The phenomenon is not new in international relations; nations have always sought competitive advantage over each other. Its current prominence reflects the rise of major power challengers to the post-Cold War unipolar world order and doctrine of liberal hegemony, particularly from China and Russia, and their quest for strategic advantage over the US and its allies.

As I deployed to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2018 for 12 months as an adviser on the reform of the Peshmerga, constant competition was far from my mind. Funded by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), my role was to advise the regional government on developing a more effective, accountable and affordable Peshmerga with greater institutional capacity and resilience. This was supporting the operational defeat of Daesh in the short-term and building capacity to prevent the emergence of new extremist threats in the longer term.

Working in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office environment lifted my horizons from the level of counter-terrorism and capacity-building to the strategic, political-military level. I saw patterns and made connections where I had previously been blind, particularly in terms of the region’s geopolitics, the UK’s long-term strategic interests and opportunities, and the competing interests of other international actors. The lens through which I viewed my role had changed.

As I left the KRI after 12 months, I had several unanswered questions. Beyond counter-terrorism objectives in the KRI, is the UK configured to achieve competitive advantage over other actors? Does it have long-term goals beyond the defeat of Daesh? Had my role supported these long-term goals? Are the UK’s competitors gaining relative advantage in the KRI?

Definitions of competition in international relations are surprisingly hard to find, let alone definitions of constant competition.1 Received wisdom is that major powers have entered a more fluid era of enduring competition for strategic advantage. This is an unpredictable form of competition with no conventional state of war or peace, no start or end, and no winning or losing.2

In this infinite game of influence and advantage, rival states are employing national levers of power to get ahead and avoid falling behind their rivals, often in cooperation with partners and usually below the threshold of armed conflict. For the US and its allies, the principal competitors on the global stage are China and Russia who are ‘shaping a world consistent with their authoritarian model.’3

The US has recently published guidance on a ‘Competition Continuum’ which sets out a conceptual framework to shift thinking onwards from the current artificial, binary distinction between the state of armed conflict and peace.4 And the UK is currently working on future operating concepts that address this phenomenon. However, there is little consensus on what constant competition actually means for the US, UK and their allies.

---

1 Mazaar, M., et al, Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, RAND Research Report. In this vacuum, RAND has defined competition in the international realm as ‘the attempt to gain advantage, often relative to others believed to pose a challenge or threat, through the self-interested pursuit of contested goods such as power, security, wealth, influence, and status.’
2 ADP Land Operations (2017), UK Doctrine and elsewhere.
3 Mazaar, op. cit.
4 US Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS
Analysis from recent articles and my experiences in the KRI point to four characteristics of constant competition.

First, the need to understand the regional and local operating environment in terms of the actors and competitors, their relative strengths and weaknesses, the opportunities in the short and long-term, and the obstacles. Clausewitz’s basic injunction on the importance of establishing ‘the kind of war on which you are embarking’\(^5\) applies equally to a period of constant competition.

Second, the type and intensity of competitive activity: Nations draw from a wide array of strategies for gaining absolute or relative advantage - some will be cooperative, some neutral, and some competitive.\(^6\) As such, relationships fall on a competition spectrum, from basic coexistence to mutual cooperation to soft and hard competition and finally to armed conflict. Relationships may alter over time, and simultaneous cooperation and competition with the same actor may also occur. The ultimate objective must be to prevent relationships moving above coexistence and cooperation through active dialogue, transparency, and shared understanding, although history suggests harder competition with some is inevitable.

Third, a mindset and commitment to enduring competition, with long-term goals: While activity is conducted in the short-term, goals and aiming marks must be sufficiently long-term to generate a sense of trajectory and avoid a reactive approach. A framework of ‘think long, act short’ should be embraced rather than any short-term, reactive alternative. Commitments must be made and held over time, even in the face of short-term setbacks and lack of progress. Success requires a vision and national resolve to synchronize all elements of statecraft to work toward an objective whose achievement may lie decades in the future.\(^7\) Premature withdrawal from the competition risks loss of advantage and forfeiture of opportunities.

---

\(^6\) Mazaar, op. cit.
Fourth, an appropriate blend of strategic levers - political, economic, security, and informational - within a supporting strategic and operational framework, which are tailored to the local environment and employed in cooperation with like-minded partners when applicable. The UK’s Fusion Doctrine aims to achieve this.

**GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KRI**

The KRI and Iraq remain critical to the UK and its allies for reasons of security, energy, and influence.

The KRI is an autonomous region in the north of Iraq rich in oil and gas\(^8\) and bordered by the geopolitical trouble-spots of federal Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. It is a sensitive and unpredictable region at the heart of the Iranian/Shiite axis that is prone to instability and insecurity\(^9\), including in recent years the rise of Daesh and the war in Syria.

Sources of tension in the near neighbourhood include ongoing civil protests in Baghdad, Beirut and Tehran; Iranian infiltration of Iraqi institutions and growing regional hegemony\(^10\); unpredictable US foreign policy, withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran including the recent assassination of Qasem Soleimani\(^11\); and, growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region.\(^12\)

The KRI’s geographic location, its relative stability compared to its neighbours, and its socio-political cohesion make it a critical cog in the broader management of the region’s politics and security. As central Baghdad falters again with a weak government, civil unrest, and cross-border tension following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the KRI remains relatively stable.

The KRI’s outward-facing leaders, their more liberal, reformist agenda, and economic resources offer opportunities for the UK and its allies to gain competitive advantage and influence in the region and advance economic and security interests. However, these opportunities are not unique to the UK with other actors also having access to them.

---

8 The Oil and Gas Year: oil reserves 45 billion barrels; oil production 451,000 barrels per day; gas reserves 5.7 trillion cubic metres.
12 Rumer, H., Russia in the Middle East: Jack of all Trades, Master of None, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oct 19.
COMPETITION IN THE PERIPHERY

There are 37 major diplomatic representations to the Kurdistan Regional Government including the major global powers of the US, UK, China, Germany, EU nations, Russia, and the regional powers of Turkey and Iran.\textsuperscript{13} A simple measure of the KRI’s geopolitical significance is the number of high-profile inward political visits in recent months that have included the US Vice President, French President, and Russian Foreign Minister.

Most actors in the KRI are democracies that are competing economically but whose interests otherwise mostly converge. Cooperation is the baseline type of relationship, manifested most prominently in the current unified approach to counter-terrorism and tackling Daesh. However, other actors have strategic interests that are divergent. The KRI is an attractive zone for the ambitions of authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, and Iran regionally, to further their own national interests.

For Russia, the KRI offers opportunities to deepen its regional influence, continuing a decade-long trend of encroaching on the US as the Middle East power-broker.\textsuperscript{14} Recent Russian bilateral engagement with the KRI includes Rosneft’s energy deals worth US$3.5 billion since 2017 and a long-term partnership with the regional government. The operations of Rosneft, Gazprom and Tatneft in wider Iraq are clear manifestations of Russia’s use of state energy companies as instruments of Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15} These deals make Russia a key international investor; they instrumentalize Moscow’s foreign policy; and they develop Russian control over gas supplies, which Europe may potentially depend upon in the future. Commercial deals serve to lock the KRI into arms and trade deals and extend military cooperation as ways to expand Russian influence further. While some experts point to systemic long-term political and economic weaknesses that may limit Russian regional advances in the longer-term, Russian influence in the region is currently only increasing.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Kurdistan Regional Government Website, Department of Foreign Relations.
\textsuperscript{14} Ferguson, N., Iran is too weak to start a world war, The Sunday Times, 5 Jan 20.
\textsuperscript{15} RE-DO - https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russia-and-china-forced-cohabitation-over-syraq-energy-22471.
\textsuperscript{16} Wasser, B., The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, RAND, 2019.
China, as the world’s largest importer of crude oil since 2017, has been an investor in Iraqi oil and gas for 20 years and the largest consumer of Iraqi Kurdish oil. It has recently announced plans to expand its regional role and deepen cooperation with the Kurdistan region in the fields of energy and infrastructure within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative.¹⁷

Iran’s influence in Baghdad is well documented, and it is now more actively seeking to expand its engagement and influence inside Iraqi Kurdistan, not just among its usual proteges near the common border but also in the capital of Erbil and in the ranks of the previously more reticent KDP party centred there.¹⁸ Kurds, keen for Western engagement yet disappointed by the lack of European and US support during its independence referendum in 2017, are balancing their options.

Against this incoming tide of foreign influence and power, my experiences last year suggest the UK is still well placed to continue generating influence and competitive advantage in the KRI as a result of its language, sense of values and soft power, historical connections, reputation for fairness and consistency, and influence amongst allies.

However, this level of influence cannot be assumed. The UK’s strategy in the KRI and Iraq, along with many of its allies, is still predominantly focused narrowly on counter-terrorism and the defeat of Daesh. With the threat from Daesh diminishing and other nations adopting broader strategies in the KRI and its surrounding region, the UK should re-configure its activities to be effective in a longer-term competition against rivals such as China, Russia and Iran.

**MAXIMISING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE - THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION**

One way to analyse this is to imagine how the UK’s current military activity in the KRI might look when viewed through the lens of constant competition and reconfigured against its four characteristics.

First, understanding the regional and local operating environment. In my role, understanding of the local environment was often patchy and one-dimensional. To truly understand the operating environment, experts - local and regional, academic and technical - could be employed to understand and assess the environment more precisely and periodically, particularly in terms of the other actors in the region, their long-term motivations and objectives, their strengths and weaknesses relative to the UK and its allies, and the local political economy in which they operate. This would ensure that military ways and means are optimally aligned to the local environment and adjusted as conditions change. Military personnel deployed to the region must be selected, prepared and then assigned in a way that maximises their understanding of local culture, language, and the nuances of the operating environment. Current deployment lengths are short (mostly 6 months or less) meaning that developing true understanding and functioning networks is challenging, and pre-deployment training and preparation is insufficiently specialist or detailed.

Second, the type and intensity of competitive activity. During my time in the KRI, the UK’s military focus was on immediate counter-terrorism objectives, meaning I was mostly blind to the military activities of several potential competitors in the region, including China, Russia, Iran and Turkey. This created a knowledge gap on other competitors’ broader military activities and motivations, with potential for opportunities to be missed and a sense of suspicion fostered. A broader perspective on competitive activity would have been useful.

Third, a mindset and commitment to enduring competition, with long-term goals. Commitments in the KRI are often undermined by the annualised MOD and CSSF funding and review cycles, inducing uncertainty over the future of projects. This does little to instil confidence amongst partners and generate mutual commitment, while creating space for potentially more malignant actors to gain influence with local partners. Instead, the UK’s military commitments could be cast and communicated in a way that generates maximum certainty and commitment for its allies and partners, while also serving to demonstrate clearly the UK’s intent to rivals.

Long-term objectives could be agreed in cooperation with partners and allies to enhance mutual commitment and ensure priorities are appropriately targeted and resourced. The defeat of Daesh, for example, ought to have been a short-term milestone within a longer-term 20-year regional security plan, not an end itself. Military activity should shift to be focused on building long-term institutional capacity and confidence in Kurdish partners rather than basic infantry skills. The short-term inconvenience of force generating more specialist troops for these tasks would be outweighed by long-term gains in-country.

---

¹⁷ China Vows to boost cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan, china.org.cn, 1 Aug 19.
Military goals in the region would be more useful in this long-term competition if they were broad and strategic rather than short-term and technical. For example, a long-term goal might be to ensure the regional government continues to view the UK as a military ‘partner of choice’ before other rivals.

Fourth, *an appropriate blend of strategic levers.* *Fusion Doctrine* should be applied to operational, regional activity in the same way it is fused strategically in London; currently, fusion between UK government departments is not fully effective in-country. The military element of a fused approach would be based in part on current high levels of influence and standing of the UK military with its KRI partners. Similarly, maintaining cohesion and cooperation with like-minded allies would create a bloc against potential rivals and further strengthen the UK’s position.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The UK’s policy in the KRI has been understandably focused on counter-terrorism and the campaign against Daesh. With the threat from Daesh diminishing and a new UK government in place, the UK governmental review of foreign, security and defence policy offers an opportunity to embrace new thinking surrounding constant competition against major rivals. The MOD and the Army are also now developing future operating concepts in which the concept of constant competition will feature.

In Iraq, there are also opportunities to enshrine this thinking in the country plan. The MOD is now signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Iraqi Government and defining its long-term Defence Offer to Iraq, although its status may be in question following the Soleimani assassination.

Beyond short-term counter-terrorism objectives, the KRI sits on the periphery of a much broader and longer-term competition for strategic advantage and influence against rivals such as China, Russia and Iran. The KRI and other similar regions offer opportunities in this competition; however, these will only be available if the UK stays engaged there, views its activity through a broader lens of constant competition with a longer time horizon, and re-frames the design and delivery of its activity accordingly. In short, and by its very definition, this constant competition is a longer-term game, and the UK (as with any of the other players) would be most successful, if they were to frame its activity within that context.
The last Tornado GR4 aircraft to take off from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, bringing an end to four and a half years of the aircrafts involvement on Op SHADER, the operation to destroy Daesh. Photo: Corporal Tim Laurence RAF, Crown Copyright
An Introduction to 77 Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel James Chandler, JSCSC, provides a brief overview of the role of 77 Brigade.

A member of 77th Brigade’s Task Group prepares specialist equipment while deployed in the Belize jungle alongside the British Army’s Specialist Infantry Group. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright
The character of conflict is dramatically changing. As recently noted by the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, the digital revolution has provided adversaries with a new dimension to gain a position of advantage over traditional Western militaries, like the British Army. Exploitation of the 21st Century’s information environment by irregular forces and hostile states have shown that manoeuvre on the battlefield today involves more than just the fire and movement of fielded forces. Furthermore, we now live in an era of ‘constant competition’, where the lines between war and peace, home and away, are blurred beyond distinction. Adapting to this ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ warfare, where physical battles between massed armies may not be the decisive moments in the minds of global audiences, is the challenge of our generation.

During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Nick Carter encouraged the Army to consider the implications of this new era. An era, he noted, that had witnessed the effects of ‘information warfare’ during Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Islamic State’s blitzkrieg through northern Iraq and Syria. Building on his experiences in Afghanistan, General Carter recommended the Army adopt a broader perspective on manoeuvre, one that incorporates non-lethal levers of influence, like information activities and civil engagement. He believed that modern ‘wars among the people’ mean the Army must learn to focus on the dynamics of local populations, their thoughts, fears and desires, more than just where they live and what tribe they are part of. Complementing this thinking were a range of initiatives to help the Army re-structure itself for these challenges. One such initiative was the creation of 77th Brigade.

77th Brigade is the British Army’s information activities and outreach formation. Information activities concern any undertaking that seeks to understand and utilise the information environment. Outreach is the Army’s term to describe civil-military engagement and involves anything from institutional capacity building to liaison...
with international development agencies and charities. Crucially, 77th Brigade is more than just the Army’s centre of excellence for non-lethal activities, it is the conceptual and physical driving force behind the Army’s development of a more integrated approach of lethal and non-lethal effects to achieve influence in modern military missions. While it is not the single answer to the challenges of today, it represents significant investment in new areas designed to support existing capabilities in finding effective ways to move forward.

The Brigade’s structure reflects the delivery of its outputs. The heart of the Brigade lies in the operations centre where all missions are planned and executed. It contains expertise from each part of the Brigade organised into mission teams aligned to each Defence operational framework. It is supported by the Information Activities Group who provide content and production expertise. The Task Group is the Brigade’s deployable element. Manned by officers and soldiers from the combat and combat support arms, it provides information and outreach support to the Army’s warfighting division. This it does by forming part of the Divisional Information Manoeuvre Group at headquarters and with tactical teams providing low-level support to Brigade and Battlegroup commanders. The Outreach Group develops civil-military and capacity-building skillsets, while the Operational Media and Communications Group assists the Army with high-end media and communications.

Complementing its key outputs, the Brigade also delivers in other areas. Utilising the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre and the Specialist Group Military Intelligence, both under 77th Brigade command, it can assist deployed commanders in understanding their area of operations. An appreciation of local actors, audiences and adversaries can be achieved via social network analysis, information environment assessments and ‘human terrain’ studies. The Brigade also delivers civilian expertise. This initially stems from its reservists, many of whom have years of experience in the communications industry or international development. Further expertise comes from the Brigade’s ‘special reserves’, a group of senior executives who provide top-level advice in areas from engineering and logistics to cyber, marketing and strategic communications. Importantly, the Brigade’s collective output aims to amplify and complement existing military capabilities, not replace them.
The Brigade is a busy and exciting place to work. During the last two years it has played an important part in the UK’s contribution to a number of international events. These include: the fight against ISIS; NATO’s enhanced forward deployment to the Baltic states and Poland; the humanitarian aid and disaster relief operation in the Caribbean; and the response to high profile events on the UK mainland. The Brigade has also maintained a near constant level of support to numerous defence engagement initiatives in Africa and all the major defence exercises in the UK and abroad. For an organisation of only a few hundred, of which over 50% are reservists, this represents a significant level of commitment. As a result, the Brigade is a popular posting for those keen for operational service and overseas travel.

Coupled with this busy programme, the Brigade is also known for developing innovative ways of working. Reflecting General Carleton-Smith’s new philosophy of ‘prototype warfare’, the Brigade executes a ‘democratised’ approach to experimentation, where young officers and NCOs are empowered to take calculated risks, enabling them to ‘fail early and fail small’, before learning quickly and exploiting lessons identified. By example, the Brigade plays an integral role in developing the Army’s emerging ‘information manoeuvre’ concept. This initiative seeks to combine information activities and outreach with a range of other capabilities, such as counter-intelligence and cyber, in order to integrate cognitive and behavioural effects into the planning and execution of Army operations. This, and other projects, aim to explore what ‘winning’ looks like for a 21st Century military and how this might manifest itself in practical terms.

One area where 77th Brigade breaks new ground is web operations. Stemming from the inspiration of one young officer and a handful of NCOs, the Brigade’s Web Operations Team is delivering capability in the virtual space. Designed to provide detailed analysis of internet activity and the ability to engage with friend and foe in the virtual domain, the Web Operations Team assists...
commanders with an understanding of local sentiment and public opinion. From humble beginnings, the small team now works on an almost permanent operational footing, often contributing to UK operations not widely discussed or known about. The team is also typical of the 77th Brigade ethos. They are an eclectic bunch of linguistic and social media experts, recruited on a competency basis, who have gone a long way with nothing more than enthusiasm, energy and a positive attitude.

It is clear we live in a more complicated and interconnected world than ever before. The digital revolution has shifted conflict into the information environment and morphed it into a near continuous ‘battle of narratives’ where skilful manipulation of peoples’ perceptions has become of strategic significance. It is possible we shall never see contained military conflicts, like the Falklands and first Gulf War, ever again. Traditional Western militaries are still trying to make sense of all the implications. The creation of 77th Brigade is a brave and novel attempt by the British Army to address these issues head-on and to ensure it remains a capable and credible force in the challenges of today. The success of this endeavour depends entirely on the quality and enthusiasm of the young men and women who volunteer to serve in its ranks. For those looking to help shape the nature of British Army operations in the information age, they should consider a tour with 77th Brigade.

During 2016-2018 Lieutenant Colonel James Chandler led the 77th Brigade Research Unit. He has an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge, was Chief of the General Staff’s inaugural Army Visiting Fellow to Chatham House and is currently the Army Research Fellow at King’s College London, where he is completing a PhD on Britain’s use of information operations in Iraq.
Members of 77th Brigade’s Operational Media and Communications Group capture a short ‘piece to camera’ with British troops deployed in Estonia as part of Operation CABRIT. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

Elements of this article first appeared in The Light Dragoon 7: 2 (2019) and are reprinted here by kind permission of the editor.
Trendy or Essential - Gendered Analysis of the Operational Environment

Lieutenant Colonel Thammy Evans, Outreach Group, describes how gendered analysis could be a game changer for operations.

A member of 77th Brigade, provides training on the international Military Gender and Protection Advisor (MGPA) course, Kazakhstan. Photo: Author, Crown Copyright

1 An earlier version of this article appeared in the Intelligence Corps journal Cognitio (2019). Abridged version printed with permission. Further discussion can be found on Defence Connect.
Long established as an essential analytical and programmatic lens for international development work, it is now high time for military operations to come to grips with the implications of gendered analysis. Beyond the benefits of greater tactical access in the field, gendered analysis should be a staple of the arsenal of analytical tools available to military intelligence supporting command decisions. Outlining basic definitions and the argument for why gender matters to the military, this article charts the path from tactical indicators to operational effects to strategic outcomes, and argues that gendered analysis could prove as fundamental a game changer for operations as the move towards a Single Intelligence Environment a decade ago. Whilst not ‘innovative’ in the technological sense, the addition of a gender perspective to analysis is innovative as a methodological catalyst, resulting in potential impact on root causes and conflict drivers in a way that many technological innovations can’t hope to achieve. In today’s sub-threshold conflicts, a gendered analysis could additionally help provide the winning edge for legitimacy in the information manoeuvre battle space for hearts, minds, likes and clicks.

Gender’ is an emotive word. In the military, where the introduction of women into the armed forces cuts into jobs that only a while ago were only open to men, the term gender is, as elsewhere in society, often mistakenly and perhaps even subconsciously willingly confused with women. Whilst definitions of gender, gender analysis, and gendered analysis will follow, this article aims to take the conversation beyond ‘just add women and stir’ platitudes, to answer a commander’s question ‘what utility does a gendered analysis have to achieve military strategic objectives?’ Moving from an understanding of gender analysis at the tactical level, further questions and examples will move the reader through the integration of a gendered analysis into operational assessments and then the policy, and moral implications for strategic level planning.

For the purposes of this article, the following definitions apply: Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialisation and determines a person’s position and value in a given context. This means also the relationships between men, women, boys and girls, as well as the relations between women and those between men. Notably, gender does not equate to an exclusive focus on women. Gender analysis requires the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender. Gendered analysis, by comparison, is the application of gender perspectives (there are many, not just women) in the processing and exploitation of information to provide deeper and broader understanding of second and third order consequences in a given situation. The aim is to produce a gendered assessment with impact on the operational environment, the development of policy and plans, and the achievement of strategic objectives.

THE CASE FOR GENDERED ANALYSIS
Global recognition of the importance of the role of Women in Peace and Security (WPS) is now 25 years old. Since then the conversation about ‘sex and war’ has widened to include gender dynamics at play in some of the root, structural, and proximate causes of conflict and therefore its role in resolving conflict. The evidence to date mostly highlights a ‘correlation between gender and conflict, rather than causation…[whereby] gender is never alone as a cause or driver of conflict, and that it is always intertwined with other social, economic, cultural and political factors’. Understanding the degree to which gender dynamics, inequalities, and power relations are embedded as structural and cultural drivers can give powerful insight into how they exacerbate violent conflict. As in development work, understanding the (often hidden) forces at play in gender dynamics may therefore provide valuable foresight for achieving operational objectives, as the following sections will show.


5 The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, was the first major conference to identify women in armed conflict as a major concern. See also UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security; UNSCR 1820 (2009) declaring conflict related sexual violence as a war crime; 2242 (2015) on doubling the number of uniformed female peacekeepers; 2272 (2017) on measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, inter alia.

6 A provocative title used by Dr Malcom Potts and journalist Thomas Hayden in their book of the same name (2008), which takes a historiographical and biological look at the phenomena of human nature, genes, warfare and terrorism.

ANALYSIS - THE FIRST STEP IN SETTING TACTICAL INDICATORS AND SUPPORTING EFFECTS

To date, guidance on gender at tactical, operational and strategic level focuses on what to do to be gender compliant, including conducting a gender analysis. Several models for gender analysis exist, starting most notably with the Harvard Analytical Framework pioneered in the 1980s for humanitarian and development work, and most recently (2018) OSCE’s highly practical *Gender in Military Operations: Guidance for Military Personnel Working at Tactical Level in Peace Support Operations*, which includes a section that starts to turn analysis into assessment using a three column format (p.18).

A gender analysis (i.e. a systemic examination of gender relations) of the conflict is a first step in reviewing collated and evaluated information to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. The table at Figure 1 illustrates the type of questions that can be asked at this stage to open up gender disaggregated insights:

Examples of the use of gender analysis and gender perspectives on military operations have tended to adopt the approach of ‘just add women and stir’ in order to establish active tactical indicators, situational awareness, and directly enhance a safe and secure environment, e.g.

- Mixed patrols in order to gain access and information from different parts of the population
- Patterns of movement of women and children as security indicators
- Placing of roadblocks or road improvements to protect women and children.

In order to maximise the supporting effects being generated at the tactical level there are further questions that can be asked to enhance effectiveness: Have barriers been eliminated in order to facilitate Mixed Engagement Teams (METs) and Female Engagement Teams (FETs)?

---

10 See AJP 2.1 for Intelligence Procedures (2016) for the full reference to analysis.
What is being done to integrate a gendered understanding into training, tactics, and procedures? What is being done to mitigate against an escalation in gender-biased outcomes, e.g., against the rise in the severity of indicators from potential, to impending, to ongoing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)?

As gender analysis becomes more common, as gender-disaggregated data becomes more commonplace, as analysts and planners become honed to seeing the differences, this first step may become more part of our standard analytical tools and less of an endeavour in itself. A gold-plated standard in analysis, using comparison with a Tier 1 Target Audience Analysis\(^\text{13}\), would see a conflict and stakeholder analysis incorporate in-country local language analysis with stakeholders. Such a pursuit of excellence requires time and resources. Whilst military intelligence might have a variety of means at its disposal to achieve a Tier 1 analysis, analysis conducted for peacekeeping, stabilisation or defence engagement could and should be done openly, as UK forces have been invited at the request of a Host Nation to engage in partnering. As a result, disaggregated data responding to Requests for Information (RFIs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) could be gathered in a more dispersed manner via ground troops, and in conjunction with other players, as we implement greater cooperation and coordination under Fusion Doctrine. Whether the results are delivered as a gender overlay for an intelligence preparation of the operating environment, or are simply mainstreamed into analytical reporting and decision briefs is a subject for further consideration.


\(^{13}\) TAA is narrower than a Stakeholder Analysis, and already assumes a decision has been made/assumed on whom to target. For more on TAA see [http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/TAA.pdf](http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/TAA.pdf)

\(^{14}\) Results of a question on gender analysis posed to the latest Officers Military Intelligence course lend itself to mainstreaming. See Cognitio (2019).

\(^{15}\) AJP 2.1 (2016).


---

**INTEGRATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECISIVE CONDITIONS OF OPERATIONS**

Beyond analysis is the integration of analysed information into the current picture of operations to reveal new significance to activities.\(^\text{15}\) For example, gender analysis during Disarmament, Demobilisation And Resettlement (DDR) often reveals that men and women disperse differently as war-fighting ends. Men who bonded in fighting, often re-assemble after demobilisation, especially if there are no jobs to go to, and remain a security concern. Women often return to families, but might not be able to if they are stigmatised from rape, or their husband has been killed. Child soldiers who have been forced to commit atrocities against their own family members are equally rejected from reintegration. These men, women and children are very susceptible to recruitment by Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs). Whether part of a clandestine VEO or frustrated and feeling disempowered back at home, the tendency for violence can be exacerbated and attempts to supress violence by the further application of force can lead to a build-up of support for VEOs, and/or a reversion to conservative values and domestic abuse of entire families. Cleansing rituals which have been used to overcome problems with re-integration, such as in Burundi and Liberia\(^\text{16}\), have tended to reinforce gender stereotypes and power relations, skirting the fundamental issue of men feeling disempowered by women - who have increasing opportunities for jobs in schools, hospitals, and traditional roles in markets and caring for family - and the cycle of retribution in domestic and societal violence that can bring.
Understanding such considerations in the current operational picture allows commanders and planners to reconsider timelines and options for supporting resettlement programmes. This includes focusing more effort on tracking and eliminating illegal weapons because of the role they can play in perpetuating domestic violence and subsequently power relations in communities, even when there are few overt external acts of violence.\textsuperscript{17} Integration of a gendered analysis can also allow the operational commander the insight into potential change agents across the gender spectrum in order to (sometimes) indirectly influence behaviours. An example here was the need during the Ebola crisis to inform women at the right times of day and location without men around because it was women who handled the deceased. Women were more susceptible to transfer of the disease sexually, whilst men disregarded the information provided on safe handling because of local taboos and cultural pressures on them, including men diseased with Ebola continuing to demand sex from partners or others.\textsuperscript{18}

In a sub-threshold conflict fought among people, an exploration of the benefits of gendered analysis into more subtle operational effects and longer term strategic outcomes could be revealing for at least four elements of a conflict analysis: the conflict profile, a stakeholder analysis (ideally looking at changes over time), root causes, and opportunities for de-escalation and prevention of violent conflict.\textsuperscript{19} One tool to help integrate gender-disaggregated data is the NAPRI wheel\textsuperscript{20} (needs, access, participation, resources, impact - see Figure 2). Together with a three column estimate format, the NAPRI headings can help group factors in the first column, and so aid deductions in the second column, and finally implications and tasks in the third column categorised according to tactical, operational and strategic levels.

\textsuperscript{17} Birchall (2019).
\textsuperscript{18} MONUSCO (2016), Gender Analysis in Field Offices, Workshop Module, p.11.
\textsuperscript{19} The 2018 UN-WB report on Pathways for Peace has documented several existing resilience drivers, that are often overlooked and disadvantaged by orthodox programming and analysis, in part because of a failure to take a gender perspective. See https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org (last accessed 15 Nov 19).
The integration of a gendered analysis at the operational and campaign level opens up opportunities for more targeted interventions, for better understanding of second and third order effects, mitigating associated risks, and promoting potential resilience drivers. How can an operation be adapted to mitigate risks of gender bias and gender-based violence (against women, men, boys, girls and different Sexually-Oriented And Gender Identity Expressions (SOGIE))? Have, for instance, the UN Action Matrix of Early Warning Indicators of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) been incorporated into operational planning? Considerations can be held at the planning level in a Gender Annex and included as part of the equivalent of a UN Annex W, which should detail the positive practical benefits in gaining second and third order consequences, which together may bring about the decisive conditions to achieve a campaign objective.

**FORESIGHT INTO THE STRATEGIC OUTCOMES DESIRED OF CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES**

Further interpretation is the final step in building an operational assessment in which the significance of information is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge. Such interpretation requires judgement and expertise in order to yield actionable operational effect to meet military strategic objectives. There appears to be little relevant guidance for the military analyst and planner to integrate the insights of the growing number of gender advisors and their analysis into an assessment picture. Nevertheless, an increasingly broad academic literature, especially in the related field of security sector reform and peacebuilding, support the case for bridging the gap between the simple tactical application of gender at one end of the spectrum and, at the other end, understanding the full implications on operations of integrating and interpreting gendered analyses and assessments.

The lack of specifically annotated military or defence level examples of the incorporation of gendered analysis in operational policy and plans in order to achieve strategic military and political outcomes, makes it difficult for planners to formulate and present commanders with courses of action and an understanding of effects that they can action and implement. This is despite the growing body of national and international policy and obligations. Greater diversity of subject matter experts at planning level, including inclusion of gender advisors, and greater understanding of operational and campaign planning by gender advisors would assist, but we are literally still growing both sides of this equation. A lack of examples does not imply that the thesis does not hold water. Yet without relevant military examples the courage and leadership to forge plans based on gendered analysis seems on the back foot. Areas where a greater nuanced military contribution to HMG objectives could be explored include the engagement of thought leadership in patriarchal

---

21 Ibid.
22 As discussed at the Inaugural Operational Intelligence Conference, Nov 2019.
societies in order to reduce violence, facilitating actively informed female electoral suffrage and correlation of length of suffrage with decrease in violence, and facilitating long term gender equality (with implications for men and women) as a determinant of improvements of wealth, stability, and prosperity.23

Considerations at this level bleed into other government business, but such is the nature of cross-Whitehall Fusion Doctrine24 and the role that a military campaign can play. Further questions for consideration in campaign planning include – what role does gender play in decision-making on conflict, security and peace in the theatre of operations? Do women, men and SOGIE have equal needs, access, participation, resources available and impact on strategic outcomes and to build common futures at political, structural, and grassroots level? How does this affect the direction and outcome for de-escalation of violent conflict and future prevention?

23 Birchall (2019).
24 National Security Capability Review (2018), p10-11. Some would argue that Fusion Doctrine is just a rehash of the Comprehensive Approach of the beginning of the century (see House of Commons (2010) The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace), but the cross government mechanisms and processes now in place have developed significantly since then and the use of the term doctrine rather than approach is more than just semantics.
26 As articulated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015.

GROWING MOMENTUM

With the UK having had its first, if brief, appointment of a female Secretary of State for Defence, the Right Honourable Penny Mordaunt (who was also the Minister for Women and Equality) in 2019, WPS and gender have sharpened in focus. Her predecessor, former Secretary for Defence Gavin Williamson, announced the establishment of a Centre of Excellence for Human Security25, in which gender, Children Affected By Armed Conflict (CAAC), modern slavery, and Protection Of Civilians (POC) are central tenets. The UK seeks a greater global role, not only to show its weight as one of the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council, but also as Defence works through being ‘international by design’.26 Today, ‘international by design’ also means ‘gendered by design’.

In response to UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015), which urges gender analysis in operations, there is a catalytic role for military command, planning and
intelligence to lead the way on how to integrate gendered analysis into the fabric of military operations and showcase the benefits that it brings. Gendered analysis could, and arguably should, be part of the standard analytical palette of military intelligence. It is not a single agency sport, and would be bolstered and enhanced by working together more systematically with a broader analytical group of military and cross-government subject area experts such as the Stabilisation Unit, MOD’s International Policy and Strategy Teams, and 77th Brigade’s Human Security capability, and the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU). Additionally, capacity building activities and Defence activities other than operations, which are seeking funding from the Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund (CSSF) - a proportion of which is earmarked as Official Development Assistance - will require a gender analysis to reinforce programming options.

A gendered analysis of the operating environment would assist in meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality, and could contribute to the UK’s role in the Contact Group of the Elsie Initiative to remove barriers to increasing women’s meaningful participation in peace operations. More robust gendered analysis at the operational level could be harnessed by wider Defence processes to illustrate military contribution to an array of UK policy drivers, including the International Development Gender Equality Act (2014), the UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2018-2022, and the Modern Slavery Act (2015).

**CONCLUSION**

Raising the bar of military planning and intelligence analysis through applying and setting the global standard for a gendered analysis of the operational environment is essential, for operational, moral, and policy reasons. It might seem that a gendered analysis is more relevant for the Engage, Secure and Support functions of Land Power. However, the ‘three block war’ that characterises war fighting as we now understand it, and the premise of this article that there is significant bleed from tactical to operational and strategic outcomes, indicates that we can’t relegate gendered analysis to peacekeeping alone.

While gender is not new, applying gender to the full methodology of operational intelligence cycle to reveal tactical, operational and strategic military implications is innovative. It could be the catalyst to help bring actionable operational intelligence to invigorate campaigns and fusion into cross-Government efforts. Such an all-pervading catalyst has not been seen since the introduction of the Single Intelligence Environment.

The window of opportunity to lead the way and use a gendered analysis to give us a winning edge to

---

30 The OECD-DAC requires programming to undergo a ‘do no harm’ analysis, and consideration of gender constraints, resources, opportunities and power as part of a gender analysis. See ibid, p6, footnotes 2 and 3.
31 In 2018, the UK became part of the Contact Group for the Elsie Initiative (led by Canada).
operations is now, as trends in WPS, gender, and human security take hold, not just in UK but in our theatres of operation. Undertaking a gendered analysis, including for more gender inclusive (as opposed to gender neutral) interventions, are part of what the public and Parliament can increasingly expect of UK operations and its narrative for hearts, minds, clicks and likes as we fulfil our commitment to be the ‘international by design’ and the reference Army of choice.

32 Nomenclature has moved on from gender mainstreaming (‘just add women’) and gender neutral or blind, to gender inclusive (deliberately challenging bias). See DCAF, Teaching Gender in the Military, p.118. Gender neutral or blind intervention usually reinforce existing gender and power bias which are underlying factors in conflict.
Image shows the audience at the Army Servicewomen’s Network (ASN) annual conference listening to Lieutenant General Tim Radford CB DSO OBE, the ASN Champion and Army Gender Champion, as he gives a key-note speech to the conference in Churchill Hall, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Photo: Corporal Mark Larner, Crown Copyright
Conceptual Force (Land) 2035

The Army’s Concepts Branch looks at the Conceptual Force (Land) 2035 as a new way for the Army to fight and operate from 2030.

Pictured is a Black Hornet Mini UAV being tested at the Copehill Down training facility on Salisbury Plain. Leading industrial partners in Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) have been invited by the British Army to put their equipment in the hands of soldiers. Photo: Sergeant Peter George, Crown Copyright
In Dec 2017 the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) directed that a Conceptual Force (Land) 2035 (CF(L)35), be developed to offer a means of leapfrogging to a new way of fighting and operating from 2030. CF(L)35, the output of seven years of Agile Warrior (AW)1 experimentation, is an analytical concept which understands the key drivers influencing the case for change as: increasingly complex threats; technological advancement; continued resource constraints; and an increasingly challenging urban environment.2 In light of recent ECAB direction, to develop a New Operating Concept fit for the next decade and beyond, publishing the CF(L)35 concept provides an essential reference point.

The CF(L)35 is designed to face the pacing threat in non-discretionary warfighting at scale, within a coalition. It is unashamedly a high intensity force, but also has utility in other contexts.

The CF(L)35 was not endorsed by ECAB but has been used for successive wargames for wider force development understanding as a future force. As such, it is just one version of the future, but one that remains compelling for 2030 and beyond.

THE CASE FOR CHANGE

Increasingly Complex Threats

CF(L)35 used DCDC publications to set the context, threats and opportunities. The updated Global Strategic Trends3, the Future Operating Environment 20354, and the Future Force Concept5 have been synthesised to describe the five-domain and three-dimension environment that a CF(L)35 would operate within. The pacing threats currently operate: fourth generation aircraft6; capable AH; long-range Anti-Tank Guided Weapons (ATGW); long-range and massed rockets/artillery; and SF capable of either leading or facilitating intelligence gathering, subversion and sabotage.7 Future capabilities under development include: GLATGM providing overmatch at increased ranges; Cyber, Space and Electro-Magnetic Activity capabilities which will degrade the EMS and deceive/spoof our sensors and communications; advanced computing; biological enhancements of humans; and Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS). The ethical and legal standards of adversaries may lead to the use of mass propaganda, deniable operations, cyber capabilities, CBRN weapons, and sub threshold competition in a manner counter to international norms. Hence, the British approach of concentrating combat mass to achieve decisive effect, may present greater risk than before by playing directly into the pacing threats hands.

Technological Opportunities

Actors who exploit technology to develop novel capabilities will derive significant advantage. Soldiers and commanders will need to be both digital natives, feeling intuitively comfortable operating disaggregated when connected, and able to operate without a network if it is disrupted. Developing a workforce that has the intellectual and psychological aptitude to work within an increasingly automated environment will present new challenges,8 however failure to understand AI capabilities may create vulnerabilities and cede advantage to competitors. This concept makes assumptions that there is enough time to develop machine learning and Robotic and Automated Systems (RAS) to be credible and deliver the mass required for future warfighting. This will require adopting a more flexible system of procurement to achieve a shift from ‘exquisite and therefore few’ to “inexpensive and therefore many’.

Continued Resource Constraints

Current financial constraints compound the challenge. Human mass is increasingly difficult to resource; personnel costs consume 55% of the Army’s budget and their rise is the single most significant contributor to Defence inflation. This seems unlikely to change in the near future. The search for more mass assumes that numbers and size are the only solutions to threats. Using Newtonian physics as a metaphor, combat Force may

---

1 Agile Warrior is the British Army’s intellectual programme to test an alternative force structures based upon the future operating environment derived from DCDC. Full evidential reports held by Concepts Branch: http://cui1-uk.difc.mil.uk/r/852/Concepts/ AgileWarrior/Forms/AllItems.aspx
8 Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends, Version 6, 15.
equate to the Mass of the force (size) multiplied by its velocity squared (speed) in much the same way Newton declared \( f = mv^2 \). If this is a valid assumption, then Force may also be generated by speed as well as size and perhaps the future British Army should focus on Notice to Effect (NTE), speed of decision-making and speed across the ground, i.e. tempo, to offset pure mass.

**DEDUCTIONS**

**AGILE WARRIOR** evidence points towards developing a new operating concept to outmanoeuvre the enemy conceptually and simultaneously exploit emergent technology. The force could be reconfigured to establish more appropriate groupings and learn to fight in new ways that challenge the assumptions of our adversaries. The force should be confident dispersed, generate increased tempo while actively deceiving the enemy. The Land force should then focus on achieving more decisive effects at range, using precision strike, aviation and area-effect, enabled by multi-spectral sensors while masking the force by decentralisation, dispersal and deception. As technology enables automation the close battle should initially be conducted, as far as possible, by automated platforms and sensors that preserve human war-fighters, therefore improving resilience and political utility. It should be noted that increased automation raises the premium on the human, a risk yet to be quantified through experimentation.

**THE CLF(L)35 DOCTRINAL PREMISE**

**New Ways**
The concept proposes a new way of operating, force design, and capabilities to deliver a more effective force. A UK sovereign war-fighting division will remain as the baseline offer to our allies. It does not consider offsetting capability to other nations and looks to support a UK military industrial base capable of supporting a divisional warfighting effort, possibly scalable to the corps level. We will deliver multiple, cross-dimension, dilemmas to the enemy so that we impose decision paralysis. Although consistent with the Integrated Action, Manoeuvrist Approach, and Mission Command, the fundamental premise focuses on the following principles:

- **Dispersal.** We will manoeuvre dispersed as the norm, which will increase protection, improve deception and allow us to fight disaggregated when applicable.
We will consequently challenge the enemy at more locations simultaneously, aiming to achieve decision paralysis. This will place higher demand on our C2 and sustainment but AW evidence suggests this is now less of a risk than concentrating combat power.

To support both dispersal and generating tempo we will refine our TASKORG to lower the level of combined-arms grouping.

- **Tempo.** We should seek to generate tempo at the expense of other factors. History and recent AW experimentation has shown that whoever drives the decision-action cycle is more likely to win. On the basis that tempo is key, units must not wait for supporting assets from higher levels. CF(L)35 task organises critical assets at lower levels so that tempo is easier to attain.

- **Deception.** The force design includes elements whose focus is to deceive the enemy in both the physical and across the EMS. AW experimentation continues to point at the adversaries’ approach to deception and the UK lack of resource in this capability.

- **Protection.** We will seek protection by speed of manoeuvre and decision rather than just physical armour, so that our forces remain strategically deployable. Evidence points towards ‘big, heavy and slow’ migrating to ‘small, light and fast’.9

- **Dislocation.** Current doctrine focuses on the destruction of enemy combat power, specifically MBTs, artillery and infantry. The CF(L)35 focuses effort on dislocation of the enemy by striking HQs, logistic bases and the narrative, to bring about cognitive dislocation and defeat.

**FORCE DESIGN**

AGILE WARRIOR experimentation provides evidence for generating greater tempo, fewer casualties and requiring less sustainment thus:

- **Command and Control.** Fighting disaggregated with the inclusion of RAS and AI for decision-making generated more speed, aggression and surprise. Exploiting developing AI technology will increase tempo, reduce the number of staff deployed in forward HQs and challenge the current concept of no more than five points of command.10

- **Information and Intelligence.** By leveraging RAS for recce, ground and airborne, a considerably higher level of situational awareness was achieved. The enemy was denied information by C-UAS capabilities and organic deception. Machine learning algorithms will enable smaller HQs by managing the incoming data, preventing cognitive overload and providing a fused ISTAR picture for commanders. Focus should switch from gathering to the exploitation of data. The Information Manoeuvre (IM) element within the Future Combat Teams (FCTs) will find information in the cyber domain while placing disruptive information of its own.

- **Manoeuvre.** Deeper, more risky and aggressive manoeuvre with RAS unhinged the enemy and broke cohesion. Employing RAS for reconnaissance to the point of destruction gained tempo at no human cost. Lack of mass can be off-set by exploiting tempo, both physically and cognitively. Multiple sensors will enable

---


10  See ASC task provided by SparkCognition on the utility of AI
greater mobility in complex terrain. The force design maintains the premise of the “rule of four” in its orbat with a specific covering force, assault force, echelon force and reserve force.

• **Firepower.** With more dedicated organic Fires, the FCT increased tempo, making the dismounted close combat more achievable. Future forces should have integral short-range indirect fire support, augmented by brigade medium artillery for counter-battery fire and divisional long-range rockets for shaping the deep. ATGW capability may offset today’s MBT capability with a suite of smaller vehicles which, when taken in combination, offer what today’s MBT achieves, but with less cost, greater sustainability and better strategic and operational mobility.

• **Sustainment.** Compared with the average of the Armored and Strike JF 25 BGs the FCT required less food, water, fuel and ammunition. Contemporary technology, such as power and water generation, will be used to reduce logistic demand. Additive manufacturing technology will produce or repair some items. Sensors on equipment throughout the force, combined with AI, will provide a common logistics picture and enable autonomous resupply when required, including health monitoring and the CASEVAC of personnel. Medical support will embrace health monitoring and rely upon automated systems to remove casualties from the contact battle. However, this does not change the overall need for MBTs.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

With an increasingly complex environment, new technology and a new way of operating, the land force would require a new structure to make the most of the new capabilities:

• **Future Combat Team (FCT).** The new unit of force will be the FCT, consisting of approximately 500 personnel that will deliver the mission sets attributed to today’s Armoured Infantry (AI) Battle Group of circa 1,250. It will be a combined arms force, with fewer personnel but increased manoeuvrability, firepower and sensors, delivering more combat mass.\(^11\) The FCT will have a flatter hierarchy, and have a better ratio of combat to combat support and combat service support than today’s BG so that it is sustainable and can fight with all its assets simultaneously.\(^12\) Mass will be augmented by Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) with the addition of RAS in the FCT, that with a degree of artificial intelligence, novel materials and next-generation power generation, provide direct and indirect fire support, ISTAR, sustainment, communications, and deception, but without requiring as many personnel. The platforms displace the soldier from the firefight, until a time when DCC is decisive. The RAS, with a person in the loop, allows for quicker manoeuvre, less sustainment and more firepower.

• **Brigade Combat Team (BCT).** BCT organisation will be flexible, delivering full spectrum effects in the deep to shape with long range massed precision fires, CEMA, and IM enabled by persistent ISTAR and resilient, high-bandwidth networks. Each BCT has sufficient CS and CSS to enable it to conduct operations independently of the Division or to provide mutual support to other BCTs as part of a divisional-level operation.

• **Division.** A CF(L)35 Division could contain circa 16,500 personnel rather than the 27,500 of the Joint Force Division of 2025. The Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), each of 3,500 individuals, are supported by Joint Fires, ISTAR, Manoeuvre Support, Aviation and sustainment assets. Hence, the UK Land Force of 2019 could be used to deliver three war-fighting divisions’ worth of combat power and adequate divisional troops using the FCT and BCT structure.\(^13\) The structural change is a balance of manpower, offset by RAS and the grouping of former Divisional assets at the Corps level.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DELIVERY**

**Risks**

Exploiting the opportunities of AI development is in line with current Government policy.\(^14\) However, the ethical considerations have only been analysed at the strategic level.\(^15\) \(^16\) Reliance on a Single Information Environment (SIE) produces vulnerabilities when the EMS is easily interdicted. As technology is central to the proposition,
the ability to procure new systems will require behavioural and process changes. The proposition does not include detail on CBRN and it is acknowledged that transforming to a new structure is a significant challenge. Furthermore the existing inability to visualise how the Army will achieve modernisation objectives means that we do not understand where our choice points are.

Conclusion

**CF(L)35** generates greater tempo, requires less sustainment, poses more challenges to the enemy and presents fewer targets, as it seeks to displace the human from the initial fire-fight. This is enabled by a new doctrinal way of fighting with more flexibility, trust and disaggregation and with a more flexible unit of force, in the Future Combat Team. The **CF(L)35** proposition offers three comparable UK Sovereign Divisions with Corps enablers while providing more deployment options across the spectrum of conflict and savings in supply. It provides HMG more opportunities, reduced risk and remains fundamental to collective defence with NATO and broader coalitions. However, while the **CF(L)35** is focused 17 years away, it may be available much sooner.

This image shows a Boxer AFV that will form part of the Army’s Strike capability seen here at the 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) which took place around Copehill Down on Salisbury Plain from 28 – 30 Oct 2019. Photo Jack Eckersly, DE&S Photographer, Crown Copyright.
Next Steps
CF(L)35 is an analytical concept providing an essential waypoint for transformation. Developing a 'New Operating Concept fit for the next decade' will require a more applied concept, which considers constraints and restraints to a greater degree. This focus will require x-DLOD engagement internal and external to the Army. Further research will try and quantify technology feasibility, especially the utility of AI and RAS, while also engaging further with industry on the practicalities of pharmacological enhancements. Corralling the interest and energy of soldiers and officers alike from across the Army will be facilitated by the Force Development Nexus (FD Nexus) and regular workshops.
Fostering Stability: Understanding Communities in Complex Environments - Part Two

Part One of this article was originally published in BAR 175, Summer 2019, and in this part, **Professor James Derleth**, a founding partner of Complexas, a specialist advisory company, continues his analysis of how to undertake successful stability operations using the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF).

Eighty-six engineers from 59 Independent Squadron Royal Engineers and Royal Marine engineers from Plymouth built shelters in Bagh District, Kashmir, as part of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, programme of aid to Pakistan after the earthquake on 8 Oct 2005. The troops travelled up to remote mountain villages up to 7,500 ft to construct shelters for medical and school facilities. Photo: Phot Ian Richards, Crown Copyright
STABILITY OPERATIONS PROGRAMMING

Effective stability programming requires a methodology focused on identifying and diminishing local sources of instability, NOT addressing the perceived ‘needs’ of the population. Most developing countries have a myriad of needs. Individuals or groups fostering instability aren’t usually building roads, providing health care, or digging wells. Yet they are able to gain support in the population. What explains this phenomenon? Spoilers are able to take advantage of the population’s grievances because they understand the local community. Grievances are issues a significant percentage of locals - not outside experts - identify as important to their community. Examples of erroneous assumptions in Afghanistan included the lack of potable water, educational opportunities, or infrastructure; insecurity; judicial bias, corruption, etc. For example, in some areas of Afghanistan the Taliban gained support because they provided Sharia courts to deal with crime and local disputes, both major grievances.¹ As a member of the Afghan Parliament noted: … people go to them [Taliban] because their justice is quick and seen as more effective than normal justice.²

Therefore, to stabilize an area, practitioners must be able to identify, prioritize, and diminish Sources of Instability (SOI). Sources of Instability are usually a small subset of priority grievances. They are SOIs because they (1) directly undermine support for local authorities, (2) increase support for spoilers, or (3) otherwise disrupt the normal functioning of society. SOIs must be identified through an analytical process. Noteworthy, analysis often finds that the actual source of instability is only tangentially related to a grievance cited by the community. For example, although locals might cite the lack of water as a grievance, analysis might show the underlying source of instability is competition between two tribes over a borehole. The lack of water and tribal tensions are two very different problems which require two very different solutions.

into a SOI by spoilers, a project that simply brings in an outside contractor to fix the canals will not necessarily increase support for the government. Why? If the government cannot maintain the repaired canals, then it will continue to be seen as ineffective, increasing popular frustration. Instead, the project should be conducted by the community - with government support - in order to increase the government and/or society’s capability and capacity to maintain the canals in the future. In summary, the goal of stability programming is identifying and targeting the local sources of instability, i.e. the issues which undermine the government, increase support for spoilers, and/or disrupt the normal functioning of society. Only after an area is stable can practitioners address needs through traditional developmental assistance. To foster stability, there is an obvious need for a simple, standardized, framework that identifies and mitigates local sources of instability.

THE TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FRAMEWORK (TCAPF)

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive framework for civilian and military practitioners, the Office of Civil-Military Cooperation at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF). It draws from the Theory of Change approach which is based on the premise that in order to increase stability in an area, the causes of instability must be identified and mitigated. TCAPF is based on five premises:

1. Instability occurs when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the government or society to mitigate them
2. A standardized, replicable, data-driven methodology is necessary to identify sources of instability
3. Local population perceptions are crucial to identifying causes of instability
4. Stability programming must be constantly monitored, with changes in the environment integrated back into programming
5. Measures of effect based on behavioral change are the only true indicators of success.

Through a five-step process (collection, analysis, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation), TCAPF identifies sources of instability, designs programs to mitigate them, and measures the effectiveness of the programming in stabilizing an area.

COLLECTION

The first step is to gain a stability-focused understanding of environment. At least three types of information are required to understand an area:

- Operational
- Cultural (major groups, their interests, conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional authorities, limits to their power, how spoilers leverage these factors)
- local perceptions (crucial to understanding how spoilers gain and maintain support)

TCAPF uses surveys, social media and technology to gather and analyze cultural factors, information about the local environment, and local perception data from a wide variety of sources across key population segments. One of the most effective ways of gathering perceptions is the Tactical Conflict Survey (TCS). The TCS is a simple, four-question survey. When used consistently with a representative population sample, it helps identify grievances, how spoilers use them to gain support and creates a baseline from which to measure change over time. The latter is especially important. For as Lord Kelvin famously said: ‘to measure is to know.’

The TCS questions were specifically designed to provide stability-relevant information with a minimum amount of effort. Note that they are open-ended questions, which are much more informative than a typical survey that uses closed-ended questions such as ‘Do you have enough water - yes or no?’ ‘How do you feel about

---

3 This framework is based on Theories of Change literature. The key premise is that problems must first be identified in order to apply the expertise needed to solve them. While this seems obvious, too often programs are based on untested assumptions and approaches. Therefore, it is important to base activities on observable results, e.g. changes in behavior. See Schon, Donald, The Reflective Practitioner, New York, Basic Books, 1983 and Shapiro, Ilana, Extending the Framework of Inquiry: Theories of Change in Conflict Interventions, Berghof Handbook Dialogue, number 5, Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006

4 A useful tool to collect and organize operational information about an area is the PMESII framework. PMESII stands for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. This framework helps practitioners identify key factors in each area and understand their relevance to local stability.

5 This framework is based on Theories of Change literature. The key premise is that problems must first be identified in order to apply the expertise needed to solve them. While this seems obvious, too often programs are based on untested assumptions and approaches. Therefore, it is important to base activities on observable results, e.g. changes in behavior. See Schon, Donald, The Reflective Practitioner, New York, Basic Books, 1983 and Shapiro, Ilana, Extending the Framework of Inquiry: Theories of Change in Conflict Interventions, Berghof Handbook Dialogue, number 5, Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006

6 A behavioral approach uses quantitative and qualitative social science methodologies to understand groups, measure their current behavior, identify motivations, and predict future behavior.

---

40 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020
your district government - good, bad, or indifferent?’
‘How do you feel about the local police - good, bad, or indifferent?’ The questions can be modified, removed, or supplemented depending on the area. For example, if you were using the TCS in a Syrian refugee camp, you could remove Question One.

Instead of having to anticipate all the possible issues and associated questions/answers that might be important in a community, these four open-ended questions allow the local population to identify what is important to them. This means we can ask fewer questions, making the TCS a more useful tool in an unstable environment and minimizing survey bias and respondent fatigue. Note an implicit ‘Fifth question’ after each of the others is ‘Why?’ This follow-up leads to a more in-depth conversation and deeper understanding of the local grievances and key actors. Since being implemented in 2007 the TCS has been used by non-government organizations, development organizations, and NATO military formations in numerous areas of the world. As an example of the latter, a US Marine battalion employing TCAPF in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, was surprised to learn that after security, the second or third biggest grievance (based on TCS Question #4) was the lack of cell phone coverage. The battalion commander said ‘this is something we had never thought about, as we considered phones a luxury.’ However, when cell phone coverage kept coming up in the Tactical Conflict Surveys, the commander made his patrols focus on the ‘why?’ They discovered that for the local population, cell phones were their primary means of swift and reliable communication. Without cell phone coverage, it could take a couple of days to find out about the security situation in a neighboring area and/or whether attacks might have injured family members. This caused a lot of anxiety and fostered a perception of insecurity, even though security was in many cases not an issue. The battalion commander noted ‘without using the TCS to understand the population’s perceptions, and especially the ‘why,’ we would never had known about this concern, understood why it was a concern, or done

---

2. Notice that Question #2 is different than, ‘What do you want?’ or ‘What do you need?’ Unfortunately, those two questions reflect our usual approach to stabilization or conflict resolution. When we ask those questions, the typical response is a wish list of several items; it’s like Christmas for the village in which you ask that question, and you are playing Santa Claus. In contrast, when we ask about the most important problems facing a specific population in a village or town (particularly in a clan-based, tribal society in which community is much more important than the individual), we tend to get a much shorter and more focused set of responses which reflect actual grievances, not just wishes.

3. This question gives us insight into who is influential in the community and who people trust to address their problems. This effectively replaces a much longer list of closed-ended questions, ‘Do you trust the government?’ ‘Do you trust the police?’ etc. It also identifies key interlocutors we would not anticipate – e.g. the local imam, a schoolteacher, etc.

4. Finally, we not only ask the local population to identify their biggest problems in Question #2, but we ask them in Question #4 to prioritize those problems - rather than us deciding for them what should be done first. This not only prioritizes things, but acts as a check on Question #2. If there is a discrepancy, we follow up again with the ‘Why’ question to make sure we really understand the priority grievance(s) of the community.
anything about it. For the population, cell towers were more important than jobs or clinics. The cell towers gave
the population a perception of security and the ability to
tell others about it. Without this baseline view of security, nothing else we did mattered in terms of popular support
for us or the government.'

ANALYSIS
As anyone who has been to a doctor knows, until the
malady is diagnosed, the doctor can’t proscribe an
effective treatment. Similarly, to implement effective
stability programming, we need to understand what
is causing instability. The Analysis phase of TCAPF
uses the information gathered in the collection phase to
identify and prioritize the local sources of instability. The
unique analytical methodology also identifies resiliencies
which can help mitigate the SOIs. This process is very
different from simply identifying societal needs or
obstacles to development.

DESIGN
After identifying the sources of instability, the next step
in the TCAPF process is to design activities to mitigate
them. This is accomplished through a series of ‘filters.’
The first filter is ‘Stability Fundamentals.’ This means an
activity must, for example, measurably:

- Increase support for the government
- Decrease support for spoilers
- Increase institutional and/or the community’s ability to
  solve societal problems

If a proposed activity fulfills these three ‘Stabilization
Fundamentals,’ the next filter- ‘Stabilization Principles,’
is applied. These are widely accepted best practices
which include local ownership, capacity building,
sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results,
partnership, flexibility, and accountability. Unless
activities are designed to mitigate sources of instability,
at best they will have no effect on stability and at worse, they will increase instability.

IMPLEMENTATION
Even if practitioners identify the local sources of instability and design appropriate mitigating activities, the way activities are implemented play a crucial role in determining whether they will foster stability. For example, giving projects to one faction in a community will cause resentment from others, fostering instability. Funneling money through the wrong contractors or corrupt officials may contribute to instability.\(^9\) Large influxes of cash in an area can cause inflation and corruption, hurting the poor. The lure of inflated salaries may also draw farmers from their farms, teachers from schools, and doctors from clinics - leading to more instability when the projects end.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION
To determine their effectiveness, practitioners must be able to not only measure whether their activities were implemented, but also whether they fostered stability. Therefore, it is necessary to track three levels of assessment: Measure of Performance (MOP), Measure of Effect, (MOE) and Overall Stability.

- **MOP** - identifies whether activities have been completed. For example, if the objective was to ‘increase police support in the community,’ an activity might include police training. The MOP for this activity would be ‘police trained.’ Note this only determines if an activity has been completed, not whether the police have more support in the community.
- **MOE** - assesses whether the stability objective(s) has been achieved. Continuing the police example, a Measure of Effect might be more information provided to the police by the population.
- **Overall Stability** - helps determine whether the net effect of the activities improved stability in the area. A basket of standardized stability-focused indicators - which can be augmented by a few context area specific indicators - gives practitioners a good idea if an area is becoming more stable.

Noteworthy, the number of indicators is not as important as what is being evaluated.\(^10\) Since the goal is to prevent conflict or stabilize an unstable area, metrics should

---

9 Trusted local partners understand which individuals, organizations, and businesses should be avoided when implementing stabilization activities. The TCAPF process identifies these partners, which can change over time.

10 Kilcullen, David, Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, (U.S. Military Manuscript, Kabul, 2009), 7
focus on ‘indicators of change’ which show whether the populations’ behavior has changed.\textsuperscript{11} Crucially, this information must be continually collected and analyzed over a period of time. This allows field personnel to create a baseline and measure the impact of activities over time. A one-time gathering of perceptions is meaningless as they will change as a result of events, activities, etc. In summary, TCAPF uniquely combines data analysis, qualitative assessment, and forecasting capabilities with data visualization techniques to identify sources of instability, mitigate them, and prevent their reoccurrence.

**TCAPF IN ACTION**

TCAPF has been employed by civilian, government, and military entities in areas as varied as Afghanistan, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Sudan. The following case studies demonstrate its effectiveness as a unique, analytical, comprehensive, replicable methodology.

**Stabilizing Helmand Province, Afghanistan**

In 2006, the British 52nd Infantry Brigade (52 Bde) was notified it would deploy to Helmand. Identifying the reasons for the difficulties faced by previous units in stabilizing the province, the Brigadier commanding 52 Bde knew that they could not be successful without a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the operating environment, particularly the challenge of gaining data from communities that could be geo-located. Because of a dearth of reliable information on the non-security aspects of the environment, a significant gap between the perceptions of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) operating in the area and the local population was identified. For example, civilian deaths, often referred to as ‘collateral damage’ by ISAF, were having numerous negative consequences. Civilian deaths decreased popular support for the Afghan Government and the ISAF. Consequently, expensive development projects had no impact in stabilizing the

\textsuperscript{11} Church, Cheyanne and Rodgers, Mark, Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs, Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, 2006.
area. To mitigate this situation, a messaging campaign had been developed. However, it had no discernible impact because it had the wrong messages/images, targeted the wrong audience, and didn’t include any measures of effect. In essence, the military and civilian entities had lost sight of their end state, i.e. stabilizing the area. They were experiencing significant problems understanding the environment and much of the development and stabilisation work was making little progress or having no impact.

To address this 52 Brigade decided its purpose was the ‘Population was the Prize.’ In order to stabilize Helmand, the Task Force had to understand the population and gain its support. Thus ‘influence’ became the focal point of all of its operations. Central to this approach was a thorough understanding of the operational environment. Detailed population perception data from the TCS provided this information. Without coherent and relevant data, field personnel are often forced to implement programming based on the views of senior officials in capital cities or corporate headquarters who conflate their values and experiences with what locals consider important. This was the case in Helmand. Within a month of their arrival, TCAPF allowed 52 Brigade to begin to identify the sources of instability with the TCS which were then geo-plotted. This led to a two-pronged campaign strategy based on mitigating SOIs (which differed throughout the province) and executing influence operations accompanied by precise messaging to foster behaviour changes. Within three months, the Bde was able to accurately capture and view the effects of their activities, e.g. increasing support for the Afghan Government and decreasing support for insurgents. An improvement in stability was identified both qualitatively through changes in people’s behaviour garnered with the TCS; and quantitatively (people moving back to their villages, more civilian road movement, decreased security incidents, etc.).

This first of TCAPF in a combat environment identified important lessons that were then integrated into the methodology. Recognizing its value, TCAPF became an ISAF training requirement for all NATO forces deploying to Afghanistan. For some combat units, TCAPF was their primary means of obtaining meaningful data and from the communities they sought to influence. As a recent book about the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan noted, TCAPF was the best effort by a British brigade in Helmand to understand the population on whose behalf they were fighting.

**EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES**

In 2015 an NGO working in the Abubakar region of Maguindanao Province, the Philippines, was rebuilding villages which had been damaged in fighting between government security forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Realizing that instability was threatening their program, they asked IMPL Project, a US-based NGO specializing in Conflict and Stabilization, to implement a stabilization program to support their rebuilding work. Using TCAPF, IMPL Project quickly identified some interesting dynamics: twice as many girls were attending school as boys, there was a lack of livelihoods because the community had experimented with new crops which had failed, cattle and horse rustling were growing, and there was increasing fighting between clans. Analysis found these issues were linked. Desperate farmers had taken their sons out of school, hoping the extra labor would increase profits. The out-of-school youths, depressed about their bleak futures, would use methamphetamines at night. To support this habit, the boys stole horses and cattle from neighboring villages, fostering clan violence.

Identifying the lack of livelihoods as the underlying source of instability, IMPL Project worked with the community to mitigate this challenge. The first step was to strengthen local resiliency by creating a livelihoods cooperative. Since farmers were losing significant income as a result of a dilapidated agricultural infrastructure needed to dry and store their crops, IMPL Project and the cooperative identified a solar dryer as a way to minimize crop loss. This project resulted in farmers selling an additional five tons of crops. More profit led to a 60% increase in micro-enterprise, largely in the form of crop diversification. More importantly, farmers stopped removing their boys from school, cattle and horse rustling stopped, and local religious council (Ulama) reported decreasing clan violence. The impact metrics were measurable and critically, there was data to support this.

The real test of both stability and desired impact came in December, 2016 when a Philippine military offensive pushed an Islamic State affiliate, the Maute Group, out of a neighboring municipality. They sought safe haven in Abubakar, but as the Conflict Opportunity Cost Model suggests, the community turned them away. Abubakar was stable and thriving and the community didn’t want

---

12 Wardlaw, Richard, 52 BDE’s use of TCAPF, Presentation given at Quantico, VA, October 2008, LTC Wardlaw was in charge of Reconstruction and Stabilization for the British 52 Brigade during their Nov 2007 – April 2008 deployment in Afghanistan.

to undermine its progress. This is a good example of using TCAPF to identify sources of instability, working with the community to mitigate them, and increasing community resiliencies to foster long-term stability. These examples demonstrate the effectiveness of TCAPF in both unstable and conflict environments.

**THE BENEFITS OF TCAPF**
The Tactical Conflict and Assessment Framework was designed by practitioners to prevent and/or mitigate conflict, foster stability, and measure impact. It is unique because it:

- distinguishes between needs, grievances, and sources of instability
- provides all entities in an area with a common understanding of local sources of instability
- is focused on mitigating the sources of instability, improving the effectiveness of programming
- is data driven, standardized, and uses population-centric, behaviorally-based evaluation criteria which can be geo-located and placed in relational databases
- uses data to measure impact
- creates a baseline which allows the effectiveness of stability programming to be measured over the short, medium and long term
- fosters continuity, mitigating the desire to ‘reinvent the wheel’
- empowers field personnel who can use quantifiable TCAPF data to influence higher-level planning and decision-making
- reduces required staff and resources as they are focused on stabilizing an area, rather than implementing ineffective projects
- greatly improves the effectiveness of strategic communications. Because TCAPF identifies the issues which matter most to the population, it helps identify strategic communication themes which resonate with the population. What is a better message than ‘We understand your grievances and here is what we’re doing to address them’.

Overall, TCAPF greatly improves the effectiveness of conflict and stability programming operations because it is based on a detailed understanding of the local environment, not on assumptions about it.

**SUMMARY**
To stabilize an area or prevent instability from fostering violence, two things must happen. First, local sources of instability must be identified and mitigated. Second, local resiliencies must be recognized and strengthened. Both are predicated on understanding the environment from the perspective of the community that lives there. Just like the human body, communities’ respond to changes in the environment. Therefore, to facilitate stability, communities need to be monitored and assessed regularly. The days of conducting a survey and then waiting 12 months to remeasure are gone. A simple, fast, technological feedback loop integrated into an inclusive planning framework, which identifies reactions to actions taken and pinpoints course corrections is required. Because of its emphasis on societal engagement and metrics, which measure the impact of activities in terms of environmental, financial, governmental, and social returns rather than simple outputs.

The TCAPF is the only comprehensive, behaviorally-focused, data-driven, population-centric instability and conflict framework which has been used successfully in numerous environments. Its success is result of making the local population, the people most effected by instability and conflict, the focal point for understanding and actions. This facilitates more effective decision-making, as decisions are based on understanding rather than assumptions. While specifically providing guidance for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the words of General Stanley McChrystal could apply to MNCs or governments working anywhere in the world: ‘understand the local grievances and problems that drive instability and take action to redress them’.

---

14 The Opportunity Cost Model is based on the premise that instability and conflict will be reduced when it is ‘more costly’ for spoilers to gain support from the community. Just as a healthy organism is more resistance to disease, a thriving community is less likely to support spoilers. See Böhne, J., Köhler, J., Zürcher, C., (2015), Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2007-2013, Final Report, Bonn/Berlin: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Pictured is E.L. Simons Primary School being cleaned up ready to be repaired after the damaged caused by hurricane Irma. RFA Mounts Bay offered support to Grand Turk island in the Turks and Caicos islands, in support of the Commando force from 3 Cdo Brigade personnel from 40 Commando Royal Marines and 59 Commando Royal Engineers. Photo: Corporal Darren Legg, Crown Copyright.
The Contested Themes of Victory

Michael C Davies, a Ph.D. candidate in Defence Studies at King’s College, London looks at the ten most common themes when considering victory and who the winners and losers are in conflict.
In early 2019, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, arranged a ‘Victory Conference’. He was bothered by Israel’s poor strategic performance of the past decades, the inability to achieve a lasting peace in the region, and wanted to bring together experts in the hope of finding a way out of its present situation. At the end of the 4-day conference, General Kochavi reportedly made a punishing statement: ‘As always, the question was, and is, what is victory and who defines it, and they didn’t answer this in the workshop.’ For those who have delved into the topic of victory, this is not a surprise. Innumerable definitions, concerns, metrics, assertions, and elements abound that make it difficult to effectively assess what it means to win a war.

While the victory discipline is contested, often context dependent, and diffuse in terms of the specific issues an analyst focuses on, a number of themes consistently emerge in considering the question of who won a war. While this article will not present a unified picture of what it means to win, let alone a singular definition, by outlining these common themes, it will offer an entree into the victory discipline for practitioners to consider in their daily efforts. In doing so, this article will highlight a considerable problem in the theory and practice of strategy for which, at present, there is no answer. It proposes that victory, the very core of strategy, remains essentially contested, and the West’s record of strategic victory in the post-World War II era is meager precisely because of it.

Creating Political Objectives

The first and most important theme is the difficulty in translating the intention, statements, and goals of policymakers into strategic aims. Dominic Tierney makes it clear that these aims should be as ‘clear and concrete as possible [because] vague goals like ‘victory’ and ‘democracy’ get people killed.’ However, what this means more precisely remains ethereal. Tierney suggests that objectives should be ‘political, meaning they refer to power relations, or who rules a given territory and in what ways.’ Gideon Rose describes it as ‘establishing [an] enduring political arrangement.’ Basil Liddell Hart famously called it a ‘better state of peace.’ Most recently, Nadia Schadlow described it as ‘the consolidation of political order.’ Sadly, instead of offering greater clarity, these terms only add to the confusion.

Turning Political Objectives into Campaign Objectives

The second theme, following directly from the above, is the need to translate these aims into campaign objectives. Sweeping policy statements might have no relationship to execution; they could be canned blather.

---

1 Harlap, Shmuel, What Is Victory? (Tel Aviv: Israel: INSS, May 1, 2019), 1, available at <www.inss.org.il/up-content/uploads/2019/05/Guest-Column-01052019.pdf>. I use the term, ‘reportedly’, because the quote is referenced to a Haaretz article that cannot be independently found. The author did not respond to my request for clarification.
4 Rose, Gideon, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), xi.
In turn, this leaves campaigns without strong guidance, meaning the use of weapons can be confused with military effectiveness. In the West, this confusion is most often related to the use of high-technology, stand-off weapons that presume universal strategic effect with the release of every weapons load, even though there is no basis for this assertion.

THE CHARACTER OF WAR
Robert Randle made the superb point that ‘... the character of a war determines the character of its settlement...’ that the understanding of what victory means is dependent on how the war is fought as much as why it was fought in the first place. The character of war is the third theme, and helps to explain the first two. Only by correctly linking the character of war, effective execution, with suitable and necessary goals in an iterative manner can an appropriate notion of victory emerge. The confusion of these aspects is a key problem within the discipline.

THE LEVELS OF VICTORY
Linked to this is the fourth theme, the levels of victory. William Martel suggests that the first organizing principle of understanding victory is that it happens across a continuum: at the tactical, political-military, and grand strategic levels. In turn, each of these levels have their own definition of victory. The levels of victory, related to the Perspective theme below, are why various actors are able to declare victory in the same war. An actor might have achieved (some of) their objectives at one level, while the other achieved them at another level.

NON-BINARY DISTINCTIONS
The non-binary distinction of victory is the fifth theme. Instead of Levels, other analysts suggest victory happens on sliding scales. Colin S. Gray defines it according to ‘decisiveness,’ while J. Boone Bartholomoees contends it occurs across a scale of success: ‘Defeat/Lose/Not Win/Tie/Not Lose/Win/Victory.’ However, the analytical

---

value of these ideas to date are unconvincing, even though they raise the important point that victory is not necessarily a purely binary distinction.

CHANGING GOALS
The sixth theme is the fact that goals change over time. Every political actor can and will begin combat with a modicum of identified objectives, whether long-standing or ad-hoc. However, because of the inherent chance that combat involves, those goals must necessarily change over time. They can become more expansive as tactical victories increase or collapse down as failures amass. Added to this, Aaron Rapport noted that domestic institutions and personalities will have their own goals and will treat them as ‘ends in and of themselves,’ thereby changing strategic goals. These problems can make it ‘seem like a new war’ has emerged, instead of simply recognizing that ‘war is a fluid, complicated thing.…’

COST
The seventh theme revolves around the question of cost. Many victory definitions build cost directly into them because excess cost can make the very notion of achieving a victory hollow, regardless of the limited or expansiveness of the goals. Moreover, as Virginia Page Fortna states, the more costly a war, the greater the domestic pressures not to concede on issues ‘for which so many may have died.’ This in turn increases the demand for greater sacrifice to justify the existing sacrifices. Robert Martel makes it clear that there can be multiple ratios utilized to assert a positive cost-benefit calculation, but ‘it is not at all clear which of these…are most critical.’

TIME
Should a war finally end, the question of time defines our eighth theme. For many, victory occurs the moment an objective is achieved and combat is terminated.

However, because termination does not equal the conclusion to a war, the holding of objectives for a time period is required. Some suggest the maintenance of that objective for one year will suffice, but one must be wary of short-term definitions as a large percentage of peace agreements collapse within five years.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, even smashing military victories can begin to look less decisive over a longer term, predominantly because of the inability to translate tactical victory into strategic victory. As Cathal Nolan writes in his masterful, \textit{The Allure of Battle}, ‘Winning the day of battle is not enough. You have to win the campaign, then the year, then the decade. Victory must usher in political permanence.’\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{PERSPECTIVE}

The ninth theme revolves around the perspective problem of victory. Just because an opponent has achieved all of its objectives does not mean the other side cannot spin its efforts as achieving victory as well. Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney’s work shows that a population’s view on victory is more shaped by pre-conceived notions of the goals they desire than the facts on the ground, unless one side is defeated in totality.\textsuperscript{18} This is why stabbed-in-the-back conspiracy theories are so prevalent in societies suffering from a comprehensive strategic failure - a society cannot believe its eyes, so it assumes a hidden force at work.\textsuperscript{19} This Dreamland state can and will be used to justify their past actions, build a new internal narrative, and regain power over time, setting the course for a revanchist response, unless the victor is prepared to address it from the start.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{SUSTAINABILITY}

The final theme of the sustainability of the victory has three separate parts to it. The first continues from the above-mentioned revanchism, in that ‘the line between justice and revenge can be a very fine one.’ Engaging in ‘justice’ can create the seeds for future aggression through excessive revenge.\textsuperscript{21} Second, linked to the Cost theme, victory can exhaust the ‘winner’ so much that they do not have the power to enforce the victory conditions, and attempting to do so only weakens them further. Third, the inability or refusal to formalize the end

\textsuperscript{18} Johnson, Dominic D.P., and Tierney, Dominic, Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
\textsuperscript{19} Kimball, Jeffrey P., ‘The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War,’ Armed Forces and Society 14, no. 3 (Spring 1988), 450; 452.
to a conflict, even if it is decisive, can 'create the strains on which future conflicts are based.' Together, they put significant, even contradictory, pressure on the victor to navigate in the post-conflict phase.

CONCLUSION
The 10 themes listed here offer a quick initial introduction to the issues of victory. But the relative complexity of the topic, its large, expansive sub-topics, and their networked character offer a sense of the problems at hand. Victory is the very purpose of war.

It is 'the only thing that gives any meaning to war.' And yet, the fact that there is no unifying notion, concept, or theory to bring this mosaic together should give any analyst or practitioner pause. In turn, it should therefore be no wonder that the West has struggled to achieve even the semblance of a strategic victory in such a long time when strategy’s theoretical center is so disordered.

The author previously conducted lessons learned research at the U.S. National Defense University, and is the author of three books on the Wars of 9/11.

Ignoring the Calls for Korean Unification

**Major Mike Churchman** argues that security in Korea is best served by the status quo and that Unification could prove to be dangerous for the region.

*The Monument to Three Charters of National Reunification south of Pyongyang, North Korea. It was built at the southern approach to Thongil Street in August 2001. Photo: Bjørn Christian Tørrissen, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License, Wikimedia*
Since the partition of the Korean peninsula at the end of World War Two and the Korean War of the 1950s into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, both entities have officially championed the goal of the reunification of Korea (albeit under their own systems). Even China, who many assume is hostile to any event that could lead to US troops encroaching on its border, has previously placed on the record its support to the concept of reunification — in 1997 its foreign minister stated that ‘China supports the reunification of the Korean Peninsula’ through a ‘practical approach towards the issue of the Korean Peninsula’.¹

Beyond these ‘Sunday speeches’ however, the reality is that Korean reunification would benefit neither the DPRK or the ROK, their respective backers China and the United States (US) nor the wider region (most notably Japan). Whilst the successful absorption of the DPRK by the ROK (backed by the US) might remove the threat of nuclear attack against Japan or the US’s western seaboard (to say nothing of the devastation which would be caused if a military conflict became the method by which unification was pursued), it is the status quo which offers the greatest stability to the security of the Korean peninsula and the wider Asia-Pacific region.

KOREAN UNIFICATION - THE US PERSPECTIVE

US troops are purportedly based in the ROK to mitigate the threat posed by Kim Jong-un’s regime to US regional allies including ROK, Japan and Taiwan.² These forces are intended to deter and ultimately defend against a repeat DPRK military conquest of the ROK, as well as against ‘North Korea’s [short- and medium-range] missiles, which threaten Japan and must be assumed to have nuclear capability’.³

Beyond these immediate threats, however, as noted by one current practitioner on Korean affairs, ‘the current geopolitical situation with North Korea providing a buffer to China allowing the ongoing presence of [US forces] in the South, is greatly in US strategic interest. The interests of the US and China, for different reasons, remain vested in the maintenance of the status quo, rather than conflict’.⁴ Stating such a purpose for its military forces would be needlessly provocative as ‘the demands of smooth-running diplomacy make it impossible to say such a thing publicly’. Instead ‘it is much easier to point to ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea’.⁵

Beyond countering the threat of conflict on the Korean peninsula and hedging against the growth of China, the current status quo incorporates US forces in Korea and provides logistical support from Japan. This presence effectively extends the US’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ of deterrence over both countries, such that neither country feels compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent or air and maritime power projection capabilities, ‘capabilities for those two nations that might appear provocative if either had developed them on their own.’⁶ Furthermore, it enables Japan to maintain its post-World War Two pacifist constitution and a military which is only permitted to defend itself.⁷ Without the status quo and the US ‘umbrella’, the historic distrust with which China and both Koreas have with Japan - formed on the backdrop of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the exploitation of Korea as a colony in the early 20th century, Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 and the use of Korean ‘comfort women’ during the Second World War⁸ - would be exposed.

What seems clear is that post-Korean unification scenario in which the US removes its forces from both Korea and Japan, Japan would be required to increase investment in its own defensive military capabilities. Such a technologically advanced country, suddenly developing its own military capabilities, risks unleashing an arms race within east Asia, not least because of the tensions inherent in its own colonial legacy vis-à-vis China and Korea, as those countries grapple with a new security dilemma.

¹ Plate, Tom, ‘In Korea, a Growing Consensus That Unification Is Inevitable,’ The International Herald Tribune, (13 September 1997), p 1
⁵ Lloyd Parry, Richard, ‘Unified Korea could destabilise US role in Asia,’ The Independent, (19 June 2000), p 14
⁸
Can the status quo even be maintained however? The DPRK’s development and testing of a long-range inter-continental ballistic missile, which can allegedly threaten the US’s western seaboard has led, understandably, to US fears on how to contain such a threat to its own territory. The US has so far rejected ‘a strategy of military deterrence and containment, as practised [sic] towards the Soviet Union, Russia and China\(^9\) for their North Korean policy, due to concern that investment, that the DPRK could ‘blackmail the USA and its regional allies under the protection of its own bomb (e.g. to compel US troops to withdraw from South Korea … or, in the longer term, even force through the reunification of Korea under North Korean auspices)\(^10\).

The temptation now facing the US is whether a policy of rapprochement, as Trump’s recent olive branch towards Kim Jong-un represents, might be able to achieve ‘denuclearisation’ and remove this threat of nuclear annihilation against the US. Despite the optimism of these recent summits however, they have to date glossed over the DPRK’s fundamentally different understanding

\(^9\) Overhaus, Marco, ‘USA: Between the Extremes,’ in Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests, eds.; Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), p 23

\(^10\) Ibid., p 24
of the term ‘denuclearisation’ - ‘namely a process that also calls into question America’s extended nuclear deterrence in the region.’

Were Kim Jong-un able to trade its nuclear status for the withdrawal of US forces, it is possible that it would unleash both the potential for DPRK blackmail against the ROK, in addition to greater military competition between the ROK, China and Japan.

Whilst it might be unwise for the US to publicly adopt this as its foreign policy, the time has come to tacitly accept the North Korean nuclear threat to Japan and the US and maintain the status quo through a strategy of deterrence - the only terms Kim would agree to would only serve to destabilise Korea and the region.

**CHINA - NOTHING TO GAIN**

All said, just because the US’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo in order to ensure troops remain in both the ROK and Japan, it does not follow that China’s interests in contrast would be served by breaking the status quo. As former head of the US delegation to the six-party talks Ambassador Hill summarised:

> The real issue would come back to how China is going to regard US troops. I’ve said to Chinese diplomats: ‘What if the only way to keep US troops in Japan is to keep US troops in Korea?’ Because the Chinese, when they’re honest with themselves, they don’t want Japan on its own. It’s a highly technological society and for all the idea that China is ten feet tall … China worries about Japan still. I would not just assume that China would see it as good if US troops were removed from Japan.\(^\text{12}\)

Any assessment, however, on the geopolitical preferences of China is fraught with difficulty, not only because of the relative secrecy which characterises the foreign policy of a single party authoritarian state, but also, as is frequently ignored by western commentators, the variety of opinions and debates held within China. In the words of Ambassador Hill:

> People like to generalise about what China does but they’ve got over a billion people there and they have a lot of different opinions.\(^\text{13}\)

The prevailing opinion is that China’s foreign policy preferences are best served by pursuing the three fundamental goals of ‘no war, no chaos and no nuclear weapons’\(^\text{14}\) which in addition to promoting denuclearisation and preventing war on the Korean peninsula, maintains the status quo by preventing North Korea from collapsing.\(^\text{15}\) The presence of the DPRK as a buffer state between China and the US-allied ROK assuages Chinese fears of how, following unification, the US might rebalance its forces in East Asia and how a unified Korea may deploy a ballistic missile defence system on its border. In this instance ‘China would be left with fewer offensive options and only Russia as a potential defense [sic] partner.’\(^\text{16}\) For all that Beijing

---

\(^{11}\) Ibid.


\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Boc, Anny and Wacker, Gudrun, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ in *Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests*, eds. Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), p 28

\(^{15}\) Boc and Wacker, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ 27.

disapproves of the DPRK’s nuclear status and aggressive foreign policy, it appears to prioritise ‘Sino-American superpower rivalry … and the seventy-year-old status quo on the Korean peninsula.’

This view can be seen from the Chinese Foreign Minister’s comments in 2007:

The peninsula issue must be resolved peacefully. The military solution has no way out. China will not allow war or chaos on the Korean peninsula’ … He also reiterated that China firmly opposed the deployment of a US-developed missile shield in South Korea, saying it severely damaged strategic security in the region.

17 Hilpert, Hans Günther and Suh, Elisabeth, ‘South Korea: Caught in the Middle or Mediating from the Middle?,’ in Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests, eds. Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), pp 18-19.


North Korea’s ballistic missiles on parade during North Korea Victory Day in 2013.
Photo: Stefan Krasowski, Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license, Wikimedia
Perhaps there are concessions which the US and ROK might offer China, which could relieve these post-unification fears, not least ‘any US presence on Korea following reunification, especially if US forces are stationed above the 38th parallel.’ Such concessions could include renouncing the role of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system on the peninsula or trading a US military role above the 38th parallel in return for an assurance that Chinese forces will not cross the Yalu River.

Making such concessions to China, however, would likely lead to China using a unification settlement to expand its influence in the Korean peninsula, not just limit the proximity of US forces in its sphere of influence. Any post-unification settlement would need to be mindful of China’s aspirations - ‘they’ve already fought one war on the Peninsula to ensure their interests are met and would be willing to invest considerable resources to protect that position.’

As Spangler highlights:

*China seems best able to influence and shape the emerging government of the four North Korean provinces along its border, notably the Tumen River Valley, as well as two mid-located provinces and Pyongyang.*

In doing so it could effectively re-establish a quasi-security buffer zone, drawing on the influence China currently has over a number of North Korean officials, to ‘help set up a pro-Chinese governmental system in the region’ - hardly a desirable outcome for the US or ROK.

Korean unification for China thus is a choice between how it limits a ‘US strategy of containment’ on China (including the sustained presence of US troops in Korea) as it continues its economic rise, and how it hedges against the impact a more confident and assertive unified Korea might have on a complex China-Korea-Japan security dynamic.

---

20 Spangler, ‘Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks,’ p 41.
21 Research Officer, FCO, email interview with author, 7 June 2019.
23 Ibid., p 40.
Ultimately, China’s overriding preference for stability and the status quo is evident in the defensive treaty between China and the DPRK, signed in 1961 and formally remaining in force until 2021, which promises ‘mutual assurances of military assistance in the event of an armed attack on one or the other’. Not only does China probably not want unification, it could go so far as to fight to prevent it.

**NOT WORTH THE RISK**

Despite the obvious revulsion which the continued existence of the DPRK brings, with its appalling human rights record and aggressive nuclear posturing, the dream of a unified Korea, in which nearly two million Korean troops cease their confrontation across the DMZ, ‘beat their swords into ploughshares’ and swell their country’s labour force, masks the huge destabilising impact this event would have on north-east Asian security. The sudden removal of the North Korean buffer zone between the Chinese border and US troops and anti-access area denial missile screens in the ROK, would lead to a significant dislocation of the Sino-American security relationship.

Leaving aside an aggressive American policy in which US and Chinese troops confront one another across the Yalu river, a unification settlement would possibly result in the US agreeing to maintain its forces below the 38th parallel, giving China the space to increase its influence over the north of the peninsula and effectively re-establish a de-facto partition of the country. Alternatively, the demise of the Kim regime as a result of unification, would remove the only overt justification for the continued presence of US troops in Korea and Japan. Such a significant departure of the US from the region would thrust the twin technological superpowers of Korea and Japan into the rapid development of their own military capabilities (including anti-access area denial and expeditionary forces). Whilst Korea and Japan might be able to overcome their centuries-old enmity on a foundation of trust built on democratic values, competition with China would be almost assured. The resultant arms race would serve only to strengthen China further. Sadly, Korean unification just isn’t worth the risk.

---

Major Mike Churchman is currently studying a Masters in Applied Security Strategy at Exeter University under the External Placement (Academic) scheme. This article is an excerpt from his wider dissertation ‘Korean Unification: War, Collapse or Mutual Agreement?’

---

25 Boc and Wacker, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ 27.
26 Eberstadt, Nicholas, ‘Hastening Korean Reunification,’ Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997), Volume 76, No. 2, p 86
This is a memorial to fighter pilots of all nationalities who lost their lives in the Korean War 1951-53. Photo: Grah
Making the Army better with 360 Degree Reporting

In this article, Captain Robin Winstanley asks how the Army might change if the subordinates’ observations of their commanders’ performances were taken into account for their commanders’ appraisals.
What are they like to work with?’ is a question frequently asked by soldiers and officers alike when they get a new commander. It is far from unusual that the opinion of a leader by his superiors can conflict with the assessment of those they command. How would the military change if subordinates’ observations of a superior’s performance lent weight to the content of both their mid-year and end of year appraisal? For an institution where leaders can have a greater impact than arguably any other profession, the military must strive to ensure the right people occupy those positions of responsibility.

Many who serve in the military can likely identify people in positions of authority that have no place being there. By adopting 360-degree reporting where subordinates’ input is included in the appraisal process, the quality of those who are promoted could improve and as a result the organisation might become more effective. Service personnel can, and should, have greater confidence that the appraisal process is a better reflection on the performance of everyone within the organisation. This is more likely when the assessment considers the experiences of all those in the chain of command. No report should be shaped solely by the input of subordinates alone but it can, and perhaps could, make an important contribution to the final assessment, helping to benefit the individual and the wider Army.

By including subordinate input into the appraisal process, reports could serve as a much more holistic assessment of a leader’s performance. Such a process could be used not only with the objective of identifying poor performing leaders, but also identifying those who perform well in their roles. Also, subordinate input could provide the Army with a greater understanding of how well its leaders embrace Mission Command. It will provide the individuals themselves with the opportunity to learn more about how they are perceived as a leader and where they can make the biggest improvements. It could potentially shift the focus of those seeking advancement, placing less of an emphasis on pleasing their reporting officer and instead lending greater weight to the team that they seek to build. Such a reporting method is one of the most effective ways of identifying ineffective leaders within an organisation since they are most readily apparent to their subordinates. This is important because, for instance, leaders interested only in their own advancement have a negative impact on retention, driving away their subordinates and undermining unit cohesion.

Many forms of 360-degree reporting exist and have been tested with mixed results, with the US military commissioning a study by the Rand Corporation. An example of this method of appraisal would be the US Army’s 360-degree assessment tool referred to as the Multisource Assessment and Feedback (MSAF). While no system is flawless, the potential benefits can outweigh the cost. There are roles in the military, such as staff positions, where people have no subordinates. As a result, this system cannot be employed universally and is only appropriate for those in appointments where they command. This can potentially have a significant impact on the results of a grading board where someone without subordinates is competing with a commander who is viewed as exceptional by those they lead. However, throughout their career officers and soldiers are required to lead as a fundamental part of their role. A comprehensive assessment of their performance in these positions must be understood if the military is to ensure they gain the very best out of their personnel.

One of the most straightforward and easy to implement approaches would be for reporting officers to talk with subordinates of those they are reporting on as a normal procedure similar to the US Marine Corps ‘Requesting Mast’. They can informally solicit perspectives from a variety of individuals, in order to gain a broad picture as to what they are like day-to-day. For instance, an example could be, a Major discussing the performance of a new officer with his Sergeants. The Sergeants’ observations and analysis can help mould how the report is formed providing valuable insight gained from observing how the subject interacts with the soldiers and carries out...
their duties. A second method of soliciting input for a report would be for the subject to have members of his team write reports anonymously that would then be sent to his reporting chain. This would allow for a transparent process, understandable by all within the organisation.

Using the example of a Troop Commander we can test the suitability and effectiveness of adopting a 360-degree appraisal reporting method. The immediate one and two down subordinates of the Troop Commander, in this case the Troop Sergeants and Corporals, would submit their assessment of the performance of the officer at the mid-year appraisal phase. The contents of their assessment would only be made available to the Squadron Commander and Commanding Officer in order to prevent potential negative reporting by their own reporting commanders.
include how effective they perceive their senior officers to be as leaders; do they embrace Mission Command, how effective are they in developing their subordinates and where they can improve?

The effectiveness of the changes in reporting that have been implemented can then be assessed at the end of year appraisal. Reporting officers should make reference in an individual’s report, to areas of improvement identified by their subordinates. This is especially so for performance shortcomings of which individual’s may not have been aware.

A clear benefit of this reporting method is allowing for the reporting officer to distil the information they have received into a useful narrative that can be inserted into the report rather than a subordinate providing it directly. Reporting officers would not be required to use all the information that is provided by subordinates verbatim, but would reference what is appropriate. In order for this process to be beneficial reporting officers must actively seek value from the information that they have been given and employ it in the appraisal process in an effective way. The reporting officer will still own the report that they produce but others within the organisation can have greater confidence that the author is fully informed about the reportee.

The input of a subordinate will have the most impact during the mid-year appraisal process where areas of concern can be identified. Areas for improvement identified more readily by subordinates may go unnoticed by a superior. Subordinates also have an incentive to articulate areas of improvement to improve their own day-to-day working environment and contribute to creating the best team possible, ready for the demands of deployment. Such a process could provide a clearer insight into how effective the individuals being report on are at developing their subordinates or commanding their teams.

For example, should a commander need to improve the way he or she delivers orders or managing subordinates, those they are responsible for are in the best position to tell them. For an organisation that invests so much time and resources in developing its leaders, there are many that are not as effective as they could be.  

The use of the 360-degree appraisal method can also be used to protect against the Observer Effect - where

---

7 Chief of Defence People, JSP 757 Tri Service Reporting Instructions, MoD, Part 4, Para 2, Pg 4-1
8 See Reed and Bullis, The Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees, Armed Forces and Society 2009, SAGE, Pg 15
a subject behaves in a particular way when they know they are being observed, for instance an Officer behaving differently when the Commanding Officer is present. The most obvious example is how individuals behave when they have an opportunity to interact with their reporting officers, particularly if they seldom have an opportunity to work with them directly. This is demonstrated when the main effort for the unit shifts from preparing for operations to preparing for the visit of the senior officer. The focus of senior officers within the Regiment is aimed at ensuring the visitor receives the best impression possible, which inevitably means that the picture presented does not reflect reality. By focusing their resources and attention on pleasing their commander in order to advance their own interests and careers, the organisation as a whole suffers.

Leaders subconsciously gravitate towards people whom they perceive as similar to themselves as discussed by Laurison and Friedman in their book *The Glass Ceiling.* When Officers or Sergeants look for traits in their subordinates that they themselves possess, they may overlook other leaders with a different style of leadership. The approaches may be more effective than that of their commanders but because it is different it may not be identified. Subordinates may be better able to comment on the effectiveness of a leadership method or, at the very least, provide a different perspective. By allowing for greater scope of different styles of leadership the diversity within the Army will inevitably increase. This opens up the prospect of greater debate within the organisation and improvement to the intellectual rigor the Army applies to its own reflective process. The current...
appraisal process encourages uniformity of opinion with subordinates agreeing with their commanders in order to ingratiate themselves with them. This inevitably cascades throughout the organisation. If the input into an appraisal was not limited solely by the view of the reporting officer, greater confidence to express opinions or assessments that differ from the collective orthodoxy may follow.

Human nature and ambition inevitably impact how people behave. In a hierarchical organisation such as the Army, inevitably the focus of attention is on the feelings and opinions of the boss, but this can negatively impact the rest of the unit and increase stress.10 Anyone who has witnessed absurd decisions made with the intention of keeping superiors happy, to the detriment of many others in the unit, would understand this. If this behaviour was recognised for what it is, could change for the better follow?

Commanders should be judged on the team that they build and the content of their character, as much as the quality of their staff work. By encouraging this method of reporting leaders are also demonstrating the moral courage to hold themselves accountable to those they lead. We expect that the lawful orders we give should be followed, despite the fact that they could potentially lead to a soldier’s death. If we are asking subordinates to trust us to make the right decision with their lives, should we not have faith in them to provide us with a fair and effective reflection on our performance? By allowing for such input we could further strengthen the bonds that bind commanders and those that they lead.

Such a method of reporting will not be effective in isolation and has several shortcomings that must be considered when deciding whether to adopt this policy. It is critical to understand that this would not replace the current methodology of appraisals but supplement...
them. The reporting officers should continue to assess and articulate how an individual has performed. The contribution from a subordinate could shape how that assessment is ascertained. Arguments against employing this method of reporting raise concerns that some commanders may approach the reporting period as a popularity contest, sacrificing the mission in order to please their troops or to keep them happy. At the same time effective leaders who are difficult personalities may be unduly penalised. This is why it is critical that the reporting officers continue to take a holistic approach to the reports that they produce. Finally, another critical concern is that reporting officers are not under any obligation to accept the input provided by subordinates. By having a transparent process where subordinates’ input is included in the report, a subject who receives a report where this input has not been clearly articulated could have grounds for appeal.

In order to test the prospects and impact of such a change in policy a limited trial could be run that focusses on a particular unit, target group or rank bracket as a control group. In order to assess its effectiveness, the change methodology should be assessed over the course of five years to determine its impact. Members of the organisation who have participated in the study should be asked to record how it has affected their approach to their work and how they lead. Subordinates’ views should be used for the assessment if they have seen an improvement in their leaders and what impact they think it has had on how managers approach their work. Commanders within an organisation should examine both qualitative and quantitative measures to assess how this practice may have impacted the organisation, examining, for instance, retention or performance such as being deployed on BATUS. For the Army as a whole, an understanding of how this has impacted the career development pathway of those who have participated will also help determine if there are significant changes in who progresses or how reports are written.

Despite enormous investment in developing commanders, managers and leaders within the military, poor performers are still evident in the Army. Civilian organisations, such as the civil service or private business also suffer from such individuals; however they do not allocate the same effort to developing their leaders nor are they invested with responsibility for the lives of the people that they lead. At the same time, many organisations practice some form of 360-degree reporting. The potential for a relatively inexpensive change of practice that could have a disproportionately positive effect on the military cannot be ignored. As a learning organisation we are constantly evolving and changing the way in which we approach our work. In an era of ever-dwindling resources and greater demands, a change in the way we assess the suitability of commanders for advancement could have a huge impact, and serve as an important force multiplier.

Those who are able to articulate intent and embrace Mission Command can have an outsized influence on the battlefield. Commanders who enjoy the confidence of those that they lead can drive them to do incredibly difficult things under the most trying of circumstances. By allowing those we lead to provide their insights into how we develop, we can all become better leaders and in so doing create a more effective Army for the future. No system is without faults, but such a reform could allow the Army to address critical deficiencies in command that far too often allow poor leadership to thrive.
Pictured are British Army Snipers and their spotters conducting live firing on Salisbury Plain during the prestigious Sniper Commanders Course held at the Specialist Weapon School in Warminster. Photo: Stuart A Hill AMS, Crown Copyright
Major James Ashton AGC (ETS) argues that mixing the right blend of people in the right environment leads to success, suggesting that the Army is perhaps not getting this quite right.
It is commonly considered that a diverse range of employees helps promote the competitiveness of an organisation, with different views and experiences helping to avoid groupthink. The outcome of groupthink, if not necessarily failure, is a low probability of a successful outcome.¹

Creative, diverse thought is a contributor to success and it can come from anyone irrespective of background, age, gender or any other factor. Some people are naturally inclined to think occasionally outside the box, whilst others prefer to remain firmly inside it. It is the author’s belief that the key type of diversity required for organisational creativity is psychometric diversity: how people think, approach problems and interact with the world.

Two questions therefore need to be addressed: firstly, does the Army successfully recruit and retain a psychometrically diverse group of people, amongst whom some might be termed as nature’s ‘heretical creatives’?² And secondly, what does the Army do with its people in order to facilitate diverse and creative thought within the work environment?

To address the first question it is helpful to turn to Susan Cain, author of Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can’t Stop Talking. Cain suggests that many of society’s most creative people (and incidentally transformational leaders) are introverts, citing Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King. She places the number of introverts in society to be between 33-50 per cent, yet suggests that such people feel under pressure to ‘be someone else’ in the workplace. She claims that for many introverts it is necessary to behave like extroverts otherwise their skills and insights won’t be recognised.³ She contends that many working environments do not support introverts’ innate talents for creativity. The importance of this will be seen later.

Malcolm Gladwell’s research supports this. In Blink he argues that group brainstorming and discussion sessions rarely produce innovative results. This is due to inhibitors in social interaction, creating bland, design-by-working-group solutions, agreed through consensus rather than revolution or inspiration. Whilst talking through a logic problem can assist solutions, there is also the danger of ‘paralysis though analysis’ which can snuff out the flickering candle of insight.⁴

But the answer is not necessarily to force people to work alone; indeed many people would be terrified of the prospect, and such an approach would prevent collaboration and cross-pollination. The answer is to use to greater effect that which we already have, which may, in turn, require some interior design modifications.

The open-plan office has, in recent years, become the common design for military headquarters. Unfortunately, this design has the potential to be the antithesis to the germination of inventiveness. This is true whether one is an introvert or an extrovert; whether one draws energy from crowded spaces or a quiet, closed environment. What is essential for the open plan office to work as intended is for it to have ‘enough people with different perspectives running into one another in unpredictable ways’.⁵

The headquarters of today are open but segregated by capbadge, and if research by the author is taken into account likely to be filled with people with a similar personality type. This is the worst of all worlds, as there is neither the space for individual quiet reflection, nor the random interactions of diverse thinkers beyond the confining desk partitions. As a work environment it has the potential to lead to a lack of creative output whilst also providing some of the antecedent conditions for groupthink.⁶

Indeed, a walk around many headquarters in today’s Army might see even Brigadiers sitting at a bench desk, given limited seclusion from the team. To some this will be a preferred method of working, and indeed in many circumstances will produce the output required.

---

¹ Janis, I., 1982, Groupthink, P, 244
² ‘Heretical creative’ is taken to mean a person who is inclined to form logical conclusions that are born from an innovative adaptation of methodology and doctrine.
³ This is supported by research by Karl Moore of McGill University in Montreal, who states that introverts who make it to the top learn how to behave like extroverts at least some of the time.
⁴ Gladwell, M., 2007, Pp. 121-122
⁶ Janis, I., 1982, Groupthink, F, 244. Antecedent conditions include: decision makers constituting a cohesive group; structural faults of the organisation such as group insulation, little impartial leadership and few methodical procedures; homogeneity of social background and ideology; a provocative situational context with high stress and low hope; difficult decision making processes which lower self-efficacy.
Yet, in the case of those who are required to see and assess the bigger picture, the inability to close the door and ponder the strategic situation in peace and quiet must have an impact whether the individual prefers the working environment of the floorplate or not. And for every brigadier who prefers the quiet of an office, there must be many more staff officers who equally work better in smaller, less intrusive environments. With the Army requiring its people to be ‘the strategic edge’ has it inadvertently created working environments which are not only non-inclusive (on the psychometric level), but which also actively inhibit our collective planning and processing? With this question in mind, we must look at the people who are likely to work in headquarters.

In terms of recruitment it appears the Army does not seek diversity in the area where it most matters: how the brain prefers to sift and process information. As has been alluded-to above, diversity in how one processes the world around them is critical to creativity in group scenarios. Yet Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) data collected by the author of one hundred and eleven lieutenants, between 2017 and 2019, showed a strong convergence of personality types within the junior officer ranks, strongly siding towards the extrovert and action-orientated individuals. Eighty-two per cent of those surveyed fell within the extrovert category, with over twenty-two percent being measured as ESTJ alone. Forty-five per cent of junior officers comprise of (ESTJ), (ESFJ) or (ENFJ), out of a possible sixteen categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personality Type</th>
<th>Count (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISTJ</td>
<td>5 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISFJ</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFJ</td>
<td>3 (2.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTJ</td>
<td>3 (2.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTP</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFP</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTP</td>
<td>6 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTP</td>
<td>7 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESFP</td>
<td>9 (8.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENFP</td>
<td>5 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTP</td>
<td>11 (9.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTJ</td>
<td>25 (22.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESFJ</td>
<td>16 (14.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENFJ</td>
<td>12 (10.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTJ</td>
<td>6 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Breakdown of MBTI results of 111 Lieutenants of mixed capbadge with 18 per cent showing as introvert, 82 per cent extrovert, and 48 per cent comprising just three categories. Note the fact that there are more ESTJs than the entire introvert category.

8 Evidence was gained through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test. The abridged version of the test was used. One individual who had previously completed the longer version reported that his outcome was the same.
Based on this snapshot, the officer cohort, therefore, is in danger of being dominated by one type of character grouping: ESTJ (extraversion, sensing, thinking, judgment). This sort of person is described as:

Practical, realistic, matter of fact. Decisive, quickly moving to implement decisions. Organises projects to get things done, focusing on getting results in the most efficient way possible. Have a clear set of logical standards, systematically follow them and want others to also. Forceful in implementing their plans.

The description sounds just like a strong military leader should be. Yet, according to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) literature, such people may end up becoming domineering and rushing into action without due consideration. This sort of person might be highly effective, but must be balanced by those who take a different approach, perhaps one that is more conceptual. Without an equal spread of personality types, there will not be a dissenting voice to be heard amongst a sea of implementers.

Further to this, Professor Karen Carr’s 2011 investigation into decision-making within the Army environment states: ‘The MOD has a cultural bias towards reductionist thinking: splitting problems into logical components and steps. The chief alternative to this is the so-called Commander’s intuition, which is viewed with a curious mix of veneration and suspicion, depending on who the Commander is, and in what context it takes place.’

The Army’s identified tendency towards reductionist thinking, coupled with the veneration of the Commander and a strong convergence of personality types could be seen as a particular risk to achieving clear-minded decision-making, innovation and creativity. The necessity for decision-making, innovation and creativity has long been established within military doctrine, and is encompassed in JDP-04 (Understanding). Yet how many military personnel feel comfortable to pitch a bold, innovative idea in a formal setting? Is the risk to personal reputation too great, and if so, what does that say about the culture of the Armed Forces?

The Army needs ESTJs at all ranks, and the effects-based organisation that the Army is works well for it. However, if the principle of diversity and inclusivity is to be followed, then the Army should consider ways to make the working environment better for those with different psychometric profiles. Individual working spaces should be available, whilst in officer and soldier reporting,

United Kingdom Army soldiers make their way to the range during the Australian Army Skill at Arms Meeting 2019 held in Puckapunyal, Victoria. Photo: Corporal Jessica de Rouw, Australian Department of Defence

quietness should not be equated with shyness or weakness, but perhaps might signal a strategic, reflective and creative thinker.

Jim Collins, in his book *Good to Great* suggests that that the CEOs who remain at the top of their companies for the longest are quiet and self-effective.\(^\text{10}\) It should be no different for the military. Let us take the example of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe, who fits into the quiet, reflective category of personality. Beginning the Second World War as a Lieutenant Colonel, he quickly rose to the top due to his ability to manage other Generals and Air Marshals with huge personalities and conflicting egos. He smoothed

---

over relationships and acted as the diplomat, letting his staff have their moments of glory in front of the press whilst he took the back seat.

Further evidence to this is the ‘draught Eisenhower’ movement, which sought to push him to run for President following the complete victory over the Axis powers. This was despite his wish not to run for office and his instinct to shun the limelight. So, while it was essential to have extroverts such as Patton, Montgomery and Coningham driving the men forwards on the battlefield, it was just as essential to have a calm, reflective character to be able to order them to work together and maintain the inter-service and international alliance, maintaining an eye on the bigger, strategic picture.

However, it cannot be said that the present day Army (and possibly militaries in general) truly recruit and promote a diverse set of psychometric profiles. Citing the case of Eisenhower, it might be more through exceptional circumstance that an introvert finds him or herself in a leadership position, demonstrating their unique managerial and leadership qualities in traditionally effects-orientated work environments.

What is certain is that further study is needed into levels of diversity at the psychometric level. As has been highlighted from the author’s small study, only 18 per cent of lieutenants fall into the introvert category. This skewed ratio might be preferable for those filling roles as platoon or troop commanders, but what of positions which come with seniority? Research should be conducted into the percentage of those at lieutenant colonel and above who fall into the introvert/extrovert category in order to gauge the retention of introverts and theorists against extrovert implementers. Do such people get to the top, and if not, why not and what happens to them?

If the Army truly wishes to promote divergent thinking and inclusivity, then it must begin at the psychometric level. The pay-off will be found in the conceptual revolutions that are critical to being able to outthink a numerically and technologically superior enemy.

REFERENCES

• Carr, Karen & Sparks, Emma, 2011, Thinking Skills for Strategic Capability, Cranfield University: MOD
• Collins, James C. 2011, Good to great: why some companies make the leap ... and others don’t, New York, NY: Harper Business
Empowerment and Mission Command - Uneasy Bedfellows?

Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham, analyses the Army’s continuing commitment to greater empowerment and the role of mission command in the process.

The 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) took place on Salisbury Plain from 28 – 30 Oct 2019. It was set in and around Copehill Down Village - the Army’s primary urban combat training facility - and showcased a variety of the Army’s most modern capabilities.

Photo: Jack Eckersley, Crown Copyright
Empowerment is very much on the agenda in the Army presently. For several years the Army Headquarters has been actively seeking ways to empower the Army and the Field Army is running the Empowerment Programme, which is driving productivity, continuous improvement and delegation in order that we can remove waste and focus on the things that matter. Additional emphasis on empowerment is being driven by the Chief of Defence Staff and the MoD Permanent Secretary, who wrote to all staff in the MoD to announce 2019 as the ‘year of empowerment’.

References to empowerment are all around us, but there is little in the doctrine to help us understand how to ‘do empowerment’.1 There is also evidence that the experience of empowerment differs between ranks. A study that looked at 5 years-worth of Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey Data found evidence that soldiers feel substantially less empowered than officers. Though officers and soldiers feel well trained and have confidence in their teams, they differ in their impressions of how much freedom they were allowed in how they do their work, the extent to which they were rewarded for good work and how much intrinsic motivation they derived from their work.2

This author researched empowerment from the perspective of business, academia and military affairs3 and was also part of a Field Army/McKinsey team during the early stages of the Field Army Empowerment Programme. This article seeks to summarise this work to assist in a more informed debate on empowerment, beginning with an introduction to the concept of power in organisational life, which is essential to understanding empowerment.

POWER

The term ‘power’ refers to ‘the capacity to obtain the result you want’.4 To accomplish even simple tasks in our work lives, we rely on a web of superiors, subordinates and others on whom we depend to get the job done. Consequently, getting the desired results is not merely a result of how we behave; it also depends on what others do and how they respond. In seeking to influence others, those who can build their power are said to be more likely to achieve their ends than those with less power.5 The literature supporting this argument compels us to engage in the consolidation of power through various means, but principally by actively and skilfully controlling valuable resources.6 There are also said to be multiple ‘bases of power’ including personality, positional (your rank), expert (you know best how to get something done), and the power to reward or punish others.7 Whether we consider power as a relational quality or as comprising various bases, we are urged to recognise that weak people and weak individuals achieve little in the world.8 Power, then, is something to be skilfully consolidated so that we can achieve our aims.

The literature on empowerment takes a somewhat different view of power. At its most basic, empowerment means ‘to give power to’. Leading management thinkers argue that for leaders to have far-reaching influence, they must make their followers feel powerful and able to accomplish things on their own.9

Thus, organisational power can grow, in part, by being shared. Therefore, unlike leaders with little power, leaders who have effectively built their power are more likely to see their subordinates’ talents as resources rather than threats and therefore encourage more autonomy.10 One might take from this that the power literature11 offers guidance to the individual on how to progress in a brutal world, while the empowerment literature12 compels us to share power for organisational over personal benefit. The reality, though, is likely to be

---

1 See Army Leadership Doctrine (2016), p52-53.
3 The author studied an MBA with Warwick Business School. Business research included Harvard Business Review articles. Academic articles and books were sourced through the Warwick Business School library. Military research included BAR articles and doctrine publications. ALIS was a useful source of military writings on mission command.
10 Ibid.
more complicated with successful individuals skilfully combining both methods.

EMPOWERMENT

Though the term empowerment is relatively new, the concept of delegating decision-making authority from management to employees as a means of improving performance is not and can be traced back to the 1970s.\textsuperscript{13} Empowerment took hold as a management concept in the late 1980s when the increasing rate of change and competition drove a search for new forms of management that encouraged greater risk-taking, innovation and employee commitment.\textsuperscript{14} Empowerment appeared to provide just such a solution.\textsuperscript{15} The central tenet of empowerment is that people respond more creatively when given broad responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and helped to derive satisfaction from our work.\textsuperscript{16} This approach contrasts markedly with traditional management techniques that have emphasised control, hierarchy and rigidity.\textsuperscript{17} Empowerment is a complicated

\textsuperscript{16} Walton, R., (1985), From control to commitment in the workplace, Harvard Business Review, March-April, pp. 77-84
concept, which history has shown is very difficult to implement effectively. Empowerment rhetoric and the reality of implementation are often very different.

The model of empowerment in Figure 1 shows all the constituent parts of empowerment and will be used to explain what empowerment is in practical terms.

**PEOPLE**

Research suggests that those with stronger self-esteem, higher rank, more tenure and higher education report stronger feelings of empowerment in their organisations. In large hierarchical organisations, this typically plays out as those at the top of the organisation feeling more empowered than those at the bottom. Therefore when considering where to focus effort in any empowerment initiative, a good place to start is with junior employees to understand how their responsibilities and participation can be improved. Trust is also important. If your manager does not trust you, he or she would instinctively rather control than empower you. Therefore, relationships matter for empowerment.

**STRUCTURAL EMPOWERMENT**

Structural empowerment consists of the things that managers do and the context they set. If a commander is considering creating a more empowered environment within the unit – and has already established a baseline of authentic and trusting relationships - then structural empowerment is where the commander should focus. Structural empowerment is associated with sharing power by shifting responsibility and decision-making authority down through the chain of command - hence ‘to give power to’. All too often leaders talk about empowerment but say and do nothing about the balance of power in the organisation. The benefits of shifting power downward include enabling us to grow our power by sharing it with others who work to a common goal and, by sharing decision-making we can create time for longer-term thinking and innovation.

---


The most common practices associated with structural empowerment are explained below. The practices are designed to enable people to act with greater autonomy while still aligning them to an organisational purpose and giving them the skills and information they need:

- **Strategic Alignment:** Leaders must continually communicate a clear and compelling unit purpose. An exercise or operation is not a purpose. They are tasks. Tasks should have associated activities which are all linked to an overarching purpose. It is a leader’s role to help subordinates, whatever their place in the organisation, understand how their activities contribute to a meaningful purpose. Purpose matters; make the organisation’s purpose clear to those you seek to empower.

- **Information sharing:** As far as possible, we must provide our people with complete and accurate information to allow them to make judgements, prioritise and plan. Merely passing on information is problematic in a world where there is so much of it. Instead, leaders should be ‘sensegivers’. Sensegiving requires us to make things that have already happened meaningful to others, i.e. using our experience to make judgements about what is going on around us and communicating that to our subordinates in a way that is meaningful to them and enables them to react. In return, subordinates must share their attitudes and continuous improvement ideas with managers.

- **Clear Boundaries:** Boundaries consist of a shared understanding of unit goals, policies, processes and lines of authority and responsibility to better enable subordinates to take autonomous action. Boundaries constitute the control element of empowerment.

- **Participative Decision-Making:** Individuals and teams must have input into decisions ranging from long term to day-to-day. Doing so will improve the quality and acceptance of decisions when participation fits the constraints of the situation. Remember that subordinates cannot be expected to participate meaningfully in decision-making if they have not been provided with all the relevant information.

- **Training and Knowledge:** Getting the most from people and enabling them to make a real difference in the organisation requires us to help them build knowledge and skills not only to do their jobs better but also to learn about the wider organisation. One aspect of the Field Army Empowerment Programme is to strengthen and standardise in-barracks routines and share this understanding widely.

- **Organisational Support:** Organisational support includes the supportiveness of the unit’s climate, our perception that the organisation values and cares about us, and the level of trust the unit has in individuals. Implicit in this is that people will be supported if they make well-intentioned mistakes.

Any one of these practices by itself will have only a marginal effect on empowerment. The real impact comes from the interaction and reinforcement among these practices.

Empowerment, then, is not about removing control and oversight and just letting people ‘crack on’. Doing so is likely to lead to activity that is unsynchronised against common objectives. The skill lies in increasing our subordinates’ area of freedom but doing so in a way that engages and supports them in pursuing a common objective. Colonels Val Keaveny and Lance Oskey, US Army veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, illustrate this point in their recommendations on how to empower subordinates on operations by the effective conduct of Mission Command. For them, the key is employing a set of tools and procedures in the form of shared documents and a cycle of coordination meetings to find a balance between micromanagement and an environment with so little structure that activities are frantic, ill-timed and unsynchronised.

The structural view of empowerment is an incomplete construct as it takes an organisationally-centric look and fails to consider whether people feel empowered. This led to the development of a psychological perspective on empowerment.

---

In contrast to structural empowerment, psychological empowerment is not concerned with the transition of authority and responsibility but instead with people’s perceptions and the enhancement of feelings of self-efficacy (meaning a capacity to bring about the desired result). Psychological empowerment is not an organisational intervention or a dispositional trait but rather a mental state achieved when individuals perceive that they are empowered. Where empowerment in a structural sense is defined as ‘giving power to’, empowerment in a psychological sense considers power as energy, and thus empowerment is ‘to energise’. Psychological empowerment is also described as intrinsic task motivation; positive experiences that individuals derive directly from a task. Sometimes we can obtain motivation and satisfaction from the work itself. These situations arise when we have feelings of meaning, competence, self-determination and impact (Table 1).

For a comprehensive perspective of empowerment, it should be considered as having both structural and psychological elements. Structural should also be

---


30 Ibid.

31 Some of these ideas are brilliantly brought to life by Daniel Pink. Search on YouTube for: RSA ANIMATE: Drive, the surprising truth about what motivates us.
The idea of *internal commitment* links both structural and psychological elements of empowerment. To generate and sustain an empowered environment, leaders must encourage the development of *internal commitment*. Internally committed individuals are committed to a particular project, person, or task based on their own reasons or motivations. Any management practice that encourages staff participation, such as participating in defining the tasks and goal-setting, will result in individuals feeling empowered and being more committed to the task and organisation.

**PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF EMPOWERMENT**

Empowerment enables organisations to get the most from their employees by harnessing their talents and ideas. Organisations with higher levels of empowerment, such as Google, have demonstrated improvements in various performance areas including innovation, productivity, team performance, flexibility and responsiveness.

The quality and efficiency of firms such as Singapore Airlines are not simply the result of good strategic decision-making by senior managers, but also the result of effective delegation of responsibility and the combined efforts of people at the bottom of the organisation continuously improving the systems and processes on which they work. The scale of the incremental benefits to be gained from bottom-up continuous improvement should not be underestimated.

The Field Army Empowerment Programme provides units and formations with the levers by which the benefits of continuous improvement can be realised. It aims to give people the skills required to identify waste (time, money, other resources), the authority to remove it, and to stop doing the things we don’t need to do. In so doing we can better focus on the things that matter; battlecraft, enhancing our collective warfighting capability, developing bold and innovative commanders, and engaging in constant competition.

Empowerment is also said to benefit individuals by enhancing well-being and positive attitudes. Similarly, empowered employees have a greater sense of motivation, job satisfaction and organisational loyalty and are thus less likely to want to leave the organisation.

**WHEN EMPOWERMENT EFFORTS FAIL**

Despite the many accounts of the supposed advantages of empowerment to the individual, team and organisational performance, very often the benefits are never realised. Empowerment efforts can only generate positive outcomes if well aligned to the organisation. If not aligned, however, they may breed backlash and resentment.

A common cause of the failure of empowerment efforts stems from the difference in assumptions about trust and control. Frequently, there is disagreement amongst management as to whether empowerment should be principally a top-down process of delegated decision-making within clear boundaries, or whether it should be bottom-up where leaders role model and provide support to subordinates whom they implicitly trust to innovate, take risks and ultimately drive improved performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td>The fit between work goals and beliefs or values; i.e. the extent to which one cares about a task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>The belief individuals hold regarding their ability to perform their work activities skilfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-determination</td>
<td>One’s sense of autonomy or control over how they carry out their work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>The degree to which individuals view their behaviour as making a difference or the extent to which they influence outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - Elements of psychological empowerment

---

Another common mistake made by organisations looking to empower people is to expect too much from the managers in the middle. Encouraging managers to ‘just let go’ ignores the intense control, achievement and recognition needs we all have. Consequently, organisations seeking to shift quickly from a controlling management culture to an empowered one could struggle because of middle management change inertia.\(^{41}\)

Efforts can also come to grief if there is an overemphasis on the psychological aspects of empowerment at the expense of structural aspects. Individuals come into work with a general sense of self-efficacy, feelings of competence and motivation, which organisations are hard-pressed to affect in any practical way.\(^{42}\) Therefore, efforts to convince individuals of their newfound power without providing them with any new levers of power can only serve to engender cynicism.

**SUMMARY**

This article has provided a practical guideline for how to go about creating a more empowered environment. In an Army context, empowerment enables the commander to increase their subordinates’ area of freedom whilst aligning them to a compelling purpose, being clear about what control measures apply and providing them with information and support. Empowerment can be particularly useful in barracks for the purpose of harnessing people’s talents to drive continuous improvement, which in turn will deliver greater productivity, performance and job satisfaction.


\(^{42}\) Ibid.
If leaders produce a clear and memorable intent, a framework of control measures and trust their people, then quicker decision-making is the likely benefit. If, however, the leaders seek a broader set of benefits and wish to do something that improves performance and morale, the model at Figure 1 should be applied. The leaders can then start conversations with their teams about what to do next.

Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham was a member of the first cohort of the Army Advanced Development Programme and is now in unit command.
Exercise TRACTABLE is being undertaken by the British Army to demonstrate its ability to rapidly project forces worldwide. Soldiers based in Bulford gathered the various armoured vehicles together for their long journey through Europe to Estonia by road, rail and sea to complete a routine fleet rotation of vehicles deployed as part of Operation Cabrit - the UK’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia as part of NATO. The Army’s fundamental purpose is to protect the nation and deployments such as this, ensures we are always ready and able to do so.

Photo: Sergeant Donald Todd, RLC, Crown Copyright
A British View of International Attachment at the German Officer School

Lieutenant Conor Patrick, 32 AEC, provides an analysis of the German Army’s Officer Course 2, at the Officer School in Dresden from the perspective of a British international attachment. He also looks at the innovative approach the school has to military education.

Pictured is the Officer School of the German Army at Dresden. Photo: Kolossos, GNU Free Documentation license, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license, Wikimedia
Since 2017, a small number of junior British Army officers have attended the German Army’s Officer Course 2 (Offizierlehrgang 2 or ‘OL2’) at the Officer School in Dresden. The author is only the fifth to do so, successfully passing off the historic Theaterplatz in the heart of Saxony in June 2019. The aim here is to analyse the course’s innovative approach to military education and to provide advice for potential attendees.

**WHAT IS OL2?**

OL2 is a centralised, twelve-week residential course which must be completed by all young German Army officers as part of their early career pipeline. The official aim of the course is to prepare these officers for the wide range of missions and tasks which they might be faced with in the field Army. In practice, it is similar in its content and the stage at which it is encountered in the German career stream to the British Junior Officers’ Tactical Awareness Course (JOTAC). As with JOTAC, OL2 is not an assessed course. Where they differ is in their duration—OL2 being three times longer—and the depth of the training delivered, which is greater.

**COURSE CONTENT - WHAT TO EXPECT**

Unlike British initial officer training, the product of the German system is not a platoon commander trained after one year; rather a rounded staff officer, capable of adding value at the Battlegroup level, developed over a number of years. In the German Army, this is, to borrow our own phrase, ‘international by design’, with participants on OL2 coming from over fifty countries. In terms of sheer numbers, NATO allies such as France and the Netherlands contribute the greatest number of young officers and their commitment is both important and impressive; they will complete the entire German officer training package. As such, the training leans heavily towards standardised NATO practices and procedures.

OL2’s contribution to the German officer training package is to take the knowledge acquired on the OL1 course, loosely akin to the Intermediate Term at Sandhurst, and have trainees apply it in a battlegroup headquarters scenario, within an armoured brigade context. All officers are expected to be familiar with the various staff roles and functions within the battlegroup. This is developed through lessons taught in the school, two comprehensive TEWTs conducted in the countryside near Dresden, culminating in a weeklong execution phase at an Army staff trainer facility, co-located at the officer school.

**COMPETENCY ORIENTED TRAINING**

OL2 was undergoing a step change in delivery due to a new concept of training being implemented across the German Armed Forces, for which the author’s company at Dresden was the pilot year. The concept will be translated as ‘competency oriented training’, or ‘KOA’ (Kompetenzorientierte Ausbildung), by which it is most commonly referred to. The aim is for all German officer training to have changed to the KOA model by 2021 with the view to applying it across all Federal Armed Forces training by the year 2030.¹

KOA’s governing Joint Service Publication outlines the key drivers for its introduction. There is a recognition of the consequences of demographic changes in German society: in short, the population is getting older. As a result, competition for talented and educated people with other employers has become fierce and will continue to do so. Therefore, training must become attractive to the next generation of potential recruits. This will aid recruitment and retention. Next, in a world of limitless and easily available knowledge, which is constantly developing and changing, it is made clear that the Armed Forces must become an organisation which promotes lifelong learning. This is described as a ‘necessity’.² In tandem with this, the Federal Armed Forces are formally acknowledging that all training that they deliver is a form of adult education and therefore must allow for balance between work and private life. This last element is partly reflected in the decision to adhere to European Working Time Directive (EWTD). It is interesting to note that these same drivers form the context to our own Field Army’s new Learning and Development Directive.³

What will not change is the German Armed Forces’ guiding principle of being operationally focused.

---

² Ibid., p. 5.
The ability to fight remains the overarching aim of training. What is fundamentally new is the understanding of what training is to achieve. Instead of meeting set training objectives, the Germans want soldiers who can take their knowledge and skills and apply them in all situations, especially those which are unexpected and encountered under duress. Trainees who are trained under the KOA model will be able to grasp, judge and tackle complex problems successfully.\(^4\) In a bold statement, then, KOA replaces training objectives (TOs) altogether. TOs are no longer considered useful. In the British Army, we too aim to develop fast thinking and innovative personnel capable of interpreting and operating in complex situations on the 21st century battlefield\(^7\) but have not yet moved in quite as drastic a way as the Germans to adapt our training. Both forces have identified the same drivers for change; perhaps the Germans perceive them as more pressing.

Until recently, German training has been didactic in nature, with Directing Staff (DS) holding centralised lectures and presenting learners with knowledge. KOA foresees learners taking responsibility for their own learning, with the intended result that more of that knowledge is retained. This is done by tasking the trainees with a given scenario and allowing them time to inform themselves and others of it. The trainees must then go through a complete cycle of planning accordingly, making a decision and carrying it out and then having their efforts assessed. Allowing for failure is an integral part of KOA; trainees must experience failure as that, too, offers valuable lessons.\(^6\) Crucially, reflection is the final element in the KOA cycle.\(^9\) The preceding stages are worthless if reflection upon the whole is not allowed for, as knowledge will not be retained. In all of this, the DS adopt an advisory and coaching role and become involved only to task the learners and then offer structured feedback to the trainees after the training intervention.\(^10\) This is to prepare the trainees in a realistic manner for the myriad, often unfamiliar, taskings they will encounter in their future roles.

This author believes that KOA does make a determined attempt to develop individuals who have been taught how to think, not what to think, which is exactly what our current Commander Field Army, wants to achieve in the British Army.\(^11\) This will require a disruptive approach to training, rather than more of the same. It will be interesting to see whether the Germans consider this year’s pilot run in Dresden to have been a success. What is clear is that regardless of the result, they are willing to take the risk in order to address the same drivers of change we, too, have identified. They have also written acceptance of failure into their policy, stating unequivocally that mistakes are to be perceived as learning opportunities.\(^12\) The Germans recognise that learners develop strategies to tackle new, unknown situations in future when they can take the risk of

\(^{5}\) Ibid., p. 7.
\(^{6}\) Ibid.
\(^{9}\) Ibid.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., pp. 20-21.
\(^{11}\) Chief of Staff Field Army, (2019). p. 1.
mistakes being made.\textsuperscript{13} We are aware of this in the British Army. Indeed, the topic was addressed at last year’s Land Warfare Conference, where the Chief of the General Staff observed that \textit{we are already training to the threshold of failure to promote learning and experimentation}.\textsuperscript{14} Yet we all accept we are not good at allowing trainees to go beyond that threshold in our training. Let us learn from the clear direction the Germans have given their own commanders in this regard as part of the KOA policy: learning from failure should be accepted and supported by trainers and commanders alike.\textsuperscript{15}

**DEPTH OF LEARNING, MASTERY OF THE BASICS**

Visiting OL2 turned out to be outstanding preparation for attendance on our own JOTAC, primarily due to the great depth of learning and the level of detail that was demanded. Though neither course is assessed, both require trainees to deliver certain products. Naturally, the expectation of what can be achieved in twelve rather than four weeks is commensurately greater. A couple of examples may help to illustrate this.

As stated, two TEWTs take place during OL2 and are conducted for an armoured Battlegroup offensive action. The DS expect course participants to follow the structure for ground briefs in strict fashion and general statements on terrain and capabilities are disallowed. Every field to be traversed, every ditch or stream to be crossed, each treeline which may conceal an enemy, is interrogated ruthlessly by the German DS. If, for instance, one proposes to plough their tanks through a fruit plantation, then one better have sound answers as to how the said vehicles’ tracks will fare against agricultural wiring. Equally, suggesting forward call signs will dramatically crash through rivers is not acceptable if there is no plan for echelon troops to follow through the muddied chaos the tanks have created - if they get across at all. And real value is placed upon technical subject knowledge and its application. German officers under scrutiny impressively reel off data on blue and red forces’ vehicles and the effect certain variables have on their capabilities.

The same can be said the military skill of map marking. A prerequisite of OL2 is a working knowledge of Allied Procedural Publication 6 (C) NATO Joint Military Symbology. German participants already arrive comfortable with recognising military symbols, drawing them and employing them during execution. Many an afternoon was spent in the classroom with maps out and a speaker system playing radio traffic from a fictional battle, whilst students individually tracked the battle in real time with their lumicolour pens. Interestingly, in the British Army, this method of tracking battles is referred to as a ‘reversionary mode.’ The Germans do not have this term and this reflects an attitude towards training which genuinely subscribes to mastery of the basics.

All this is noteworthy as it speaks not just to the professional competence demanded of a young German officer, but more broadly to the import the Germans place on their personnel being able to slip seamlessly into a NATO working environment and add value there.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{15} Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), p. 23.
EUROPEAN LAW AND GERMAN TRAINING DESIGN
The working day begins rather early: normally 0730 and finishes at 1615, with Fridays being half-days. The German Army is not exempt from the European Working Time Directive (EWTD). What that means is that service personnel are not allowed to work more than 41 hours other than in exceptional circumstances, which must be signed off by the commanding officer. Anything over and above that is demanded back in time in-lieu. Invariably, the nature of officer training means that there are times when this is exceeded, but this is managed at Dresden through careful timetabling. Programmed reflective periods (Arbeitsphasen) have been integrated heavily by the course designers in part to ensure tasks assigned to students can be completed within the working day; there is no homework whilst on the course as this would be incompatible with the EWTD.

Writing as a professional military educator, and having had the use of these programmed study periods, it must be commented that they are incredibly useful in allowing learners to thoroughly engage with the course material. Students retain access to all the superb facilities of the Officer School during these periods and the time allocated allows for proper collaboration between students as well. The trade-off is a much-lengthened total course duration. For that, the Germans develop officers who are confident in their professional body of knowledge and its practical application and who have worked with allies in an environment that is conducive to learning. This makes the British career course design seem condensed and rushed by comparison; indeed, in recent years the British Army has tried to reduce course duration without sacrificing content. This phenomenon is readily observable in the example of Junior Command
and Staff College (Land), delivered at Warminster, which has been cut to 6 weeks from 8. The question is, then, whether the British system places greater value on throughput, with additional time freed for more courses in the training year, than quality of product. What is certain is that the Germans have made a conscious decision to strive for the latter and their argumentation for doing so is simple: superficial forays [into subjects] have the capacity to mitigate learning success.16

WIDER EDUCATION AT THE OFFICER SCHOOL

Aside from the ‘golden thread’ conflict scenario mentioned earlier which informs the planning and execution staff work carried out during the course, other subject areas colour the syllabus of OL2 and add breadth to the course. These include military history and military law, both of which German officers must know intimately. The Officer School is fortunate to be located on the same grounds as the outstanding German Military Museum (Das Militärhistorische Museum), which serves as the backdrop for many of the lessons and presentations students attend and deliver. Its collections contain thousands of objects from battlefields around the world and encompass hundreds of years of military history. The museum focuses on the cause and consequences of war and its exhibitions achieve this in various, innovative ways. For example, laying out a model of an entire division, man for man, so one can grasp the sheer scale of the numbers involved; or setting aside an entire exhibition hall interrogating the role animals have played in warfare through the centuries.

Political education is at the forefront at Dresden as well and largely revolves around analysis of current affairs and international relations. It is expected that, at unit level, German officers will be responsible for informing and educating their soldiers on Germany’s Defence policy and place in the world, generally, and this is practiced daily during the course. A roster is established during the course whereby each student must present to the others on either an event on that day in history, or a pertinent current affairs event. These must be linked to lessons the Bundeswehr can draw from them. It was fascinating to watch colleagues deliver on a range of topics such as the German invasion of Crete or China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In the British Army, this so-called ‘education piece’ seems to be outsourced at times to education centres, whereas all German officers take ownership of this.

Less prominent is the German chaplaincy’s involvement in lessons on the moral component, which, whilst present, is effectively optional for those who decline interaction with the church, reflecting wider-German society’s increasing secularism. The German Army’s disposition to concentrate on the legal aspects of the use of force over the moral may be an area for focused research but lies outside the scope of this article. Suffice

to say, the German chaplaincy plays far less a direct role in German training than it does at, say, RMAS. Nonetheless, the facility exists and both Protestant and Catholic offices are located at the barracks in Dresden. Stepping slightly away from OL2 for a moment, it must be mentioned that the Officer School has its own English language training department. This department, run by the Federal Languages Office (Bundessprachenamt), teaches officers the English language as part of their training pipeline for 3 months. Similar to the rest of the school, it is run on company lines. What is fascinating, however, is that the platoons are streamed on ability, and from the strongest platoon, the German Army selects its candidates to attend RMAS. This author had the privilege of delivering a presentation to these officers and answering their many questions about British training. The question, in this author’s mind, was why don’t we have greater involvement here? Dresden already has regular visits from large groups of American service personnel stationed in Germany who speak to these students to improve their English. The fact that the British Army has a large cohort of professional, trained English teachers makes this seem such an obvious way to maintain a footprint in Dresden and reinforce relationships. The Americans are ahead of us in this respect.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**

What must be emphasised is that having British officers in Dresden to complete OL2 fits importantly into the bigger picture of British and German cooperation. In October 2018, the Defence secretaries of both the United Kingdom and Germany signed the *Joint Vision Statement* at Augustdorf, north of Sennelager. Joint Vision seeks to strengthen Defence ties between the UK and Germany, explicitly referencing the importance of interoperability between our forces, closer cooperation in training, and the desire to increase officer exchanges. This year will see the dissolution of HQ British Forces Germany. Continued British presence at Dresden is a tangible demonstration of British commitment to the Anglo-German Defence relationship which is more important now than ever before.

It is often said that the greatest impediment to having a more regular British footprint in Germany is the language ability of our young officers; but this is not an excuse for inaction, nor is it entirely true that we do not have enough linguists within our ranks. One challenge is ensuring that those qualified service personnel who wish to attend are given the time and encouragement to do so. This author was fortunate to have a supportive chain-of-command, but not all are so understanding. To be sure, it will demand some considerable time away from the unit; but the benefits accrued at the strategic level for UK Defence are not to be underestimated and this effort must be supported and resourced. In fact, Field Army direction is clear in this regard: *every opportunity should be taken to enhance Fd Army language capability in support of [...] interoperability.* At the tactical level, units will receive better educated, more competent young officers on their return with an accompanying course report written by a German OF4. That, too, is unique and useful and should be prized by sending units.

---


FINDING OUT MORE

British participants for OL2 are trawled for on a regular basis by the international attachments team of Army International Branch. Candidates are currently sought at the lieutenant to captain rank range with German language skills. The recommended pre-arrival level of German for OL2 is Standardised Language Profile (SLP) 3332. German-speaking personnel who have not already done so should have their SLP determined at the earliest opportunity by the Defence Requirements Authority for Culture and Language (DRACL) at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham. This is especially useful as knowledge of military specific language is tested here.

Aspiring course participants should discuss their wish to attend with their respective chain-of-command at the earliest opportunity to account for the long lead times between expression of interest and physical arrival at Dresden. For this author, the whole process took close to one year. That should not dissuade anyone from taking advantage of this challenging, fulfilling and enjoyable opportunity. Those who do may look forward to three months in one of Europe’s most beautiful cities, enjoying high quality, professional military education with colleagues from around the world. I am personally at the disposal of anyone who wants further advice on attending the German Officer School at Dresden. Please feel free to get in touch at conor.patrick106@mod.gov.uk.
Managing the News During The Battle for Rome in 1944

Brigadier (Ret’d) Richard Toomey analyses the relationship between the British Army and the media during the Battle For Rome in 1944.

Landing ships unloading supplies in Anzio harbour, 19-24 February 1944 © IWM (NA 12136)
The British public received the news of the Allied landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 with enthusiasm, even though they were weary of dispiriting news from Italy. Since the Italian surrender in early September 1943, the Allied advance from the ‘boot’ of Italy had been slow, bloody and demoralising. The landing, behind the Gustav Line - the forbidding German defences anchored on Monte Cassino - seemed to be the breakthrough that everyone had been waiting for. The good news reached the home audience quickly. The Allies had provided reporters at Anzio with a radio transmitter to get their reports out without delay.

But by mid-February the military-media relationship in Italy had deteriorated badly. As the landing failed to make the progress that had been hoped for, and defeat seemed possible, some reporters became despondent, privately speculating about a ‘Dunkirk-style’ withdrawal. Public morale about the progress of operations fell to its lowest level since the disasters of mid-1942. The Prime Minister and certain senior Army officers deemed the media reporting to be too negative and its impact damaging. Matters came to a head when the British commander of Allied Armies in Italy, General Sir Harold Alexander, flew in to visit Anzio on 14 February. He came to ensure that commanders and the defences were ready for a major German counter-attack that intelligence had told him was coming. He also had to deal with the sensitive issue of the replacement of the American corps commander in the beach head. Just before he left, he called all the press and radio reporters together. BBC correspondent Wynford Vaughan-Thomas was one of them. He recalled:

He spoke to the assembled group with the firm tone of a headmaster disappointed at some misdemeanour.

When he ‘went on to say that the reports sent from the Beachhead were causing alarm, there were emphatic protests. General Alexander looked sternly at the protesters. ‘Were any of you at Dunkirk?’ he asked. ‘I was and I know that there is never likely to be a Dunkirk here.’ The reporters were told that they could no longer use the transmitter. ‘We could not send any news’ (which was not quite true), said Vaughan-Thomas, ‘but hadn’t the news become too depressing to send?’

Three months, three failed attempts to penetrate the Gustav Line and many thousands of Allied casualties later, on 11 May, Operation DIADEM began. Fifth (US) and Eighth (British) armies concentrated in the Cassino area smashed through the Gustav Line defensive belt. Soon after, the forces in the Anzio beach head broke out and the Allied advance continued, liberating Rome on 4 June 1944. Reports to the public were accurate and timely, good relations between the military and the media had been restored and the public liked what they were reading and hearing.

How had the Allies in Italy recovered their relationship with the media? The answer provides a fascinating insight into the development of approaches to handling the media during military operations.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE WAR
During the Second World War, public opinion mattered. After the immediate threat to the UK abated in 1941 the war had to be maintained to a successful conclusion. The public would have to accept and endure the privations of wartime for years. People gritted their teeth and got on with rationing, the blackout, long working hours, limited holidays, significant state direction of individual lives and many restrictions. In exchange, people expected Churchill and his government to conduct the war effectively. Yet a series of setbacks and disasters in 1941 and 1942, some of Britain’s own making, did not inspire confidence. Even Churchill’s personal standing came into

---

2 Ibid.
3 According to Wikipedia, Operation DIADEM was an operation by the British Eighth Army and US Fifth Army, supported by air power (Operation Strangle) against the German 10th Army holding the Gustav Line and the subsequent Hitler Line. The plan was to smash through German defences, relieve the pressure on the Anzio beach head, open up the Liri Valley and liberate Rome. While DIADEM achieved its objectives much of the German 10th Army were able to withdraw north of the Arno River.
4 MacKay, Robert, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). Another factor that grew in importance during the war was the proposal for the post-war welfare state.
question, and if things had not improved, it could have been even worse for him.5

Churchill hated criticism. He disliked the gloomy content of the Ministry of Information’s national morale reports in 1942 so much that he wanted to stop them altogether.6 The popular, left wing Daily Mirror really irritated him and sailed so close to the wind that it was nearly banned.7 For the Mirror, the failures of 1941-1942 was all evidence of an incompetent, upper class old guard running the country and the Army.8

Of course what mattered most was battlefield success against the Germans. For that, from El Alamein in November 1942, through Tunisia and into Sicily in 1943, Alexander and Montgomery, and the entire Eighth Army became national heroes. They and Churchill were seen to be steadily bringing the war to a successful conclusion. There was a clear, functioning inter-relationship, sustained by the news between home morale, the national war effort and operational success.9 The impact was international as well. As the war could only ultimately be decided on land, it was clear that the

---

5 In July 1942, the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) reported that only 41% were satisfied with the conduct of the war. Paradoxically, confidence in Churchill, at 78%, was notably high, yet this was the lowest level recorded since he came to power.


8 The Army in particular. The standing of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force - seen as more modern and more competent - was much higher, according to contemporary research by Mass-Observation.

9 By June 1943 BIPO found that 75% were satisfied with the conduct of the war - the highest level since their surveys started in summer 1941 - and Churchill’s approval rating had risen to 92%.
Army’s operational performance and impact, real and perceived, was the leading indicator of national power. With every British and Commonwealth success on the battlefield, Churchill’s strength in negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union increased.

THE BRITISH MEDIA AND THE WAR OVERSEAS
During the war the media was subject to censorship. The policy was to censor only those facts that could be of value to the enemy, and in theory never to censor opinion. Journalists in the field were expected to report facts and atmosphere; editors and writers at home would supply opinion. Once a journalist had drafted a report, it would be taken to the censors for approval. Censors and journalists received frequently updated direction on what could not be reported. These so-called ‘stops’ were imposed to maintain operational security, leaving journalists free to adopt whatever tone they felt captured the story best. There was plenty of self-censorship. Journalists knew that a censor’s ‘blue pencil’ crossing out would mean that they would have to come back for approval, likely missing their deadlines. Not only that, but journalists also wanted their country to win the war and consciously avoided undermining their compatriots, even though this might have gone against their peacetime journalistic principles.

REPORTING ON THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
By the time the Anzio landings began, the Allies had been in Italy for just over six months. The first two months had been seen as a great success and culminated in the Italian surrender. At this stage, Churchill imagined the liberation of Rome before the end of 1943 possibly tilting Allied strategy to the Mediterranean. But the Germans chose to fight every step of the way, over terrain that favoured them. The media with the Allies reported what they saw, which was a slow advance of endless small battles through mountains, over rivers, and for small towns and villages. Churchill, instigator of the campaign, was particularly frustrated.

At the end of October General Alexander explained the difficulties to the Allied journalists in Italy, and this went some way to reassuring the public. It is notable how the newspapers of the day were full of the striking successes of the Soviet Army. The public could not fail to compare progress in Russia with progress in Italy. Every potential breakthrough in Italy was latched onto by the media and the public, but as they came to little, eventually Italy fatigue pushed the story off the front pages.

Churchill personally triggered the Anzio landing, conceiving it as a tactical masterstroke that would open the way to Rome and reignite his pet campaign. It would unhinge the German defences in the Gustav Line in the Cassino area, allowing a dramatic Allied breakthrough. So in December 1943, latching on to a contingency plan to land a division on the coast south of Rome, he proposed a two division landing and it was duly put into effect. Just four weeks later the first wave of troops landed.10

The Allies provided the media with a dedicated transmitter to send their reports back to the censors in Naples. The journalists reported what happened but events did not conform to the Allied script. Like everyone else involved they were hugely optimistic at the start, but when the landing force was encircled by the Germans, one of the bloodiest attritional battles of the war in the west began, and there was a serious prospect of defeat, some of them became despondent. Alexander knew that he was in a very dangerous and sensitive situation. He probably thought that eyewitness reporting of the battle would be unhelpful. The Germans did not need to know what was going on inside the beach head, and he and the fighting troops did not need a running commentary.

So he decided to switch off the transmitter; all reports from Anzio would have to go out of the beach head in writing by air.

This caused a storm at home. The press claimed that they were being stifled and made a formal complaint. Certain Members of Parliament were up in arms. Churchill made an immediate statement in which he seemed less than fully confident and appeared to slope shoulders, saying: *all battles are anxious as they approach the climax, but there is no justification for pessimism, according to the latest reports from the responsible authorities.*

Several days after the event, after the crisis in the battle had passed and the transmitter had been switched back on, Churchill came to Parliament to take personal responsibility, make an emollient apology, but also to criticise the reporting.

Such words as ‘desperate’ ought not to be used about the position in a battle of this kind when they are false. Still less should they be used if they were true. In the first case they needlessly distress the public; in the second they encourage the enemy to attack.

This highlights the extent to which Allied media reporting, particularly by the BBC, intended for home audiences, was being gleaned for intelligence and propaganda purposes by the Germans. The same broadcasts also reached Allied soldiers in the field, who were quick to spot disconnects with either their actual experience, or the briefings of their own commanders.

**OPERATION DIADEM PRESS POLICY**

The Allied attacks at Anzio and in the Cassino area in January, February and March 1944 were all failures.

---

Alexander decided to delay any further attacks until May. There was a key personality change. In early January Alexander received a new chief of staff (‘CGS’) Lieutenant General John Harding. Brooke had sent Harding to add some senior intellectual weight to Allied Armies Italy. He arrived too late to influence Anzio or Fifth Army’s attempts to take Cassino, but he was the architect of Operation DIADEM. Over March and April his staff concentrated most of the Eighth Army alongside the US Fifth Army in the Cassino sector in complete secrecy.

The strategic context was extremely important. A month before D-Day, and after months of failure in Italy, DIADEM had to be a success, and be seen as such by Allies and enemies alike. To pre-empt the sort of media problems that had arisen at Anzio - which the Army attributed to ‘unbalanced reporting’, but for which they were at least equally responsible - Harding issued a press directive, the first of its kind, at least in Italy.

Dated 8 May 1944, three days before the operation, and consisting of only two sides of direction, it starts by briefly explaining why the Commander-in-Chief (Alexander) thought that a press directive was so important. He wanted reporting to raise morale and facilitate success whereas if reporting was not ‘a correct representation’ (in Alexander’s view of course) it ‘may easily damage morale’ and the ‘excellent relationship ….. between American and British troops.

---

15 ‘Press Directive’, issued by Lieutenant General Harding, Chief of General Staff A.A.I., 8 May 1944, WO 204/6881, National Archives. Reference to this being the first such policy is in ‘Guidance to Censors in connection with the Spring Campaign’, 11 May 1944, in the same file.
In several paragraphs of guidance the document addresses the key information issues that commanders, staff and journalists needed to bear in mind. The first theme was to measure expectations:

Without guidance from the start unwise statements may appear and there may be a tendency to magnify early successes and anticipate events without building up in the minds of the public a true picture of the problem that confronts the Allied Armies in Italy.

The directive described just how substantial and deep the defences were, how they had been skilfully melded into the terrain, and how they were in reality the defences of Hitler’s ‘European fortress’. Even after the Allies penetrated the Gustav Line, there was another one, the Hitler Line, to come. Crossing the River Tiber would be an enormous challenge. German troops would be ordered to fight to the last man. Progress would be slow, unlike in North Africa, and should not be judged in miles.

The second theme was Allied relationships. The issue Alexander and Harding were keen to pre-empt was the idea that the British Eighth Army had come to do a task that the American Fifth Army could not. Unstated, but in the background was the fact that the international and inter-army rivalry had been strong, and many of the national contingent commanders (ranging from army group to corps) disliked each other or had low opinions of each other’s and their army’s ability. Alexander wanted to keep that firmly under control and out of the public eye.

Finally it concludes with one paragraph of ‘do’s’ and a crisp list of ‘don’ts’:

**Do’s**

*Portray a clear picture of the successive enemy defence lines. Build up in the minds of the public the strength of each as they are approached upon which guidance will be given. As each one is broken, proclaim it as a success as opening the way not to Rome or some more distant objective but to the next line of the Fortress which is not many miles behind. The strength of the Hitler Line could well be magnified and in any case shown to be greater than that of the Gustav Line. The breaking of this line can then be used by us as great propaganda value [against] the enemy.*

**Don’ts**

- Don’t compare this summer campaign with desert warfare which almost always resulted in a spectacular advance after a successful battle before the enemy could stabilise again a long distance to his rear.
- Don’t expect a large number of prisoners to be taken as this country is unsuited to quick manoeuvre which alone results in such capture of men and material.
- Don’t draw comparisons between success now and previous failures.
- Don’t speculate on the future conduct of the campaign.
- Don’t measure success in terms of some distant objective.
- Don’t magnify early successes. Play down the news in the opening stages and as each successive line is broken proclaim the success in crescendo.’

The process of censorship still applied as before, and censors were given further, more detailed direction based on Harding’s themes. Harding’s directive, a clear statement of the higher commander’s intent, went to everyone who might work with the media, or communicate directly themselves. The distribution included army commanders, staff in ‘public relations’ (i.e. media operations) branches, censors, and the editors of in-theatre magazines such as Union Jack, Stars and Stripes and Maple Leaf.

The resulting newspaper reporting over the following few weeks was carefully measured. As a consequence the British national morale reports recorded a gradual but sustained increase in enthusiasm. What Alexander and Harding could not influence was the extremely high level of second front anxiety at home, shared by Government and people alike, including Churchill. Unfortunately, for all those in Italy, their theatre had been eclipsed by Normandy.

Yet Harding’s press directive indicated a keen awareness of the strategic context, and it showed that the staff who planned Operation DIADEM had learned lessons from the campaign and the failures of Anzio in particular. The directive was judged such a success that another was issued on 3 June 1944. Allied Armies Italy’s insight - probably Harding’s personally - was to see that to be fully successful, operations had to be accompanied by a compelling narrative. This not only told the media - and through them the audience at home - what was happening, but carefully and conservatively shaped their expectations before operations actually started and maintained that approach throughout the subsequent campaign.

**FURTHER READING**

*The Italian Campaign and the Battle for Rome*

• Fennell, Jonathan, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019)

Public Morale in Second World War Britain
• Calder, Angus, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 1992)
• Donnelly, Mark, Britain in the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1999)
• MacKay, Robert, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002)

War Journalism in the Italian Campaign
• Moorehead, Alan, Eclipse (London: Sphere Books, 1968)
• Talbot, Godfrey, Ten Seconds From Now: A Broadcaster’s Story (London: Quality Book Club, 1974)
AMERICA’S MODERN WARS: UNDERSTANDING IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND VIETNAM
Christopher A Lawrence

Review by WO1 John Hetherington

America’s Modern Wars summarises the research that The Dupuy Institute (TDI) has done on irregular warfare over the last two decades. Its aim is to show which factors do and do not predict success in such wars. The findings are stark. Often statistical analyses find phenomena which are significant but hard-to-detect: here, the data is clear.

The book’s main conclusion is that large force ratios are needed to have a good chance of winning an irregular war, just how large depending upon how popular the irregulars’ cause is. A simple and popular, usually nationalist, insurgency typically requires a force ratio of above 10:1 to provide a good chance of winning; defeating a less popular, regional insurgency typically requires a ratio of less than 5:1. Causes like ‘Communism’ and ‘Islamism’ were in the middle. Lawrence’s key finding is the relationship between cause and required force ratio, a link not made in previous analyses: more popular insurgent causes not only require more forces to defeat them, but proportionally more forces. This enabled the TDI to produce a model which predicts the outcome of an irregular war to eighty percent accuracy.

Some respected irregular warfare authors have rejected the importance of force ratios, most notably Richard Clutterbuck (although he qualified himself on the matter) and Sir Richard Thompson. Both authors note that this rejection is only found in British authors. However, the author’s data seems clear. The idea is controversial because it implies that there are insurgencies - popular insurgencies in medium-to-large countries - which simply cannot be defeated because of the size of forces required to beat them.

Most of the remainder of the book is spent in describing in detail the other data TDI examined to see what other factors correlated with success. Some of these are surprising: the structure of the irregular forces does not matter; outside support and sanctuaries are important but not critical factors; population controls only work in unusual circumstances (Malaya was a real outlier);
Democratic countries suffering insurgencies were more successful but only if not supported by foreign interventions. Strict rules of engagement or severe brutality on the part of the security forces both correlated with success (an unhappy medium did not) but higher rates of civilian casualties overall favoured the insurgent. There are also brief but informative surveys of both irregular warfare theory from Clausewitz and Jomini up to the present and of contemporary statistical analyses. The book compares TDI’s findings with the writings of the most important theorists: it finds David Galula’s and Bernard Fall’s works most robust.

This book takes a macro-level view of the subject which is quite uncommon, as most books have concentrated on specific tactics and operational measures. The author holds the proper scientific view: ‘we aren’t convinced we are correct, but we will argue that (our view) has at least as much support as any other suggestion made and more support than most’. Its data, although imperfect, is the widest yet produced, although many areas are noted as worth further study. Reading the book is sometimes hard work as the data is analysed step-by-step but the results are summarized clearly. Its conclusions, although sometimes unpalatable and counter-intuitive, hold great promise for promoting better analysis of insurgencies and in designing more effective counter-insurgency interventions and is recommended on that basis.
HURRICANE THE LAST WITNESSES: PILOTS TELL THE STORY OF THE AIRCRAFT THAT WON THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Brian Milton

Review by Nick Smith

2015 marked the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, one of the most important victories in the history of these Islands. For many British people this battle is principally associated with the Vickers Supermarine Spitfire, an iconic aircraft in its own right. However, it was the Hawker Hurricane which was destined to carry the bulk of Britain’s defence during the Battle, confronting the Luftwaffe as it attempted to dominate the airspace over southern Britain, in preparation for Operation Sealion, the Nazi invasion of Britain. That the Luftwaffe was unsuccessful was in no small part due to the sacrifice and courage of RAF aircrew - ‘The Few’, and the outstanding quality of two aircraft, the Hurricane and the Spitfire.

The author Brian Milton, himself a distinguished pilot, has attempted to redress the ‘popularity’ balance between the two aircraft. Over a period of some years Brian Milton traced and interviewed eighteen of the surviving former pilots who flew the Hurricane during WWII. In this excellent book he has brought their personal stories together, as ‘Last Witnesses’, where Hurricanes fought in nearly every theatre of war, from the Battle of France, through the Battle of Britain, the defence of Malta, the deserts of North Africa, to Sicily, Italy, Normandy, to the Arctic and the intense heat and humidity of the Far East.

Miltons’s book is about the human element, the personal stories of the men who flew and fought in these aircraft and they really bring this story to life. They variously describe the Hurricane as a first rate gun platform, not as fast or as aesthetically pleasing as the Spitfire but able to withstand punishment, damage which would have brought down lesser machines. Of the three main Battle of Britain fighter aircraft, the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitt Bf109, the RAF’s Spitfire and the Hurricane, it was the latter, with its ability to turn inside the others which often enabled the Hurricane to be the superior dogfighter.
Designed by Sydney Camm the Hurricane was the first monoplane to enter service with the RAF in December 1937 and the first RAF combat aircraft to exceed 300 mph in level flight. It was something of a compromise between tradition and the demands of the new era of air warfare. Around 60% of claimed ‘kills’ during the Battle of Britain fell to the guns of Hurricane pilots but it never achieved the legendary status of the Spitfire. However the Hurricane/Spitfire combination during the Battle of Britain was ideal, the Spitfires taking on the faster Luftwaffe fighter escorts allowing the Hurricanes to attack the German bomber groups. Sydney Camm later went on to design some of the most iconic aircraft of the post war years, the Hawker Hunter and P1127, the progenitor of the Harrier, but he remained ‘miffed’ that all the credit for winning the Battle of Britain went to Reg Mitchell for his faster aircraft, the Spitfire.

Some 14,533 Hurricanes, including Sea Hurricanes, were built and at the end of the war it emerged a most versatile aircraft, having been also used as a nightfighter, ground attack, tank buster and convoy protector. Of those built, about 15 remain airworthy around the world with eight in the UK, compared to over 50 Spitfires flying worldwide. Two historically important Hurricanes, one the last from the Hawker production line and the other the last in RAF service, are maintained in airworthy condition by the RAF Battle of Britain Memorial Flight (BBMF) at Coningsby Lincolnshire.

In the summer of 1940, 2,946 young men took part in the Battle of Britain, 537 were killed and before the war ended a further 791 of ‘The Few’ had lost their lives. In 2010 there were fewer than 100 left alive, in February 2019 there were six. This book is a tribute to those ‘Few’ remaining and their colleagues who died during WWII.
The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

FIGHT TO THE FINISH: THE FIRST WORLD WAR - MONTH BY MONTH
Allan Mallinson

Review by John Peaty

A retired Brigadier, Allan Mallinson is well known as a military commentator in newspapers and as an author of military history and military historical fiction books. From the opening shots in August 1914 to the signing of the armistice in November 1918, the First World War lasted 52 months. It was fought on, or in the waters of, six continents and in all of the seven seas. And for the first time, the fighting was on land, at sea and in the air.

It was a war that became industrial - and unrestricted: poison gas, aerial bombing of cities, and the sinking by submarines, without warning, of merchant vessels and passenger ships. Casualties, military and civilian, probably exceeded 40 million. During its course, four empires collapsed - the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman.

In all its military, political, geographical, economic, scientific, technological and above all human complexity, the First World War is almost impossible to comprehend. Day-by-day narratives - excellent reference books - can be dizzying for the reader trying to make sense of the whole. Freer-flowing accounts, while helping to convey the broader trends and themes, can lose the sense of the human dimension of time. The month is a digestible gauge. We remember months, because months have names, because they are linked to the seasons, and because they have their own characters. Looking at the First World War month by month reveals its complexity while preserving the sense of time.

Based on the author’s monthly commentaries in The Times throughout the war’s four centenary years, Fight to the Finish is a new and useful single-volume portrait of “The War to End War”.

It is not a comprehensive account of the fighting nor of all the other factors in the war. It does not examine the war’s causes or consequences. It aims simply to give a picture of each month: what was the predominant action, how and why it came about, and how it looked. It is a narrative not an analysis and there are no references. While not Anglocentric, it is told in the main from a British perspective.

There could have been more maps and they could have been in colour. There are some oddities. The ‘cruiser rules’ of naval warfare are explained 3 times. July 1916 is all about the British failures and casualties on the Somme on the 1st. There is no mention of the British and French advances in the southern sector. There is no mention of the reduction in the BEF’s manpower prior to the great German offensive of March 1918. Allenby’s destruction of the Ottoman forces at Megiddo gets half a sentence. The author is ready to criticise Haig and reluctant to say anything in his favour.

Despite its limitations, the author has produced a clear, informative and digestible summary of the military aspects of the war for a British audience.
WHY WE FIGHT
Mike Martin

Review by *Major David Hoey, QDG*

War is an apparently deeply unpleasant business with few benefits. On a national level the process can bring even a victorious country to its knees; on an individual level it involves a great deal of personal discomfort and risk. So why do we as a race pursue conflict? Specific examples can be explained by one or more of Thucydides’ well-known trilogy of fear, honour and interest. But in *Why We Fight*, Mike Martin looks beyond these proximate causes for ‘a war’ to seek the underlying impulses that draw mankind as a species towards the activity of war in general.

Martin, a visiting fellow at the War Studies Department of King’s College, London, and a reservist officer with the Royal Yeomanry, approaches the question through the lens of evolutionary biology, the subject of his undergraduate study at the University of Oxford. His extensive time in Helmand, setting in motion the Cultural Advisor programme and studying the province for his PhD, led him to observe two things that have been the foundation for the theory he advances in this book. The first is the in-group/out-group nature of human interaction, so starkly exposed in a society where survival is an everyday struggle. The second is the exhilaration often felt by troops in contact, something he unapologetically describes as ‘the ultimate team sport’.

The theory posits status and belonging as the key factors in, respectively, making war and joining the fight, and Martin advances his argument in sometimes exquisite detail, working from first principles in ancient times and developing them as societies evolved to be more complex. It is status, first as individuals and second as groups, that led to greater access to the resources needed to be evolutionarily successful, i.e. to have most offspring. Those males who were more aggressive were able to achieve that status and therefore it became a human characteristic.
The more puzzling question is why men (mostly) would feel a deep yearning to take part in conflicts that might advance their leader’s status, but have very little material benefit for them. More importantly, conflicts statistically reduce their chance of reproducing. Martin believes the answer lies in the evolutionary benefits of being part of a group, with the associated easier access to safety, food and mates. We are hardwired to thrive on collective experiences and the euphoria familiar to anyone who has been in a sports crowd or religious service is triggered by a release of oxytocin, giving evidence of its biological rather than cultural origin. Thus we seek adversity to provide the most intense group experiences and to prove our value as group members. The inverse can also be seen in the outcasting of those who refuse to fight for a common cause.

Such a theory is not without its critics but the author maintains that individual examples do not disprove it. He begs us to consider the centre of the bell-curve rather than the outliers. In his lectures he has often had to deal with accusations of falsely glorifying conflict, countering that not only is he giving an honest description of his experiences, but he is also seeking to explain, not to exalt.

Martin’s third book is his most intellectual to date, often requiring detailed clarifications to enable the layman to understand the evidence behind his theory. The layman will, however, discover these denser parts are worth persevering with, while the expert will breeze through. This evolutionary explanation of the psychological urges towards conflict has the benefit of the author’s first-hand knowledge, and much that he says will chime with a soldier’s experience. It should be required reading for not just biologists, psychologists and historians, but military leaders and recruiters as well.
The United States Army adopted mission command as doctrine some forty years ago. Alongside the official manuals, there have been numerous ‘private’ collections of essays on the topic. These two new volumes themselves ask the question, ‘Why write another group of essays on Mission Command?’ (I: ix). Their answer is that the United States is at war and that it must (and can) fight better - but how?

There is no easy answer to this question. What is certain, however, is that adaptability will be essential. We need leaders who can solve complex problems [...]. We need individuals that can take the initiative and thrive in uncertainty, we need resilient organizations that shift on a dime when circumstances change. We need Mission Command. (II: xiii)

[However,] the Army does not conduct Mission Command as a normal way of doing business, [...] there are systemic obstacles to the conduct of Mission Command, and [...] the problem has become so pervasive that the Army’s culture must adapt in order to improve. This implies that change will be difficult and take some time. (I: ix-xi)

Together, the two volumes comprise thirty-two essays, by twenty-five authors, most of whom are serving or retired officers up to the rank of colonel in the US Armed Forces, some now working as specialist advisers or academics to the Armed Forces. The driving force behind both volumes was Donald Vandergriff, who has written extensively on the subject of Mission Command and has argued there is an urgent need for the US Army to reform its personnel system, currently based on a Taylorist expectation of a mid-twentieth century-style mass civilian army, if it is truly to adopt its espoused command system.  

1 Currently, Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0: Mission Command (2012).  
3 For example, Donald Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2002) and Donald Vandergriff, Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2019).
Both books are structured around the US military reporting format (I: xi): Who and What (definitions), Where and When (history), and Why (practical application). As is almost inevitably the case with anthologies prepared by multiple authors, there is some variation in the adopted tone (from the analytical to the polemical), in the approach (from the reflective to the practical), and in the intended audience (from academics through to young officers). In addition, although the many authors are united in their conviction that Mission Command, as a flexible system that grants freedom of initiative to junior commanders to work out for themselves, is the most effective means to achieve the intent of their superiors, is essential for the modern US Armed Forces, their understanding of the key factors holding back its effective adoption, and consequently their solutions for these, varies considerably. This is both the strength and the weakness of the collections.

On the whole, the two volumes are primarily directed towards an audience of young officers, up to the rank of major or perhaps lieutenant-colonel. These are officers who may find themselves bewildered by the apparent disconnect between the US Army’s espoused support for Mission Command and their experience in practice, where the personnel system rotates officers on an individual basis, thereby hindering the development of unit cohesion, and employs a system of performance appraisal that encourages officers to focus on avoiding risk and protecting their own careers.

The essays are designed to give these puzzled and dispirited officers a better understanding of the origins of Mission Command as a philosophy and how this conflicts with the principles adopted by the US Army from the end of the nineteenth century, notably set out in two essays by Vandergriff himself. They then provide a series of examples of the application of Mission Command in key operations, for example, Gerry Long’s essays on the Germans in May 1940 and on the celebrated David Hackworth in Vietnam and Tyler Fox on US airborne forces in Italy in 1943. The bulk of the material, amounting to around half the essays in each volume, is devoted to practical issues, ranging from the application of Mission Command in a garrison or in a logistics environment through to the importance of physical fitness as a basis for the cool thinking required for applying Mission Command to the development of subordinates. In addition, there is an interesting essay on Mission Command in a policing context.

Despite being primarily targeted at serving officers up to field rank, among whom the two volumes have become something of a bestseller, there is much to attract the interest of readers outside the US Armed Forces. The descriptions of the realities of life as an officer in the present-day US Army, with their myriad examples of stifling control and lack of trust on the part of commanders, are very striking to anyone outside that environment and provide real insights into the reasons behind some of the more significant operational failures experienced by that force in recent years. In addition, the most analytical essays, interestingly all written by the non-American contributors to the anthologies, provide deep insights into why Mission Command appears not to have taken firm root in the US military, and the formidable barriers that stand in the way of it ever doing so.

For students of the modern US Armed Forces, these two volumes provide an invaluable means by which to understand the importance of culture in determining behaviour, and how this can overwhelm even the most determined efforts to change practice. For readers in the British Army, while the culture and context within which they operate is of course different in many respects from that of most of the contributors to these two volumes, there is also much that will be familiar, or will translate fairly easily.

Whether these anthologies will have the desired effect, however, must be doubted. A number of the essays refer to Eitan Shamir’s outstanding study of the adoption of Mission Command in Western armies, including the British Army, which found that successful implementation relied upon strong support from commanders at the most senior levels. By targeting their work at more junior officers, Vandergriff and his co-authors may simply be reinforcing their sense of discontent, rather than securing practical change. But what can be done to secure the commitment of those at the top of the armed forces?

---

4 See, I: 10
5 See I: 49-58 and I: 101-118
6 See Long (II: 69-66), Hackworth (II: 67-86), and Fox (II: 59-66)
7 See MC in a garrison (II: 121-136), logistics (II: 200-218), physical fitness (I: 193-206), development of subordinates (II: 149-161) respectively
8 See MC in a policing context (I: 207-222)
9 See Long on training, (II: 69-86), Tommy Krabberød on Mission Command in the navy (I: 17-48), and James Fish on how Google’s staff management might be applied to an army (II: 244-250)
Sceptical Christianity: Exploring Credible Belief
Robert Reiss, Jessica Kingsley
Review by David Benest, Colonel, (Ret’d)

Her Majesty, The Queen, is both Head of the Church of England and of the Armed Forces. The Church has a strong influence within all units of the Armed Forces and as mentioned elsewhere in BAR, has been a source of great comfort and reassurance in times of peril and in peace. The Reverend Dr Robert Paul Reiss, Canon Emeritus of Westminster Abbey, has undoubtedly followed in this tradition. Yet he is acutely aware of the ‘doubting Thomases’, of whom I am certainly one. Having recently joined the ranks of Humanists UK, I feel decidedly more comfortable than when as a cadet at RMAS, I was required, on compulsion, to attend weekly CofE services. Had those been on a voluntary basis, I do wonder just how many cadets would have felt the need to attend. Robert Reiss thus asks a very simple and relevant question, ‘How can Christianity remain a credible faith in our current era of scepticism? What can be plausibly believed today?’

Chapters include themes such as: belief in God; the actual historical record of Jesus of Nazareth; the Resurrection and Ascension; Faith and Reason; Salvation; Death and Afterlife; public worship and prayer; and contemporary issues of a Christian life - Forgiveness, Interfaith engagement, Euthanasia, Homosexuality; and finally, an examination of issues of freedom of thought within the Church.

Dr Reiss is himself refreshingly sceptical of much received wisdom and is especially critical of those ordained members of the Church who seem not to know, nor care, whether their own ‘wisdom’ is based upon not much beyond prejudice. For Army Chaplains, this book really is ‘up your street’ when talking to our officers and soldiers, many of whom might be sceptical, not least in the context of acts of state violence that are legal yet ethically troublesome to many. On this I would much have liked to see another chapter, exploring the ethics of war and counter insurgency.
Dr Reiss writes lucidly and with the book just under 200 pages, his account could easily be devoured in time for the next padre’s hour. Who knows, perhaps we are gradually experiencing a ‘Second Reformation’ - the realisation by senior members of the Church of England that it must either adapt or collapse in the face of Enlightenment thinking of the Twenty-First century. Well worth reading in conjunction with Stephen Law’s *HUMANISM - A Very Short Introduction*. 
The centenary of the Great War has produced an array of books on its general history, on the senior officers involved and on the fighting soldier. Less well documented are the lives and concerns of the staff officers - without whom the war could not have been fought and won. A contemporary Great War joke ran 'If bread is the staff of life, what is the life of the staff - Answer: One long loaf'. Cornerstones remedies that gap and disproves the joke: it is the collected letters, supplemented by biographical detail, of Colonel Harold Mynors Farmar (late Lancashire Fusiliers).

The book was written initially as an act of love by Mynors Farmar’s great-granddaughter; it has developed into a tour de force. Katherine Swinfen Eady - a leading contemporary artist and married to a former officer - set out to examine her grandmother’s version of her youth. The grandmother (Mynors Farmar’s daughter), the novelist Mary Wesley, had cultivated the persona of a neglected child of an absent, distant, unloving father. ‘Absent’, Mynors Farmar may have been - there was a war on; ‘distant’ and ‘unloving’, his letters disprove. The majority of the book details - with the authoress’s commentary for context - his service in the Great War.

Throughout the war, with the exception of the opening months when he was a regimental officer in India and a few months teaching at the US Army Staff College in France, Mynors Farmar served on the staff - initially as a Brigade Major at Gallipoli and later mainly at divisional level (3 Australian Division, under General Monash then 35 Division). In his war he had to wrestle with the issues of amphibious operations, trench warfare - and then the air-land battles of the war of movement from August 1918. These were novel challenges which he, along with his peers, had to overcome, employing his imagination, experience and training. Undoubtedly Colonel Farmar’s career up until the opening of the Great War was more varied and interesting than we would now be used to - perhaps this imbued a certain flexibility of mind and ‘make-do’ attitude?
Exiting RMC Sandhurst his first posting took him to the Sudan in time to form square at Omdurman. Then on to the Boer War for service as Mounted Infantry, before returning home via police operations on Crete, and garrison duties in China and Barbados. Within the UK he served as adjutant of his battalion in southern Ireland during the halcyon Edwardian period about which one reads in Somerville & Ross books - hunting with the Black & Tans. (It is interesting that a recent official Army publication on the Great War did not even know what the Black & Tans are!).

Throughout, one is also aware of Colonel Farmar’s deep concern for social issues - he was one of the instigators of Toc H\(^1\); and when he left the Army he went into charity work (and not as an highly paid executive). This book fascinates on a number of levels: seeing the attitudes of a regular Army officer of the time; what it was like dealing with the issues of war constantly for four years; and for its insight into the wider Army of the time (and comparing with today). It is sobering to realise that to gain entry to staff college, pre-Great War students had to educate themselves to pass an exam the ‘equivalent of Honours in Modern Greats at Oxford, together with proficiency in higher mathematics and two modern languages plus all military subjects’ - not just get on well with their Second Reporting Officer!

Also to learn that, in the 1900s (and again in the 1920s and 1930s), for those who missed selection for Staff College through ill health or bad luck, the Army organised courses of instruction at the London School of Economics where modern business methods were taught as a way of solving AQ (G4) issues. My one sorrow with this book is that the authoress has been let down by her editor - who should have removed the spelling mistakes and anachronisms (practice/ practise and RMA Sandhurst).

---

1 According to the Toc H website it is an international charity and membership movement that emerged from a soldier’s club in Peperinge, Belgium during the First World War. It was set up by Reverent Phillip Bayard (Tubby) Clayton. Toc H stands for Talbot House and got its name from the radio signallers’ in lieu of its initials TH. https://www.toch-uk.org.uk/history-of-toch/
COMMAND: THE-TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY GENERAL
Professor Anthony King
Review by Colonel Alistair McCluskey

Command is the third book of Professor King’s trilogy analysing military transformation in the 21st century. Following on from The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces and The Combat Soldier, his latest work explores the subject of command via the development of Divisional headquarters over the last century. His central thesis proposes that in the face of increased operational complexity, traditional heroic models of command are now giving way to ‘command collectives’ better able to cope with the challenges of the modern world.

This book appears to somewhat polarise opinion; readers seem to either love it or loathe it. There are several written references to it from informed commentators, such as Professors Peter Mansoor and Lawrence Freedman, which comment positively on its insights into modern command. Conversely, I have heard several verbal critiques, from both academic and military personnel, which are less convinced in the validity of its conclusions. Both positions have merit, although there may be shortcomings in his core argument, particularly with the use of history, limited contextualization of the Division within a wider command architecture and a loose definition of key terms.

In broad terms, Professor King juxtaposes the execution of Divisional command by key personalities through the 20th century, against the transformations driven by their modern counterparts in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. He describes the integration of these later developments into contemporary command structures and processes of the British and US Armies through 3(UK) Division and the 82nd Airborne Division following his attachment to both formations.

It is in the contemporary observation of the sociology and personal interaction within these organizations that Professor King excels, and where this book is at its best. Analysing 6(UK) Div/CJTF-6 in 2009-10 and 1 Marine Division’s ‘March Up’ to Baghdad in 2003, he observed the efforts to integrate civil, governmental, informational and military activity to operate successfully at pace.
He highlights the role of the Commander in ‘defining the mission’ while collaborating with a wide swathe of subordinate actors to develop the eventual plan. Likewise, processes to communicate intent were developed through ROC drills and constant liaison, backed up by an understanding that commanders were to act decisively. To help manage this process and focus on the key issues, King tracks the development in both formations of an effective system of Deputy Commanders. This harnessed the senior officer experience at hand, provided deployed command presence to points the GOC could not personally reach and was pivotal to mission management.

Professor King also highlights the influence of these missions on both British and US military command capabilities in recent years. In Britain, A2020 saw the restructuring of the Divisional HQs with the creation of Future Plans, Future Ops, Current Ops and JAGIC Cells amongst the changes. Likewise, he describes the US evolution of distributed command in 82nd Airborne using digital communication technology to create a Joint Operating Center in Fort Bragg to support an ‘in-theatre’ Divisional Tactical Command Post.

Where Command is less compelling is the assertion that these developments represent a coherent chronological response to an increasingly complex operational environment. The use of historical examples has significant shortcomings, characterized by the statement of a contemporary British Officer that The First World War was ‘not a war among the people’. The soldiers fighting in the Western Desert or Dublin in 1916, or Palestine in 1917-18 might have had a different view. A further (acknowledged) problem is caused by Professor King’s use of a very small ‘control’ group of historical commanders including Monash, Rommel, Montgomery, Gavin, Ridgway, Massu, Erskine and Rupert Smith. Given that most of these were operating within armies made up of tens or hundreds of Divisions, their removal from this wider context makes representative comparisons between historic and contemporary command more difficult to sustain.

This in turn highlights the almost total absence of the military command nodes above and below the Division in Command. HQ ISAF and V(US) Corps are not referred to at all which creates an air of independence around both CJTF-6 and 1 Marine Division that is difficult to understand. This may be an accurate reflection of fact, but it needs to be explored more deeply to explain the implications for contemporary Divisional command. In the same vein, there is no discussion of how the HQs of 3(UK) and 82nd Airborne Divisions integrate with a deployed 3* HQ in a contemporary deployment. This is a critical omission for Armies preparing for future conflict in which C4I resilience is essential.

Finally, there is some confusion in the use of the terms, command, management and leadership. Although Command includes chapters to address this, the discussion is somewhat limited. Leaning chiefly on the work of Drucker and van Creveld, Professor King defines leadership as primarily related to combat motivation, and command to decision making; management is not defined at all. Professor Keith Grint’s work is better developed in this area and may provide a better framework to understand the conduct of all three tasks for a collective organization facing complex problems.

Overall however, notwithstanding the points made above, Command is a thought-provoking work. Professor King’s observation of contemporary 2* command is a valuable record of operations in the early 21st century, and for that reason alone, it is worth the read.
There’s an old military proverb that goes something like ‘never laugh at an old man in a young man’s profession’. Military skills, experience, and mindsets take a long time to grow. The cost of not developing or maintaining military skills is often death and defeat on the battlefield. Yet, armies are not always needed and tend to wilt away at times of perceived peace.

*How Armies Grow* is a historical examination of how land forces expand rapidly at times of need. The book is a collection of articles from a range of senior academic and military writers edited by Dr Matthias Strohn. Each chapter focuses on a different case study starting with the French Revolution in 1789 and ending with the Second World War in 1945. It covers a broad range of military traditions from which to draw context and to examine different models for growth. These case studies cover issues such as recruitment, equipment, training, casualties, and leadership to detail the challenges that the nations examined faced. But despite this range, *How Armies Grow* stays focussed on its purpose of articulating the challenges of expansion. It is worth reading as both a piece of history and because it contains many direct parallels to military problems today.

The core theme of the book is that growing an army is a task for the whole nation. An army cannot expand on its own. One of the recurring themes is the need for political oversight to ensure that wider industrial production, transport, education, material, etc, are in place. This requires a political plan and purpose. As such, the writers make a strong case for politicians to determine a long-term strategy for expansion when, not if, a large army is needed. This hits at the heart of the purpose of land forces. Are they expeditionary or defensive? Small and professional or large and conscript? The tensions this creates are examined through the different case studies.
To give one example, the book highlights the role of the Territorials in Britain during the interwar period. The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Henry Wilson, wanted a reserve force that offered military utility. For Wilson, the shape of the British Army needed everyday utility to justify its cost against a declining budget. However, Winston Churchill was more concerned about the reserve being a popular and political success. Such debates about the purpose of the reserve forces will feel very familiar to modern British readers.

Another key theme is the importance of military education. *How Armies Grow* argues that it is critical to maintain a high level of doctrine, staff training, and experience if an army is to expand successfully at a time of need. The interwar period German Army, restricted by the Treaty of Versailles, is used as a case study of an Army able to operate ‘one up’ to quickly incorporate new recruits. Leaders were trained to do it without formal military academies. Yet, the really successful armies in the case studies were heavily reliant on defined education programmes. Be it, the formal establishment of staff and war colleges or more informal training, *How Armies Grow* finds that maintaining a breadth of experience was a core part of any army expansion.

*How Armies Grow* is an important contribution to the literature focussed on a core question for land forces, namely, how to generate mass. As western policy makers increasingly look for ways to make defence cheaper, this book offers historical insights into ways in which land forces can expand when needed. As such, it should be read widely by those involved in making strategy and military policy. The lessons of history cited are valuable to those who might have to implement them in the future.
THE NAZI HUNTERS: THE ULTRA-SECRET SAS UNIT AND THE QUEST FOR HITLER’S WAR CRIMINALS

Damien Lewis

Review by Ian Palmer

This book has commendable intentions. It concerns itself with the activities of the SAS involved in Op LOYTON in the Vosges region of France in August to October 1944 and their aftermath. Although it purports to tell the tale of the efforts by members of the SAS to track down those SS responsible for the murders of 31 SAS soldiers and 140 French civilians, readers have to wait until halfway through the book to get to this, the first half having been taken up with a depiction of the operation itself. This was an operation that was compromised early and relied heavily on support of the local population to keep going. A particular relationship developed with the village of Moussey, which continues to this day. It introduces the key players, on all sides, and memorialises them within its covers.

I was looking forward to reading this book as I had been an RMO to this unit. It is an easy and quick read. However, the prose style seemed inappropriate to my (military) taste and rather spoilt my enjoyment of the book, which at its core is a tragic tale of total war and its consequences to civilians and soldiers alike. The style of writing currently de rigueur, in which the voices of the individual players I heard felt a little bit like a dialogue heard through the craft of a ventriloquist.

The target audience would appear to be the lay readership, armchair warriors and the itinerant populations of airport lounges. The purple prose was redolent of the war comics of my youth. It felt like the sort of book that Barbara Cartland would have written had she chosen to write a war story. Throughout, I could not escape the thought that it is a book ‘looking for a film’. Had I read the author’s acknowledgement, I may have been less disappointed … we are told that ‘… early in the manuscript stage an extremely gifted schoolboy had “read and commented with aplomb on this book”’ - I wonder if he ended up doing a bit more!