Sandhurst and the First World War: the Royal Military College 1902-1918

by

Dr Anthony Morton

Central Library
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
2014
The Author

Dr Anthony Morton is Curator of the Sandhurst Collection. From 1997 to 2004 Anthony worked as the Archivist for the Royal Logistic Corps Museum at Deepcut, during which time he published a number of articles in the Corps journal and co-authored the millennium publication *Our Heritage: the History and Collections of the Royal Logistic Corps and its Predecessors* (2000). From 2004 to 2009 he worked as the Archivist and Deputy Curator of the Sandhurst Collection at the RMAS and since 2009 has held the post of Curator. Anthony has published frequently in the Academy journal and was a contributor to the publication *Sandhurst-A Tradition of Leadership* in 2005.
INTRODUCTION

This year sees the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War (known at the time as the Great War) in 1914. The war drew in all the world’s economic powers, which were assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies (based on the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France and Russia) and the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Later Italy, Japan and the United States joined the Allies, and Turkey and Bulgaria joined the Central Powers.

The war, that saw the eventual victory of the Allies in November 1918, resulted in the deaths of more than 9 million combatants and involved many new military technological advances such as the machine gun, aircraft and tanks for which, during the early part of the conflict at least, effective tactics had yet to be devised. Nevertheless, some elements of contemporary military technology such as the widespread use of barbed wire and other field fortifications and the machine gun and magazine rifle had already been used by and/or against the British Army in the Boer War of 1899-1902, and as a result of its experiences in this war the Army itself underwent a series of large-scale reforms between 1902 and 1914 which in turn impacted quite heavily on the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.

This paper therefore endeavours to firstly summarise the ways in which the Royal Military College changed between the Boer War and the outbreak of the First World War, and secondly to provide an overview of the part played by the College and the challenges it faced in helping to provide the huge numbers of trained officers required by the British Army as the First World War progressed, from the opening shots at Mons in 1914
to the final victorious battles of 1918 in which the British Army played the leading role.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the role of Sandhurst was to train gentlemen cadets, as they were known at the time, for a regular commission in the Army which in August 1914 was tiny compared to its European counterparts and contained only 12,738 regular officers. The majority of the 247,061 officers commissioned during the First World War\textsuperscript{1} held a temporary commission and therefore, not being regular officers, did not commission from Sandhurst. To put the matter in perspective, 5,131 gentlemen cadets commissioned from the College during the war\textsuperscript{2} and circa 2700 officers holding a temporary commission received additional training there. Out of the 41,846 British officers killed in the First World War\textsuperscript{3} 3,274 were former gentlemen cadets.

**BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

**THE AKERS-DOUGLAS REPORT**

In the decade before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the Royal Military College at Sandhurst had undergone a number of changes. The Boer War of 1899-1902, although resulting eventually in a British victory, began badly with a number of shocking defeats that appeared to reveal shortcomings in the officer corps, leading to the publication of a report by the Government Committee on the Education and Training of Officers of the Army in 1902 (also known as the Akers-Douglas Committee\textsuperscript{4}). According to the report gentlemen cadets at Sandhurst spent too much time indoors and were subject to too little supervision. There was
also little incentive for cadets to excel at work and a lack of esprit de corps. The amount of drill was considered excessive and the subjects studied unbalanced and too compartmentalised. Only sixty hours of the year-long course were devoted to Tactics and less than half that time was spent outside. Neither musketry nor pistol shooting were part of military training and cadets had to pay to join a club should they wish to practise such skills in their own time.\textsuperscript{5}

As a result of the Committee’s recommendations, by 1907 the syllabus at the RMC had been revised as follows:

- Instruction in Tactics had been greatly expanded and included use of the magazine rifle and quick-firing artillery was taught, as well as co-operation between the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery Arms and night operations.

- Language instruction had been increased (it had been reduced by two-thirds during the Boer War) and now included not only German and French, but also Hindustani (as a voluntary subject) for Indian Army cadets.

- Signalling became a compulsory subject.

- Unit administration and sanitation (hygiene) were added to the curriculum.

- The teaching of military engineering and topography now included a larger component of practical work.
• Cadets were taught the Trained Soldier’s Musketry Course.

• Annual month-long camps were held in the summer on Salisbury Plain to give cadets more practical experience of field training and manoeuvres.

In 1910 the problem of a lack of incentive for cadets to excel at their studies and develop an esprit de corps was remedied by the institution of an inter-company competition consisting of military and athletic exercises. The cadet company that scored the highest marks became known as the ‘Champion Company at Arms’ and had the honour of becoming the right flank company of the cadet battalion in the following term.

In September 1912 the one-year training course was replaced with an eighteen-month long course to allow for the month of instruction lost to the annual camp on Salisbury plain. Ironically this would be the last year that such a camp would be held there and from 1913 field manoeuvres were instead carried out on the College’s own training area on Barossa Common lasting from one to three days.

THE FIELD EXERCISE OF JUNE 1913

The last battalion level exercise before the outbreak of war in 1914 was that carried out on 26 June 1913. The manoeuvres consisted of a night attack by the Cadet Battalion against a dug-in enemy protected by barbed wire. The Battalion had been divided into three smaller ‘battalions’. The attack was preceded by scouts and wire cutters with the enemy being attacked at two points along his line. The main attack of two ‘battalions’ was concentrated on Flagstaff Hill. The whole operation was co-ordinated
by field telephones, which proved useful when broken ground slowed the main attack resulting in the left flank ‘battalion’ advancing faster than the two ‘battalions’ on the right flank (the main assault). Use of field telephones meant that the left flank attack could be halted while the main attack recovered its formation and was ready to continue a co-ordinated advance.  

The diagram that accompanied the report published in the college magazine (see above) shows the ‘battalions’ advancing in three waves with each of the four sections in each ‘company’ deployed in file. Since the Boer War infantry tactics had changed from volley firing and close order frontal attacks to advancing in extended order, flank and converging attacks and fire and movement (ie advancing in short rushes and making best use of available cover before closing decisively with the enemy). The Infantry Training Manual of 1911 codified the lessons learned from the conflict of 1899-1902 and specified that generally an infantry attack should be preceded by scouts and be made in successive lines with each line consisting of a number of small, shallow columns on a narrow front, with
not less than 50 yards between each column. Such formations were less vulnerable to direct artillery and long range infantry fire and were easier to control, particularly over broken ground.\(^9\) The field exercise carried out by the Cadet Battalion in 1913 shows that the field training given to the gentlemen cadets closely followed the 1911 Infantry Training Manual and was therefore as up-to-date as it could be at the time, incorporating the lessons learned by the Army over the previous decade.

THE HALDANE REFORMS

Modernising and improving the cadet training course was not the only major change to come about at Sandhurst as a result of the lessons learned from the Boer War. In response to the lessons learned from that war Viscount Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, instituted a series of far-ranging reforms of the British Army from 1906 to 1912 that directly affected the Royal Military College. Previously the Army could only provide three Regular Divisions and one Cavalry Division for service overseas. The old Militia could not serve overseas and the Yeomanry and Volunteers who could go overseas had no field artillery, engineers, transport or medical services. Haldane’s reforms, not without causing some controversy amongst militia officers,\(^10\) created a new Territorial Force organised in divisions with all ancillary services. The Army Reserve was considerably increased and the Militia became a Special Reserve available to maintain an Expeditionary Force overseas. The Regular Army now had six Divisions (with a seventh available in six weeks) and a larger Cavalry Division (five brigades instead of three).\(^11\)

The training of the Reserves and the creation and training of the Territorial Divisions needed large numbers of additional regular officers, a
need that could only be met by the expansion of the Royal Military College. The subsequent doubling of the cadet establishment to 700 cadets plus an increase in staff numbers required the building of accommodation blocks and extra classrooms. The new buildings, which required the construction of a light railway from Blackwater station to transport the three million or more bricks needed, were begun in November 1908 and completed in 1912, becoming known as New College. A new hospital, specially designed and equipped, was built on the hill behind them. Construction also began on a larger, more modern gymnasium, but this was not ready for use until early in 1915. The original College building became known as Old College and had a new cadet dining room built to help accommodate the increase in cadet numbers. By August 1914 there were ten companies of gentlemen cadets at Sandhurst, designated A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K (a specialist company for cavalry cadets) and L,\(^{12}\) together with fifty-five military and nine civilian staff.\(^{13}\)

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

THE GENTLEMEN CADETS

In June 1914, as tensions rose in Europe throughout the summer and war seemed ever more likely, the Royal Military College instituted a rifle and revolver competition to improve cadets’ shooting skills. At the end of the month Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist.\(^{14}\) On 28 July, thirteen days after Sir Charles Douglas, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had taken the half-yearly inspection at Sandhurst that marked the end of the summer term, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia. Two days later
the Russian Army mobilised in support of Serbia. On 1 August Germany declared war on Russia in support of Austria and two days later declared war on France. On 4 August after German troops marched into Belgium ignoring her neutral status, Great Britain declared war on Germany in support of her treaty with Belgium. Britain’s Armed Forces were ordered by Parliament to mobilise on the same day. The First World War had begun.

Mobilisation orders arrived on 4 August and had a dramatic and immediate effect on Sandhurst. For the duration of the war the entry age for admission to the Royal Military College was changed from between 16 and 19 to between 16 and a half and 25 and fees were abolished. The senior cadets were commissioned immediately forgoing their final phase of training. Those remaining who had completed six months training were put on a refresher course in Tactics for four weeks and then commissioned. Eight to ten cadets were requested to be sent as observers with the Royal Flying Corps accompanying the British Army to Belgium (A number of RMC gentlemen cadets would become officers in the Royal Flying Corps during the war).15

The newly arrived juniors went straight on to the newly-established emergency short course of three months’ purely military training that had replaced the former eighteen-month course. This greatly reduced Course of Instruction was established for the purpose of commissioning as many officers as possible in the shortest possible time to meet the shortage of officers in the British Expeditionary Force at the outbreak of war. Later the unexpectedly large numbers of casualties sustained by the British Expeditionary Force at the Battles of Mons, the Marne and Ypres in late 1914, together with the obvious need to expand the army made this
shortage even more acute and led to the War Office ordering the College to increase its cadet establishment from 700 to 960 in November of that year. This figure also included 180 temporary commissioned officers (see below) who, when they left Sandhurst in December 1916, were replaced by two newly raised gentlemen cadet companies, M and O, in order to keep to the enlarged establishment of 960.

The rapid and unplanned-for expansion of the cadet establishment at Sandhurst led to a number of practical problems. It took some months for British Industry to get onto a war footing and in the early months of the war the expenditure of ammunition during offensives was far higher than had been anticipated. Until the national economy was fully geared for war, shells and other munitions became in short supply. The huge increase in the number of cadets being trained at the Royal Military College led to a shortage of the expensive .303 ammunition required for the Lee Enfield rifles used for cadet training. The Lee Enfield magazine rifle was the standard British infantry weapon of the day, and the needs of the Army in the field were too great for the War Office to agree to an increase in supplies of .303 ammunition to the College. As a result in April 1915 the College had instead to order extra .22 rimfire ‘miniature rifles’ (smaller, lighter, cheaper and less effective than the Lee Enfield) together with ammunition to go with them. This of course meant that cadets would be training with a weapon they would not actually use in battle, although some elements of musketry drill such as firing positions would be similar for both types of weapon. Musketry instruction with the new rifles required the construction of two new miniature rifle ranges at the College.
A similar situation occurred with the supply of machine guns. The College held four Maxim guns at the outbreak of war that were considered obsolescent compared to the modern Vickers guns in use by the army in France and elsewhere. When on 19 March 1915 the Assistant Commandant instructed the College quartermaster to obtain ten Vickers guns (one for each cadet company) so that the cadets could train with the type of machine gun actually used by the British Army on the front line, he clearly had doubts that the College’s requirements could or would be met. His instruction contained a perhaps more realistic alternative if this proved to be the case: six more obsolete Maxims and one Vickers gun.

As the war continued and the demand for officers remained unabated concerns began to be raised about the health and physique of some of the gentlemen cadets that were now being accepted into Sandhurst from the diminishing pool of available manpower. Two medical reports by the College Surgeon that have survived from mid-1916 suggest that about five per cent of the cadets were below acceptable physical standards. It was believed that the majority of the cadets in this category would improve with good food (which of course implies that they were malnourished prior to their admittance to Sandhurst), but a minority were deemed either unlikely or unable to improve their physique enough to be commissioned.

There were other health concerns too. One consequence of the fact that the Royal Military College was more crowded than any time in its history was the increased danger of epidemics. In the days before mass vaccination, such a large number of people concentrated in one area increased the risk of contagious diseases such as mumps. In 1917 there was a severe outbreak of the mumps virus from 9 March to 3 April resulting in the loss of twenty-four days of work and the holding back of the senior
Gentlemen Cadets’ exams until July as the College had to close. During this time Old and New Colleges and the Staff College were disinfected and repainted.\textsuperscript{21} To deal with such problems a new isolation hospital was built on Windsor Ride, the site for the new hospital being cleared by a detachment of the Canadian Forestry Corps.\textsuperscript{22} In 1918 during the worldwide influenza epidemic the College managed to escape the worst effects of the virus by imposing strict controls on the movements of cadets.\textsuperscript{23}

THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION

The emergency short course of three months that ran for the first twelve months of the war was necessarily intense and the cadet’s ‘working day’ began at 6.00 am and ended at 11.00 pm.\textsuperscript{24} This new Course of Instruction excluded all language teaching and formal sports activities. Instead the syllabus, only one-sixth the length of its pre-war format, concentrated on the future officers’ most important requirements such as instruction on tactics, including elements of infantry and cavalry training, ammunition supply and outpost duty, all extracted from the 1911 Infantry Training manual; the tactics employed by the German army as well as those of Britain’s allies; field engineering based on the 1911 Manual of Field Engineering; map reading which also included ensuring cadets were made familiar with the theatre of war; musketry; sanitation; drill and physical training; riding and horse management.

Also included in the Course of Instruction was greatly abridged instruction on military administration, military law and ‘military history’. The latter subject had previously covered Wellington’s Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns but was now something of a misnomer as it concentrated solely on the causes of the current war and its progress.\textsuperscript{25} The
course as a whole was supported by a programme of lectures that continued throughout the war and included topics as diverse as ‘The Geography of the Theatre of War’, ‘The Recent Progress of Trench warfare’, ‘The Battle of the Marne’, ‘On Sniping’ and ‘Bayonet Fighting’, amongst others.\textsuperscript{26}

Although reducing the course from eighteen to three months made it easier to meet the urgent demand for officers on the front line it was obviously impossible to provide anything like the level and quality of training comparable to the pre-war course. The absence of modern language instruction, for example, meant that officers were joining their regiments with no knowledge of French or German, important skills needed respectively for co-operation with Britain’s French and Belgian allies and interrogating German prisoners of war. The dropping of instruction in English Composition should not be overlooked either as its retention would have helped improve officers’ written and oral communication skills in their mother tongue. Even core military subjects were drastically reduced. The practical element of the Emergency Musketry Course Syllabus, for example, consisted of just twelve hours instruction.\textsuperscript{27} It must have been clear that three months was too short to provide adequate training for young men with no previous military experience and by the end of 1915 the College had extended the Course of Instruction where possible to six months,\textsuperscript{28} increasing to eight months in October 1916,\textsuperscript{29} ten months throughout 1917, and twelve months at the beginning of 1918.\textsuperscript{30}

In practice, however, the length of any one course was in reality tied to the constantly changing war situation and the often sudden and urgent need to find more and more officers, not only for the Western Front with its
appalling casualties, but for the growing number of overseas theatres of war such as the Gallipoli campaign, the campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia and the Italian and Salonika Fronts. In fact, throughout the war infantry officers suffered a disproportionately high numbers of casualties among platoon, company and battalion commanders, all of whom usually led attacks from the front. In fact such officers were five times as more likely to die than other soldiers. Even later in the war the Course of Instruction could occasionally be abruptly shortened as happened during the massive German offensives of March-July 1918 known collectively as the ‘Kaiserschlacht’ (Emperor’s Battle), when the heavy losses among the British officer corps led to the course being temporarily reduced to a mere two months in order to provide the desperately needed replacements as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, generally as time went on the pressure on Sandhurst began to slowly decrease, particularly from April 1916 when the College no longer had to train temporary commissioned officers. No longer having to run an entirely separate course for the latter meant that the Course of Instruction for gentlemen cadets could be gradually expanded to include more academic content including French and German language instruction and English Composition for Junior cadets (reintroduced in October 1916), together with prizes reintroduced for excellence in these languages and all the main military subjects. Formal sporting activities were reintroduced from late 1915 as was the Champion Company Competition. More importantly there was now room on the syllabus for more comprehensive instruction on existing military subjects such as Field Engineering and Musketry (which now included theoretical and practical instruction on the Lewis light machine gun), although it appears that part
of the extra time gained in the expanded course was a result of dropping Signalling instruction\textsuperscript{36}.

Obviously the military subjects studied by gentlemen cadets were taught in the main from the appropriate British Army training manuals. But there is evidence that where circumstances permitted cadets at Sandhurst were also given instruction on German responses to the tactical dilemmas faced by the opposing armies on the Western Front. On 16 October 1915 the War office sent the Royal Military College and other appropriate establishments a translation of a captured confidential German report dated 18 June 1915, on the lessons learned by infantry, pioneers and artillery from the fighting on the Western Front. These lessons included deploying detachments of bomb-throwers (ie soldiers equipped with grenades) in special shelters ready to recapture lost positions as soon as possible, and sealing off both ends of trenches in which enemy troops are still fighting preparatory to the launching of flank attacks from both ends of the trench\textsuperscript{37}.

A year later a copy of a new manual of detailed regulations relating to the disposition and deployment of machine guns in trench warfare dated 19 June 1916 was captured from the Germans about a month after its publication and by 28 July had been translated and made available for use by the Royal Military College. This particular document very usefully detailed not only how an infantry regiment was to deploy and use its machine guns in defensive positions but also how the Germans expected their opponents to attack such positions.\textsuperscript{38} The way in which these examples of contemporary, up to date and detailed German tactical doctrine were integrated relatively quickly into the Course of Instruction must have given a sense of heightened immediacy and relevance to the military instruction of the cadets. It certainly suggests a flexible approach
to training that could respond efficiently and in a timely manner to developments on the battlefield.

One new and very pertinent military topic that was able to be added to the Course of Instruction when it was extended to ten months in 1917 was gas warfare. The first use of chlorine gas as a weapon had been used by the German Army against British, Canadian and French troops at the Second Battle of Ypres on 22 April 1915, and various forms of gas continued to be used by all sides as the war progressed. Twice in 1916 officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps had given one-off lectures on gas warfare at Sandhurst.\(^\text{39}\) In April 1917 systematic instruction on the effects of “battle gas” as it was called was added to the course, consisting of a series of lectures and practical training with helmets, small box respirators and various kinds of gas. The instruction was described with conviction as enabling the Junior Officer to “\textit{come with confidence through the frequent gas attacks he will meet overseas}”\(^\text{40}\).

In February 1918 the Course of Instruction was extended to twelve months consisting of three terms\(^\text{41}\) until the winter term of that year when finally the pre-war eighteen month course was reintroduced to Sandhurst.\(^\text{42}\) The extra time created during the gradual extension of the course meant that not only were large-scale field manoeuvres able to be included but also even more intellectual content. A course of lectures by Mr T Seccombe MA, Professor of English at the College on ‘\textit{The Growth and Problems of the British Empire}’ was introduced for Intermediate and Senior cadets. The course was supported, naturally, by the College Library and the list of books the Library acquired for use with the lectures provides some insight into how the Royal Military College was preparing its young officers-to-be for the post-war world. Titles such as ‘\textit{The Empire and the Future},'
‘Growth of British policy’, ‘Administrative Problems of British India’, and ‘Studies in Colonial Nationalism’ amongst others imply a desire on the part of the College to give its cadets not simply a narrowly focused military education, important though that undoubtedly was, but also a broader, politically aware education to fit them potentially for future leadership of the Empire.\textsuperscript{43}

On a lighter but still relevant note, the Library acquired a number of books recounting daring escapes from German prisoner of war camps that can be assumed to have been particularly popular with cadets.\textsuperscript{44} Inspired by the plight of their countrymen both the Library and the gentlemen cadets of F Company provided some support to British prisoners of war languishing in German camps by collecting magazines and books to be sent on to the camps via the appropriate authorities.\textsuperscript{45}

FIELD MANOEUVRES

An important benefit of being able to extend the Course of Instruction later in the war was that it became possible to organise large-scale field manoeuvres involving the entire RMC Cadet Battalion, something the Akers-Douglas Committee in 1902 had urged the RMC to make a priority as part of its instruction on Tactics.

The value of Battalion level exercises involving the tactical use of platoons and companies in preparing the cadets for real life operations at any level above that of a trench raid would of course have been obvious but there had only been time for small scale exercises during the three-month emergency short course of the first year of the war. These short but frequent exercises (they occurred three nights a week) appear to have been
quite basic and consisted of one cadet company defending a trench against another cadet company with the former using flares and fake bombs against the attackers, in other words a trench raid. These exercises would have taken place on Barossa Common where practice trenches from the First World War still survive.

On 14 March 1916, for the first time since the outbreak of war, the gentlemen cadets of the Royal Military College took part in large-scale battalion level manoeuvres on Bagshot Heath. The RMC Cadet Battalion together with the Officer Training Corps of Winchester and Charterhouse were designated the ‘Southland’ Army, while the Officer Training Corps of Eton, Harrow, Wellington and Bradfield and a troop of Cavalry Cadets from the RMC took the part of the enemy ‘Northland’ Army. The conclusions drawn from the exercise were that scouting and use of the terrain were poor, there was a lack of co-operation between units, cavalry found rough terrain difficult, attacks needed to have been made in greater depth and holding the high ground was vital. Considering the realities of the fighting on the Western Front these were valuable lessons to learn.

These manoeuvres were followed in 1917 by a three-day field exercise on 23 April involving only the RMC Cadet Battalion, with the Junior and Senior cadets playing the part of the British Army and the Intermediate cadets playing the part of the German Army. The background to the scenario was that the Royal Navy had somehow been temporarily incapacitated, allowing the German Army to land an invasion force in England. The ‘British’ had to defend their positions between Yateley Grange, Hill Farm and Hornley Farm against a ‘German’ attack preceded with aggressive patrols to capture prisoners and the use of snipers and then launch a counterattack on the second day. A touch of realism (or
(...cynicism?) added to this phase of the exercise was the notion that the supporting artillery barrage intended to cover the counterattack was deemed to have failed just prior to the attack going in, leaving the attacking troops exposed. The final day involved the ‘British’ pursuing the defeated ‘Germans’ while the latter fought a rearguard action. The exercise was deemed to be a success, particularly in the way the ‘British’ counterattack was carried out across difficult ground (in fact hindered by a desire to avoid damaging farmers’ crops) on the second day.50

Later in the year the RMC Cadet Battalion practised a dawn attack on the Barossa training area on 15 December. The attack was preceded by a ‘barrage’ provided by the RMC Band who set off explosions and smoke bombs in an attempt to replicate a real artillery barrage.51 In fact, the main objective of the exercise was precisely that - to give the cadets some idea of what it would look and sound like to mount an attack with artillery support. The exercise was clearly successful as an observer remarked, ‘Nothing short of the real thing could so effectively convey a vivid idea of what a barrage really is.’52

Unfortunately none of the published reports of the preceding field exercises provide the level of detail found in the report of the June 1913 exercise so it is not clear what formations were used by each side as they mounted attacks against defended positions, although there is no reason to believe that the tactics taught to and used by the cadets were dissimilar to those currently in use by the British Army in the field. It is certainly clear from the reports in question that many of the aspects of war on the Western Front such as trench raids to capture prisoners; piquets and aggressive outpost patrols; attacking over broken terrain; and co-operation with
artillery were being taught to the gentlemen cadets of Sandhurst during
these manoeuvres.

THE OFFICERS’ COURSES

In November 1914 the Royal Military College was given
responsibility for, alongside its own gentlemen cadets who by definition
were training for regular commissions in the Army, training hundreds of
officers who had received a temporary commission for the duration of the
war only. The scheme was the idea of Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State
for War, who was one of very few people to foresee a long and costly war
that would require a much larger force to fight and win it than the small
standing army that went to France in August 1914.

To begin with, Kitchener’s ‘New Armies’, as they were called, were
to be led by temporary officers granted direct commissions because they
had been to a recognised public school and were university graduates
(many had some prior military training in Officer Training Corps).
However, as demand grew for officers to replace the huge losses especially
among junior officers, whose life expectancy on the Western front during
certain periods of the war was a mere six weeks, it was common later in
the war to promote officers from the ranks who were known as ‘temporary
gentlemen’. Having received a temporary commission from the War
Office, the officers who would lead Kitchener’s ‘New Armies’ were sent to
Sandhurst for a month of intensive training.

As there was no room in the College buildings for the officers, they
were quartered in the Staff College, which had closed down at the
beginning of the war. On 27 November three companies were formed at
the Staff College, M, O, (not to be confused with the M and O cadet companies formed later in the war) and P each consisting of sixty temporary officers, and three instructors transferred from the RMC. These monthly courses of instruction (fifteen in total) ran from January 1915 to 15 April 1916 and consisted of instruction in tactics, military engineering, military law, military organisation, and hygiene, with physical training and signalling classes in the summer. In addition, each course included one lecture on the Royal Flying Corps (naturally given by an RFC officer) and a visit to Farnborough aerodrome. In a similar fashion to the ‘military history’ instruction given to the gentlemen cadets, the temporary commissioned officers were given a series of lectures, also by T Seccombe, on the “Origins and Issues of the Great War”.

It is significant that despite the Officers’ Course being only a third of the length of the already drastically reduced Course of Instruction followed by the gentlemen cadets, adding an intellectual element of the course not directly related to infantry officer skills was still thought to be necessary. The syllabus for these lectures shows a fascinating mix of balanced political analysis, such as the topics covering the traditional fears and insecurities of the major Powers (including Britain) and the political and ethnic tensions in the Balkans that led to the outbreak of war, together with an obvious and wholly understandable desire to give the temporary officers (who unlike the gentlemen cadets were not career officers following the military profession for its own sake) an intellectual and moral justification for fighting. This is certainly suggested by topics such as ‘Germans’ conviction of racial superiority…..’ and ‘Germany’s ……..hope of World Dominion’.
Some of these topics of course may well have been included in T Seccombe’s lectures on the causes of the war given as part of the ‘Military History’ element of the Course of Instruction followed by the gentlemen cadets. The spirit of these lectures can certainly be seen in the publication of excerpts from German General Baron Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven’s ‘Deductions from the World War’ in the February 1918 issue of the college journal under the title ‘Maxims of Militarism’. With such pearls of wisdom as “The limits of what is permissible are...in many ways elastic” (under the heading of ‘FRIGHTFULNESS’), “It is in the great democratic Republics that we find the worst form of moral servitude” (under the heading of ‘DEMOCRACY’), and “The idea of a universal league for the preservation of peace remains a Utopia, and would be felt as an intolerable tutelage by any great and proud-spirited nation” (under the heading of ‘SCRAPS OF PAPER AND LEAGUES OF NATIONS’), it would not have been difficult to use the Baron’s bracing maxims as examples of German militarism and absolutism that had to be resisted by the Western liberal democracies.)

Ultimately, just as the three-month emergency short course was deemed inadequate for the needs of gentlemen cadets with their lack of any prior military training, the one-month course for temporary officers also proved to be too short despite the fact that many of them had acquired some elementary military skills from their university Officer Training Corps. The Sandhurst-based courses came to a close and the three companies disbanded on 15 April 1916. In their place Officer Cadet Training Battalions were raised across the country. From then on candidates for a temporary commission would have to undergo a four and half month course in one of these units prior to being offered a temporary commission. One such unit, the 200-strong No 11 Officer Cadet Training
Battalion, briefly occupied the Staff College from 8 May to December 1916 before being sent to its permanent location at Pirbright. The Staff College building was then occupied by the gentlemen cadets of the newly-raised M and O Companies RMC until their disbandment at the end of the 1918 summer term.

As stated elsewhere, the Staff College was closed for most of the war as its buildings were needed to provide accommodation, first for the temporary officer courses, then for 11 Officer Cadet Training Battalion and finally for M and O Companies RMC. This meant of course that no higher level staff training for commissioned officers was available until the Staff College re-opened in September 1918. However, Q Company was formed on 30 June 1915 to pursue a seven week course of study similar to that offered by the Staff College before the war. The Company was based at the Royal Military College and consisted of young subalterns, many of whom were undergraduates, on probation for commissions in the Special Reserve. Q Company was disbanded when the course finished in mid-August 1915. The course appears to be the only one of its type to have been run at Sandhurst during the war.

THE RMC STAFF

After mobilisation the officers on the military staff of the College were, over a period of time, posted elsewhere to meet the shortage of experienced, trained officers in the field army. Out of the forty-four Company Commanders and Company Officers on the establishment in August 1914 over a quarter had been posted from Sandhurst by the end of the year. By December 1916 all the original officers on the permanent staff had gone to other appointments. The Commandant, Brigadier-General L
A M Stopford, was himself posted to France in November 1914 to take command of a Division, but would return in August 1916 to take up his former post of Commandant of the Royal Military College once more.  

Before his departure Brigadier-General Stopford had voluntarily offered to reduce the number of officers on the establishment by thirteen at the outbreak of war in order to help the general shortage of officers in the army. This meant that each of the ten cadet companies (increased to twelve companies in 1916) now had only three officers to train them instead of four or five; in practice the number of officers available was even less as six of those remaining were soon to be allocated to the one-month temporary officers course. Indeed Brigadier-General Stopford’s generous offer may well have been regretted in November 1914 when his successor, Brigadier-General S P Rolt, was faced with the increase of the cadet establishment from 700 to 960. By February 1915 the ratio of instructors to cadets was more than twice the pre-war ratio of 1:35.

The frequently urgent despatch of peacetime permanent military staff to the various theatres of war overseas and their replacement by a number of short-term successors was not limited to company officers and other instructors or the higher command of the Royal Military College. The College Surgeon for example, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, was sent to Salonika in early 1916 to take command of 42 General Hospital and his successor Major O’Brien only remained in post until November the same year. By the end of the war there had been an average of one College Surgeon per year of the conflict.

Likewise the College Chaplain, Reverend H W Blackburne, whose preaching was so popular with the gentlemen cadets that it merited a
mention in the college magazine, left for the Western Front soon after mobilisation in August 1914. He had served as a cavalryman in the Queen’s Own West Kent Yeomanry during the Boer War before being ordained in 1902. During the First World War he would win a Military Cross and be Mentioned in Despatches. His successor, the Reverend P C T Crick likewise joined the British Expeditionary Force in France, in February 1915. Reverend Crick’s successor remained in post for no more than six months followed by the Reverend E S Woods who remained in post throughout the rest of the war.\(^66\)

The pressure on the reduced numbers of staff at Sandhurst was severe particularly when the three-month emergency short course was being run during the first year of the war. The demand for the College to produce officers for the Army was so great that each iteration of the cadets’ and temporary officers’ Courses of Instruction was run back to back with no breaks for the staff between the end of one course and the beginning of the next. This meant of course that during this period there was no possibility of applying for any leave.

By March 1915 the Commandant felt compelled to write to the Director of Training for permission to have an Easter recess of one week from 31 March to 6 April on the grounds that the staff needed some respite and the College buildings needed to be cleaned and disinfected, something for which there had been no opportunity to do since mobilisation.\(^67\) His request was granted.\(^68\) Later in August that year a two-week recess was granted by which time the gentlemen cadets’ Course of Instruction had been extended on average to six months.\(^69\) At the end of that year a Christmas recess was in place.\(^70\) When much later the Course of Instruction
was extended in 1918 to twelve months with three terms this necessarily included three periods of recess similar to the pre-war situation.

Another challenge faced by the military staff at Sandhurst was related to the circumstances in which they were posted to the College. From the early battles of late 1914 onwards the large numbers of casualties sustained by the British Army on the Western Front resulted in a huge demand for able-bodied officers and men from wherever they could be found. For Sandhurst this meant that as the pre-war military instructors were posted to the frontline they were replaced by soldiers who had been wounded in battle badly enough to be taken out of the line and then given time to recover.

As soon as such an individual was deemed to be ready for active service again he was posted back to his unit and replaced by another injured officer or soldier. One consequence of this was that it was difficult to maintain consistency in the delivery of the gentlemen cadets’ and temporary officers’ Courses of Instruction run at the College in the first two years of the war. An instructor might be posted back to his unit part way through teaching a particular subject, to be replaced by a colleague recovering from an injury who had to try his best to get up to speed immediately with the subject he had just been given responsibility for teaching.\textsuperscript{71}

Sometimes, however, the period of recovery required was substantial with the result that an instructor remained at the College for quite some time. Captain W H C Brownlow, for example, was wounded in 1915 and later posted to Sandhurst as an instructor in August 1916. He was not passed as fit for service overseas until 15 May 1918.\textsuperscript{72} Just two weeks after
he was sent to France he was killed in action on 28 May during the Third Battle of the Aisne. It was not always as a result of being physically wounded in battle that an officer was sent to Sandhurst as an instructor to recover. Lieutenant Colonel A P H Trueman was admitted to hospital in early February 1916 suffering from shell shock. He was posted to Sandhurst later in the year and remained there until February 1917. Sadly he later died of the worldwide flu epidemic in November 1918 while in command of 1 Officer Cadet Training Battalion based in Devon.

Sometimes not even soldiers unfit for service overseas could be spared for the College. For example, in February 1916 the Commandant wrote to 1 Reserve Cavalry Brigade based at Aldershot requesting cavalymen that were unfit for active service to be sent to the College to help replace members of the RMC Riding Troop who had been posted overseas. The Riding Troop’s primary role was to provide specialist training for K Company, whose cadets were training for a commission in a cavalry regiment. 1 Reserve Cavalry Brigade, whose function was to train drafts for frontline cavalry regiments refused the Commandant’s request, pointing out that the War Office had forbidden such training to be interfered with in any way. Although not all such requests to other units were rebuffed, shortages of trained cavalry instructors and specialists such as shoeing smiths ultimately made it too difficult provide the RMC Riding Troop with the skilled manpower needed to fully perform its function and in March 1916 K Company was converted to an infantry company. From then on cavalry cadets underwent the same short non-specialist riding course as infantry cadets.
It was not just the military instructors who were adversely affected by the pressures of the war. One consequence of the early wartime courses including very little academic content was that the civilian instructional staff became more or less redundant. Only one civilian instructor, T Seccombe, the Professor of English was retained, to provide the series of lectures on current affairs for the gentlemen cadets’ Course of Instruction and the Officers’ Courses as mentioned earlier. Based in the Library he also kept the College war diary up to date. By 12 September 1914 three instructors in French, Monsieurs E Ruf, A F Damiens, and A Noblet had managed to find alternative employment by serving with the French Army. Later, in April 1915 with the support of the Commandant Brigadier-General Rolt, Etienne Ruf—now a Captain in the French Army—would apply for a translator’s position at the British Army’s Headquarters in France, at the same time acting as an intermediary between the French Minister of War, the Royal Military College and the War Office in the French Army’s quest for English interpreters. As the emergency short course for gentlemen cadets was expanded modern language instruction would be gradually re-introduced onto the Syllabus.

SANDHURST AND THE INDIAN ARMY

Ever since the closure of the East India Company Military Seminary at Addiscombe House in 1861 the Royal Military College had trained officers for the Infantry and Cavalry Arms of the Indian Army. During the First World War Indian troops fought the Germans in Africa and were also used in the Middle East against the Turks. In addition, an Indian Corps of two infantry divisions (15,700 strong) was sent to France and the Indian Army also provided 5000 men for the landings at Gallipoli in 1915. The need for officers to replace the growing number of casualties being
sustained by the Indian Army in these campaigns meant that there was yet more pressure on Sandhurst to increase the number of cadets it accepted for regular commissions. Apart from the pressure of the sheer numbers involved, the three month emergency short course run at Sandhurst was not long enough for most Indian Army cadets to learn Hindustani to an acceptable level - a crucial requirement for any British officer serving in the Indian Army.

In response to the situation the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta in Northern India that had been closed down at the outbreak of war in 1914 was re-opened in May 1915 as the Quetta Cadet College. The course was six months long and, unlike at the Royal Military College, Hindustani was made a compulsory subject. After the first Sandhurst entrance examination that gave Quetta Cadet College as a choice for cadets seeking a commission in the Indian Army, 141 successful candidates were selected. The experiment was deemed a success and a second cadet college was opened at Wellington in Southern India in June 1915 to cope with the increasing numbers of cadets being commissioned into the Indian Army. It should be noted that some cadets seeking an Indian Army commission still chose to study at Sandhurst and commissioned from there into the Indian Army.83

ROYAL VISITS

One factor that was seen as beneficial to the morale both of cadets and staff at Sandhurst during the war was the frequency of royal visits. Even before the outbreak of war King George V had shown more interest in the Royal Military College than his predecessors and had on 10 May 1913 presented the College with new Colours, as well as inspecting the
newly-opened New College and the additions made to the Old College resulting from the pre-war expansion occasioned by the Haldane Reforms. During the war King George V and Queen Mary visited the Royal Military College a number of times. In mid-1916 the Royal Couple visited Sandhurst twice within three days. On the second visit, on 2 July, the King became the first monarch to attend a service in Christchurch, the College Chapel. Each visit by the King and Queen included inspecting the Cadet Battalion on parade and sometimes watching the cadets engaged in practical outdoor training. In an age much more deferential than our own and where without the immediacy of modern media few people had the chance to see the Royal Family, however briefly, ‘in the flesh’, the morale effect of such frequent visits to Sandhurst should not be underestimated.

Perhaps the most important and lasting consequence of royal interest in Sandhurst, however, was when at Buckingham Palace on 7 November 1918 the King showed his appreciation of Sandhurst’s contribution to the war by presenting the ‘King George V Banner’ to the Royal Military College (represented by 108 gentlemen cadets), to be carried on parade by the Champion Company, as the winner of the inter-company competition was known. The competition was undoubtedly enhanced by royal recognition of its value in ‘promoting efficiency and esprit de corps’, with the result that it became an important element of Sandhurst tradition and remains so to this day. Four days after the King had bestowed this singular honour on the College, on 11 November 1918 at 1100 hrs, the Armistice was announced and all hostilities ceased. When the news reached Sandhurst the gentlemen cadets tugged the historic ‘Waterloo Cannon’ on display in front of Old College into Camberley, dropped their rifles into the lake and embarked upon a series of riotous celebrations in the town centre. The war was over.
IN MEMORIAM

Between the outbreak of war and 19 December 1918, a month after the signing of the Armistice, 5,131 gentlemen cadets had been commissioned from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The Roll of Honour up to 30 June 1919, two days before the Treaty of Versailles was signed officially ending the war, contained the names of 3,274 former gentlemen cadets and over forty former RMC Staff who had died for their country. Thirty-seven former gentlemen cadets were awarded the Victoria Cross, Britain’s highest gallantry award. In 1918 it was decided to make Christchurch into a national memorial to those former cadets and staff who had given their lives in the Great War. Both regimental and individual memorials were incorporated into the new design with the names of the fallen to be grouped by regiment and inscribed on white marble panels. The money for the rebuilding of the College Chapel had to be raised by subscription as there was no government funding available.

Work began in 1919 and included increasing the seating capacity of Christ Church - a need recognised before the war - for the expanded cadet establishment. During much of the building work the Chapel could not of course be used for services and so the ‘old chapel’ (then in use as ‘Lecture Hall no. 3’) in Old College was temporarily brought back into use. The latter’s lack of seating capacity meant that Sunday services for the Cadet Battalion had to held at St Michael’s Parish Church, Camberley. Ultimately not enough money was raised to build a great central tower as per the original plans, but the rest of the project was finally completed and included building a new east and west end and considerably increasing the size of the nave. The new Chapel was consecrated by the Archbishop of
Canterbury on 2 July 1937 in the presence of HM King George VI and his family. It was renamed the Royal Memorial Chapel.\textsuperscript{93}

In 1922, five years after the death of British sculptress Lady Feodora Gleichen, her sister Lady Helena Gleichen presented a replica of her 37\textsuperscript{th} (British) Infantry Division memorial to Sandhurst. Lady Feodora Gleichen, brother of the first commander of the Division, General Lord Edward Gleichen, had sculpted the original in 1921 and installed it at Monchy-le-Preux in France, site of the 37\textsuperscript{th} Division’s most bloody battle during the war. The replica was installed opposite the main entrance to the Royal Memorial Chapel and unveiled on 18 June 1927 by the Prince of Wales, who described it as an ever-present reminder to all who enter the College of the undying bond of loyalty and service that exists between the British soldier and his officers.\textsuperscript{94}
Notes
1 Sheffield, pp. 29-30.

2 'Inspection by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, July 15th', *RMC Record* Summer 1919, p. 7.

3 Officers Died in the Great War, HMSO 1919. The actual total is slightly less than this as some officers were duplicated in the list.

4 After its chairman the Right Honourable A Akers-Douglas MP. The relevant papers are held at the National Archives ref. CSC 3/319.

5 Newly-commissioned officers had to be sent to the School of Musketry at Hythe in Kent to gain the necessary skills.

6 The sudden expansion of the College to meet the urgent requirement for more officers as a result of the Haldane Reforms resulted in a degree of chaos (e.g. the cadet establishment had to be raised more or less immediately before the rebuilding of the College had been completed. This meant that the newly-raised G Company had to be accommodated in tents until Old College had been refurbished and extended), and together with the need for more staff to cope with the increased numbers of cadets the logistics of organising the month-long annual camp on Salisbury Plain was too problematic.

7 'Night Attack of June 26th', *RMC Record* July 1913 pp. 28-29.

8 Griffith, pp. 48ff.

9 Infantry Training Manual 1911, p. 111.

10 Bowman & Connelly, p. 119-121.

11 Shepperd, p. 105.

12 Thomas, p. 166; Shepperd, pp. 111-113; Pugsley & Holdsworth, pp. 38-40.

13 'Summer Term 1914', *RMC Record* July 1914, pp. 80-89.

14 On 28 June.

15 See AIR 1/122/15/40/116 “Selection of officers from Sandhurst as pilots and observers with the R.F.C. Expeditionary Force. 1914 Oct.28-1917 May 23. Papers held at the National Archives.

16 Request to GOC Aldershot 13 April 1914, ref. CAYMA:90.9231.

17 Compare the RMC Miniature Rifle Course Standards (CAYMA:90.9299.3) with those of the RMC General Musketry Course (CAYMA:90.9299.4).

18 See WORK 43/1069 "Miniature rifle range: plan, elevations at target and at firing end, section AB, etc 1915 April". Papers held at the National Archives.

19 CAYMA:90.9211.

20 Medical reports dated 31 August 1916 (CAYMA:90.9635.1) and 27 September 1916 (CAYMA:90.9635.4).


22 This Corps had been created on 14 November 1916 to harvest timber to meet to the demand for huge quantities of wood on the Western Front, to use for duckboards, shoring timbers and crates and many other
items needed in the trenches.

23 ‘Editorial Notes’, *RMC Record* April 1919, p. 7.

24 Shepperd, p. 126.

25 See Appendix 1.

26 See Appendix 2.

27 RMC Syllabus of Emergency Musketry Course, CAYMA:90.9299.2.

28 ‘RMC Chronicle’, *RMC Record* April 1917, p. 7.

29 ‘The Staff College during the War’, *RMC Record* April 1917, p. 56.

30 Shepperd, p. 123.

31 Clayton, p. 169.


33 ‘RMC Chronicle’, *RMC Record* April 1917, p. 12.

34 See previous footnote.

35 Compare the Syllabus of Musketry Instruction from 1915, CAYMA:90.9299.1 with the original Syllabus of Emergency Musketry Course, CAYMA:90.9299.2.

36 ‘RMC Chronicle’, *RMC Record* April 1917, p. 13.


38 CAYMA:90.9613.

39 “Poisonous Gases” by Captain Cathgart on 21 March and “The Employment of Gas” by Captain Lovatt-Evans on 16 October. See Appendix 2.

40 ‘Gas Lectures, 1917’, *RMC Record* February 1918, p. 106.

41 Shepperd, p. 123.

42 ‘Inspection by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, July 15th’, *RMC Record* Summer 1919, p. 7.

43 See Appendix 6.

44 ‘Library Notes’, *RMC Record* February 1918, pp. 109, 114.

45 ‘Library Notes’, *RMC Record* February 1918, p. 108.

46 *The Wish Stream* Spring 1966, p. 22.

47 It seems that the Common was the only suitable site that could be found for building practice trenches as a letter from the Assistant Commandant to GOC Aldershot makes clear (See CAYMA:90.9630).

48 *The Wish Stream* 2008b, pp. 59-60.
Such ‘special effects’ could be very convincing. When the RMC Band detonated similar charges in order to simulate an artillery barrage and aircraft bombing runs during the Tank Field Day at Sandhurst in 1919, the realism of the display caused many civilian onlookers to panic, believing that the artillery barrage and bombing raids were genuine. See *The Wish Stream* 2012, p. 122.
72 Captain Brownlow eventually felt obliged to apply for a wound pension given the length of time he had been deemed unfit for service. See correspondence CAYMA:90.9620.1-4; 90.9624.1-2.

73 See his army service records held at the National Archives ref. WO 339/7372.


75 CAYMA:90.9588.2

76 CAYMA:90.9588.3. It should be noted that cavalry were not at this time seen as redundant in modern warfare. British and German cavalry had fought each other in the opening months of the war in 1914, and later in 1917 at the Battle of Cambrai and in 1918 at the Battle of Amiens British cavalry would play an important role, as they also did in the campaigns fought against the Turks in the Middle East.

77 See rejection of Commandant’s request for a replacement farrier by the Army Veterinary Corps 20 February 1915, CAYMA:90.9165.5.6.

78 Shepperd, p. 124.

79 See correspondence on unemployed civilian staff between the RMC and the War Office, CAYMA:90.8983.1-2.


81 See correspondence CAYMA:90.9229.1-2. Captain Ruf died later during the war and is mentioned on the RMC Staff Roll of Honour in the Royal Memorial Chapel at Sandhurst.

82 See T 1/11746 War Office. Staff changes in the modern language departments of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. 1915. Papers held at the National Archives.

83 Heathcote, pp. 200-204.

84 ‘Presentation of Colours by His Majesty King George V’, RMC Record July 1913, pp. 13-16.

85 ‘Chapel Notes’, RMC Record April 1917, pp. 72-73.

86 ‘Presentation of The “King George V Banner” by HM The King at Buckingham Palace’, RMC Record April 1919, pp. 9-11.

87 Thomas, p. 180.

88 ‘Inspection by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, July 15th’, RMC Record Summer 1919, p.7.

89 See Appendix 4.

90 ‘Presentation of The “King George V Banner” by HM The King at Buckingham Palace’, RMC Record April 1919, p. 13; ‘Memorial Chapel’, RMC Record April 1919, p. 93.

91 ‘Building the Memorial Chapel’, RMC Record Summer 1919, p. 10.

92 Shepperd, pp. 128-129.

Appendix 1

Syllabus of the Course of Instruction used during the first year of the war for the three-month emergency short course in operation for gentleman cadets training for a regular commission. Instruction in Military History, Law and Administration was considerably abridged, and attention concentrated on Tactics, Infantry Training, Drill, Musketry, and Field Service.

TACTICS AND FIELD ENGINEERING

War Establishments of :-

(a) Our units in the field.
(b) The units of our Allies.
(c) The enemy’s units.

Explanation of the enemy’s system of tactics.
“Field Service Regulations,” Part I., Chapters I., III, V., VII. and IX.
“Infantry Training,” 1911, Part IV., Part V., Section 177; and the chapters dealing with the employment in War in “Cavalry Training.”

Ammunition supply, “Infantry Training,” Section 168. The training will be mostly of a practical nature, and will follow closely on the lines laid down in Sections 171 and 172, “Infantry Training,” 1911. Special attention will be devoted to outpost duty and to the subject matter of Sections 122-127, “Infantry Training,” 1911.
The elementary principles of Field Fortification. Such practical instruction in Chapters V., VI. And X., “Manual of Field Engineering,” 1911, as time will permit.

MAP READING ETC

Map reading and problems connected therewith. Cadets will be made familiar with maps of the theatre of war.

MILITARY HISTORY

The causes which led to the war. The geography of the theatre of war and its probable influence on the conduct of the campaign. The progress of the campaign.

MUSKETRY

Care of arms. Fire a modified course, Table “A.” Judging distance

SANITATION

How to guard against disease on active service. How to prepare food. Expedients for increasing the comfort of the soldier in bivouac. First aid.

DRILL AND PHYSICAL TRAINING

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

Procedure on enlistment and terms of service. Soldier’s rations in the field. Method of issue and how carried. Soldier’s small book. Rates of soldier’s pay, and method of payment in the field. Soldier’s equipment and kit. How carried in the field. Organization of:-

(a) Our forces.
(b) The forces of our Allies.
(c) The enemy’s forces.

Duties on board ship. Entraining and detraining.

MILITARY LAW

Description of Military Law. Martial Law as affecting our troops, etc., and the inhabitants of the theatre of war. Offences on active service. Field punishment. Field General Court-Martial procedure.
Appendix 2

Visiting speakers and their lectures 1914-1918

*The Present War, its Causes and Issues* by Mr Seccombe, 21st and 28th October 1914.

*The Geography of the Theatre of the War* by Dr Vaughan Cornish, 9th November 1914

*The Recent Progress of Trench Warfare* by Captain Barwell, 20th December 1915

*The War in the East* by Captain E S Harcourt, 7th Gurkha Rifles, 21st and 22nd February 1916.

*Poisonous Gases* by Captain Cathcart, RAMC, 21st March 1916.

*The Course of the War in the Cameroons* by Captain E G Wheeler, Hampshire Regiment, 27th April 1916.

*The Siege of Liége and Beginning of the War* by Professor Hamélius, Liége University, 1st June 1916.

*The Battle of the Marne* by Mr Hilaire Belloc, 5th June 1916.

*Russia and the War* by the Bishop of Northern and Central Europe, 26th June 1916.

*Aerial Photography* by Major C D M Campbell, RFC, 19th September 1916 and again on 19th February 1917.

*The Employment of Gas* by Captain Lovatt-Evans, RAMC, 16th October 1916.

*The French Army* by the Commandant de Malysé, 18th December 1916

*Co-operation between Artillery and Infantry* by Lieutenant-Colonel the Reverend W Wingfield DSO, 5th February 1917.

*On Sniping* by Lieutenant J A D Burnett, 21st February 1917.


*A lecture in connection with the war* by General Sir H H Wilson KCB DSO, 3rd August 1917.

Lecture accompanied by a Demonstration of Methods of Training by Brigadier-General Dugan DSO, 8th September 1918.
Appendix 3

Syllabus of Lectures on the “Origins and Issues of the Great War” given by Mr Seccombe as part of the month-long courses held at the Staff College between January 1915 to May 1916 for temporary-commissioned officers of the New Armies and Auxiliary Forces.

Causation of the War:

1. Traditional Fears - Slav Pressure (Germany); Eclipse by Teutondom (France); Loss of Insularity (Britain)

2. Germans’ conviction of racial superiority and phenomenal success in 1866 and 1870.


4. Germany’s Main Objective (Drang Nach Osten) and hope of World Dominion.

5. Economic and Expansionist “Necessities”.

The Need for avoiding Fallacious Theories of Causation (the Causation of Wars a much Neglected Study) - The Question of Insurance and of Settlement or Reparation at Close of War-Abdication of Legitimate Influence by Officer unable to conclude clearly and correctly on the European Evidence-Possibility of a National Army of Electors developing a mind of its own…. Secondary Causes of War in Slackness, Inefficiency and Neglect of Responsibility-Dangerous Aversion of National Mind in Britain from (1) European Realities, (2) Army and Navy Problems - The Need of a Wider Basis in Knowledge of Modern Europe for National Diplomacy - Protean Identity of War Aims - Obscure Causation - Unchanging Persistence of War.

Key to the situation best discernible by following the course of Austria: vital dates 1740, 1774, 1793, 1815, 1848, 1866-67, 1878, 1882, 1903, 1908. Probable exhaustion by Austria of her role as
Warden of the Eastern Marches.

How this Empire of East and West, Diverse Races, Languages, Nations and Interests is held together - The Dynasty and the Army; the fatal gift of Bosnia, 1878-1908 - Vienna fatally caught in the chariot wheels of Berlin and the Pan-German Ideal (Aehrenthal, Antwerp, Berlin, Stamboul, Bagdad)-Bohemia, the sentinel of Slavdom against the menace of Mittel-Europa.

Balkanic Complications (The Macédoine of Europe, Magna Serbia, Magna Rumania, Bulgar Aspirations, Treaty of Bucharest) and Moroccan Aggravations - Our Position in Egypt - The Suez Canal - Mesopotamia - “The Key of India.”

Neutral, Eastern, and Colonial Problems - Italian Unity-Problems since 1870 - Italia Irredenta; Legacy of the Makers of Italy; Gradual Realisation of Mistake made in joining Triple Alliance-Complications of Italian Unity and Italian Politics - Neutralists and Interventionists - From Triple to Quadruple Alliance - Adriatic Problems - Neutral Attitude of Scandinavia, Holland, America and Rumania.

Belgium. - Neutral Belgium a Primary English Interest since before 1300 - Belgium the “Counterscarp” of Britain” - Historic Expedients, Burleigh, Temple, Marlborough, Waterloo-What We Owe to Belgium - Recompense to Belgium the First Charge on the Allies.

Elements of the Russian Problem. - Our Colossal Ignorance-Distinctions of East and West-Aristocracy and Democracy - Pan-Slavism - The Polish Question - New Ideals in Russia - Russia the Friend, no longer the Bogey, of Britain - The Russian Quest for an Open Port.


Modern Germany under the Hegemony of Prussia -Treitschke and Bernhardi - Germany’s Colonial Empire - The Nemesis of Docility.

The Course of Conflict and Diplomacy since 1908, from which date War on a Grand Scale became well-nigh inevitable.


The Conception of Nationality Postulates Reciprocity-Why a Drawn War would be a victory for Germany as complete as was the Seven Years’ War for Prussia-Submerged Nationalities and other Problems of the Future Europe-Europe says Nay to a German Caesar.

Source: ‘Courses at the Staff College’, RMC Record April 1917 pp 56-58.

Appendix 4
List of former gentlemen cadets (GC) from the RMC awarded the Victoria Cross during the First World War

1914

Lieutenant M J Dease 4th Royal Fusiliers, France (GC 1909-1910)*
Major C A L Yate 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, France (GC 1891-1892)*
Lieutenant J A O Brooke 2nd Gordon Highlanders, France (GC 1903-1905, Sword of Honour) *
Lieutenant W L Brodie, 2nd Highland Light Infantry, France (GC 1902-1904)*
Captain J F P Butler King’s Royal Rifle Corps, Cameroons (GC 1906-1907)*
Lieutenant W A McC Bruce 59th Scinde Rifles, France (GC 1909-1910)

1915

Captain E Jotham 51st Sikhs, NW Frontier (GC 1902-1903)*
Captain C C Foss DSO 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment, France (GC 1903-1904)*
Major G G M Wheeler 7th Hariana Lancers, Mesopotamia (GC 1892-1893)*
Lieutenant G R P Roupell 1st East Surrey Regiment, France (GC 1911-1912)*
Captain R R Willis Lancashire Fusiliers, Gallipoli (GC 1895-1897)*
Lieutenant-Colonel C H M Doughty-Wylie CB CMG Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Gallipoli (GC 1888-1889)*
Lieutenant J G Smyth 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, France (GC 1911-1912, Cadet Corporal)*
Captain P H Hansen Royal 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, Gallipoli (GC 1907-1909)*
Captain A F G Kilby 2nd South Stafford Regiment, France (GC 1903-1905)*
Captain A M Read 1st Northampton Regiment, France (GC 1902-1903)*
Major A F Douglas-Hamilton 6th (The Queen’s Own) Cameron Highlanders, France (GC 1883-1884)*
Captain E D Bellew 7 Canadian Infantry, France (GC 1900-1901)

1916

Brevet Major W La T Congreve DSO MC Rifle Brigade, France (GC 1909-1911, Cadet Sergeant)*
Lieutenant W L Robinson Worcestershire Regiment and Royal Flying Corps, England (GC 1914)*
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J V Campbell DSO, Coldstream Guards, France (GC 1895-1896)*

1917

Major G C Wheeler 9th Gurkha Rifles, Mesopotamia (GC 1899-1900)
2nd- Lieutenant M S S Moore Hampshire Regiment, Belgium (GC 1916)
Major L P Evans DSO Royal Highlanders, Belgium (GC 1899)
Lieutenant-Colonel A D Borton DSO London Regiment, Palestine (GC 1901-1902)
Captain N B Elliott-Cooper DSO MC Royal Fusiliers, France (GC 1907-1908)
Lieutenant W N Stone Royal Fusiliers, France (GC 1914-1915)

1918

Lieutenant J R Gribble Royal Warwick Regiment, France (GC 1914-1915)
Major O C S Watson DSO County of London Yeomanry, France (GC 1895-1897)
Captain F C Roberts DSO MC Worcestershire Regiment, France (GC 1910-1911)
Captain J Forbes-Robertson DSO MC Border Regiment, France (GC 1903-1904)
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G W St G Grogan CMG DSO Worcestershire Regiment, France (GC 1895-1896)
Captain C E Hudson DSO MC Notts & Derbyshire Regiment, Italy (GC 1910-1911)
Major D Burges DSO Gloucestershire Regiment, Balkans (GC 1892-1893, Under Officer)
Brevet Major J S S P V Viscount Gort DSO MVO MC Grenadier Guards, France (GC 1904-1905)

*Citations for these officers can be found in the RMC Record April 1917 pp 15-21, extracted from the London Gazette.

Sources: RMC Record April 1917 pp 15-21 supplemented by entries in the RMC Cadet Register. See also Chandler, pp. 268-269.

Appendix 5

The Higher Command of the RMC during the First World War

Commandants

Brigadier-General L A M Stopford 15 January 1911-24 November 1914*
Brigadier-General S P Rolt CB 24 November 1914-25 August 1916
Major-General L A M Stopford KCVO CB 25 August 1916-20 July 1919

Assistant Commandants

Lieutenant-Colonel A F Sillem 20 March 1914-1 March 1915
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel H C Warre DSO 1 March 1915-11 September 1915
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel F W Radcliffe CIE 11 September 1916-20 November 1917
Colonel A T Paley CMG DSO 20 November 1917**-December 1918

Adjutants to the Battalion

Captain Hon J F Hepburn-Stuart-Forbes-Trefusis 22 Jan 1914-10 Sept 1914
Major N A Baillie-Hamilton 10 Sept 1914-23 Oct 1915
Captain F W L Bissett 23 Oct 1915-5 June 1916
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple-Hamilton MVO 5 June 1916-1 Aug 1919

*According to RMC 1917 p.6. The RMC Staff Register shows an over-written date of 17 November 1914.
** According to RMC 1917 p.6. The RMC Staff Register gives the date as 18 October 1917

NB All officers are shown with the rank they held upon leaving their post at the Royal Military College.

Sources: RMC Record April 1917 pp 15-21 supplemented by entries in the RMC Staff Register.
Appendix 6

Books added to the RMC Library in support of the course of lectures to Intermediates and Seniors during 1918 on “The Growth and Problems of the British Empire”:

- Historical Geography of the British Colonies: Lucas
- Expansion of the British Empire: Woodward
- The Commonwealth of Nations: Egerton
- Short History of British Colonial Policy: Egerton
- The Empire and the Future: Seeley
- Growth of British Policy: Ramsay Muir
- Making of British India: Woodward
- Foundation and Growth of British Empire: Williamson
- History and Description of British Empire in Africa: Johnston
- History of Australasian Colonies: Jenks
- Black and White in South-East Africa: Evans
- Administrative Problems of British India: Chailley
- Modern Egypt: Lord Cromer
- The Partition of Africa: Scott Keltie
- Foundation of British East Africa: Gregory
- Race Question in Canada: Siegfried
- The Asiatic Danger in the Colonies: Neame
- Studies in Colonial Nationalism: Jebb
- Black Jamaica: Livingstone
- Federations and Unions in the British Empire: Egerton
- English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century

Source: RMC Record February 1918 p 114.

Appendix 7

Maxims of Militarism

I. THE MORAL OF THE WAR. - “Our business is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war as they lived in the German Army up to the year 1914, to soak them in the experiences of the present war, and to make the fullest technical use of these experiences.” (p. 102.)

II. CONSCRIPTION. - “Universal military service hold sway over our age, and for generations will not vanish.” (p. 34.) “In Germany it must be more exacting. We shall have to continue to pursue this road in future, quite apart from the necessary increase of garrison artillery and technical troops.” (p. 169.)

III. MILITARISM. - “The spirit of German militarism, which has enabled us to stand the test of the world-war, and which we must preserve in the future, because with it our world-position stands or falls.” (p. 146.)

IV. SEA-POWER. - “Germany must for all time to come maintain her claim to sea-power.” (p. 10.) “World-power is inconceivable without striving for expression of power in the world, and consequently for sea-power.” (p. 171.)

V. FRIGHTFULNESS. - “The limits of what is permissible are...in many ways elastic. A new weapon opens up its own paths, as is shown, for example, by the submarine war.” (p. 57.)
VI. THE NEXT WAR. - “In future we must disregard every objection, and must see to it that the disproportion between the credits which are asked for and what is to be done in case of war shall in any case never again be so great as it was in the world-war.” (p. 168.)

VII. DEMOCRACY. - “It is in the great democratic Republics that we find the worst form of moral servitude.” (p. 25.) “The masses, as such, can never rule.” (p. 148.)

VIII. ABSOLUTISM. - “Only under the absolute command of a war-lord can an army achieve a really vigorous development.” (p. 148.)

IX. WAR AND PEACE. - “A lasting peace is guaranteed only by strong armaments.” (p. 171.) “War has its basis in human nature, and as long as human nature remains unaltered, war will continue to exist, as it has existed already for thousands of years.” (p. 172.) “We find it impossible to believe in the realization of genuine pacifist ideals.” (p. 176.)

X. “SCRAPS OF PAPER” AND LEAGUES OF NATIONS. - “We misconstrue reality if we imagine that it is possible to rid the world of war by means of mutual agreements.” (p. 174.) “The idea of a universal league for the preservation of peace remains a Utopia, and would be felt as an intolerable tutelage by any great and proud-spirited nation.” (p. 174.) “The world-war should disencumber us once and for all of any vague cosmopolitan sentimentality.” (p. 175.)

XI. AMERICA. - “America’s behaviour in the war has shown that pacifism, as represented in America, is only business pacifism, and so at the bottom nothing else than crass materialism.” (p. 175.)

XII. THE MAILED FIST. - “In the future, as in the past, the German people will have to seek firm cohesion in its glorious army and in its be-laureled young fleet.” (p. 176.)

[From General Baron von Freytag’s “Deductions from the World-War.” (Constable 1918.)]

Source: RMC Record February 1918 p. 116.

Appendix 8

Roll of Honour of the Officers on the Staff of the Royal Military College


Lieutenant Colonel Alfred McNair Dykes MiD, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment). Officer Commanding H Company RMC 29 January-1 August 1913. Killed in action on 26 August 1914 during the Battle of Le Cateau.

Captain Reginald Walter Morton Stevens MiD, The Royal Irish Regiment. Instructor with a Company of Gentlemen Cadets* at the RMC 26 January 1908-21 January 1910. Died on 28 August 1914 of wounds received during the Battle of Le Cateau.


Lieutenant Colonel Henry Charles Pilleau DSO MiD, The Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment). Instructor with A Company RMC 17 September 1902-31 January 1906. Died on 21 September 1914 of wounds received during the Battle of the Aisne.


Lieutenant Colonel Henry Charles Pilleau DSO MiD, The Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment). Instructor with A Company RMC 17 September 1902-31 January 1906. Died on 21 September 1914 of wounds received during the Battle of the Aisne.

Captain Charles Frederick De Bohun Boone MiD, The Essex Regiment. Instructor with C then E Company RMC 16 January 1909-15 January 1913. Died on 23 September 1914 of wounds received during the Battle of Marne.


Captain Charles John Chard Barrett, The Royal Scots Fusiliers. Instructor in Military law and Military Administration with B Company RMC 1 February 1911-September 1914; Officer Commanding L Company RMC September-October 1914. Killed in action at Hooge on 13 November 1914 during the First Battle of Ypres.

Captain George Arthur Murray Docker, The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment). Instructor with a Company of Gentlemen Cadets* at the RMC 16 April 1907-31 August 1911. Killed in action on 17 November 1914 during the First Battle of Ypres.


Major Lyall Brandreth MiD, The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment). Instructor with a Company of Gentlemen Cadets* at the RMC 9 November 1903-26 January 1908. Killed in action on 6 June 1915 at Gallipoli.


Major George Denis Macpherson, The Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment); late of the Royal Munster Fusiliers. Instructor in Military Engineering at the RMC 23 March 1901-17 September 1902. Killed in action on 26 September 1915 during the Battle of Loos.


Lieutenant Colonel Francis Wyatt Abbot-Anderson, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment). Instructor with a Company of Gentlemen Cadets* at the RMC 28 June 1907-22 February 1908. Died on 1 January 1916 while serving on the Staff in Egypt.


Major Edward Lycett Lyon, 18th (Queen Mary’s Own) Hussars. Posted to the RMC on 12 September 1913; Instructor with K Company RMC 8 August 1914-11 April 1915. Died on 17
September 1916 of wounds during the Battle of the Somme.

**Brevet Major Frederick Gill Powell MC**, The Dorsetshire Regiment. Officer Commanding E Company RMC 26 February 1916-14 April 1917. Died of natural causes on board a train near Dorchester on 14 April 1917.


**Captain Etienne Ruf**, French Army. Professor in French at the RMC 17 September 1903-4 August 1914.

**Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Julius Le Fleming MiD**, The East Surrey Regiment. Instructor with A Company RMC 22 January 1914-11 October 1914 and 4 August 1915-19 October 1915; Officer Commanding A Company RMC 19 October 1915-20 August 1917. Killed in action on 21 March 1918 near Vermand during the German offensive ‘Operation Michael’.

**Captain Jacob Andrew Norman Hessler**, The Durham Light Infantry. Instructor with a Company of Gentlemen Cadets* at the RMC 3 January 1918-May 1918. Killed in action on 27 May 1918 at Chaudardes during the Third Battle of the Aisne.

**Captain Wilfrid Herbert Cecil Brownlow**, The Northumberland Fusiliers. Instructor with B and then H Company RMC 5 August 1916-15 May 1918. Killed in action on 28 May 1918 during the Third Battle of the Aisne.


**Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Philip Hamilton Trueman OBE**, The Buffs (East Kent Regiment). Instructor with H Company RMC 5 February 1913-1 September 1915; Instructor at the RMC 1916-26 February 1917. Died of influenza and pneumonia in Mansfield on 26 November 1918.


**Colonel Sir Charles Cuyler Baronet CBE**, The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. Instructor in Fortification at the RMC 25 August 1897-1 April 1903. Died on 1 October 1919 in
Oxfordshire.

*Identity of cadet company unkown.

Sources: The RMC Staff Register, RMC Record, London Gazette, Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Army Lists, Officers Died in the Great War 1914-19, and various regimental histories.

Bibliography

Unpublished Material

*War Office: Royal Military College Sandhurst: Correspondence and Letter Books; Reference WO 152.*

These records are held in the Sandhurst Collection and have been catalogued using the prefix CAYMA (‘Camberley Military Academy’) as provided by the Museum Documentation Association (known as the Collections Trust since April 2008). Originally classified as public records and held by the Sandhurst Collection (an Approved place of deposit) on behalf of the Public Records Office/National Archives, these records were gifted to the Sandhurst Collection on 13 December 2004 (Instrument 201) and therefore are now the property of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Published Material

Journals:

*The Royal Military College Record July 1913*
*The Royal Military College Record July 1914*
*The Royal Military College Record April 1917*
*The Royal Military College Record February 1918*
*The Royal Military College Record Summer April 1919*
*The Royal Military College Record Summer 1919*

*The Royal Military College Magazine & Record Michaelmas 1927*

*The Royal Military College Magazine Autumn 1937*

*The Wish Stream 1966*
*The Wish Stream 2008b*
*The Wish Stream 2012*

Books and Articles:


*Infantry Training 1911*, HMSO 1911.


*Officers Died in the Great War 1914-19*, HMSO 1919 (reprint by the Naval and Military Press Ltd 2002).


